Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Ninth Chamber)
2 July 2026 (*)
( References for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 93/13/EEC – Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Effects of a term being found to be unfair – Contract found to be null and void – Action for restitution brought by the seller or supplier – Limitation period for the seller or supplier’s action – Point from which time runs – Principle of equivalence – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of legal certainty – Principle of proportionality – Right to effective legal protection – Unjust enrichment )
In Joined Cases C‑261/25 [Ścierbek] i and C‑262/25 [Drózdzik], (i)
TWO REQUESTS for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland), made by decisions of 7 and 3 April 2025, respectively, received at the Court on 7 April 2025, in the proceedings
Bank BPH S.A.
v
AS,
NS (C‑261/25),
and
Raiffeisen Bank International AG
v
MZ (C‑262/25),
THE COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed of M. Condinanzi, President of the Chamber, R. Frendo (Rapporteur) and A. Kornezov, Judges,
Advocate General: R. Norkus,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the written procedure,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
– Bank BPH S.A., by A. Cudna-Wagner, radca prawny, and B. Miąskiewicz, adwokat,
– Raiffeisen Bank International AG, by M. Bakuła, radca prawny, and Ł. Hejmej, adwokat,
– AS and NS, by M. Korpalski, radca prawny,
– MZ, by W. Budzewski and M. Chęcińska, adwokaci,
– the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna and D. Lutostańska, acting as Agents,
– the European Commission, by M. Brauhoff and P. Kienapfel, acting as Agents,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,
gives the following
Judgment
1 These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29), Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the principles of effectiveness, equivalence and legal certainty, and the right of access to a court or tribunal.
2 The requests have been made in proceedings between banks and consumers, namely, in Case C‑261/25, between Bank BPH S.A., on the one hand, and AS and NS, on the other, and, in Case C‑262/25, between Raiffeisen Bank International AG (‘Raiffeisen Bank’) and MZ, concerning the restitution of undue payments made by those banks to those consumers under loan agreements that have become null and void as a result of unfair terms contained therein.
Legal context
European Union law
3 Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 provides:
‘Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.’
4 Article 7(1) of that directive provides:
‘Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.’
Polish law
The Civil Code
5 Under Article 118 of the ustawa – Kodeks cywilny (Law establishing the Civil Code) of 23 April 1964 (Dz. U. of 1964, No 16, item 93), in its version applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings (‘the Civil Code’):
‘Unless a specific provision provides otherwise, the limitation period shall be six years, and for claims concerning periodic payments, as well as claims related to the pursuit of a business activity, it shall be three years. However, the end of the limitation period shall be the last day of the calendar year unless the limitation period is shorter than two years.’
6 Article 405 of the Civil Code provides:
‘Any person who, without legal basis, obtains an economic advantage at the expense of another person shall be required to restore that advantage in kind and, where that is not possible, to return the value thereof.’
7 Article 410(1) and (2) of that code provides:
‘1. The provisions of the preceding articles shall apply in particular to undue performance.
2. A performance shall be undue if the person who rendered it was not under any obligation to do so or was not under an obligation to render it to the person to whom it was rendered, or if the basis for the performance has ceased to exist or if the objective of the performance has not been achieved or if the legal act requiring that performance was invalid and has not become valid since the performance was rendered.’
The Code of Civil Procedure
8 Article 203(4) of the ustawa Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Law establishing the Code of Civil Procedure) of 17 November 1964 (Dz. U. of 1964, No 43, item 296), in its version applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings (‘the Code of Civil Procedure’), provides:
‘A court or tribunal may declare the discontinuance, abandonment or limitation of a claim inadmissible only if the circumstances of the case show that such acts are contrary to the law or the rules of social conduct, or that they are intended to circumvent the law.’
The disputes in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
Case C‑261/25
9 On 12 May 2008, AS and NS concluded with GE Money Bank S.A., the predecessor of Bank BPH, a mortgage loan agreement for a duration of 360 months determined in Swiss francs (CHF), under which they received a sum of 460 000 zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 109 000).
10 On 27 August 2019, AS and NS sent a complaint letter to Bank BPH in which they claimed that certain terms of that agreement were unfair. In that regard they stated that the wording of those terms was identical to the wording of terms entered in the register of unlawful terms held by the Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów (President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection, Poland) (‘the register of unlawful terms’).
11 On 16 September 2019 they brought an action against Bank BPH before the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland) seeking a declaration that the agreement is null and void and the return of the sums paid in performance thereof, with default interest, claims which were granted by judgment of 30 October 2023.
12 On 1 December 2022 Bank BPH, in turn, brought an action against AS and NS before the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw), which is the referring court, requesting that, as a result of that agreement being null and void, AS and NS be ordered to repay the sum of PLN 460 000 (approximately EUR 109 000), with default interest, as reimbursement of the loan capital made available to them.
13 In response to that action by Bank BPH, AS and NS contended that the claim relied on by the bank was time-barred. They submitted that the three-year limitation period under Article 118 of the Civil Code was to be calculated from 21 May 2008, the date on which they had received the loan capital under the agreement concluded with that bank or, alternatively, from 16 April 2014, the date on which the terms whose wording is identical to the terms contained in that agreement were entered in the register of unlawful terms.
14 The referring court states that the fact that the agreement concluded by AS and NS with Bank BPH has become null and void has the effect that each party must return to the other party any performance rendered under that agreement in accordance with Article 405 of the Civil Code, read in conjunction with Article 410(1) of that code.
15 According to that court, there is no doubt regarding the existence of the claim invoked by Bank BPH, which corresponds to the total of the loan capital, with statutory default interest from the notice of default.
16 However, that court observes that it must reject Bank BPH’s applications if the bank’s claim is found to be time-barred.
17 The referring court emphasises that determining the starting point for the limitation period applicable to sellers and suppliers’ claims is therefore decisive in order to decide the case in the main proceedings.
18 In that regard, that court takes the view that it follows from the judgment of 14 December 2023, Getin Noble Bank (Limitation period for actions for restitution) (C‑28/22, EU:C:2023:992, paragraphs 69 to 75) that Directive 93/13 precludes that the limitation period for sellers or suppliers’ claims for restitution of undue payments made in performance of a contract that has become null and void begins to run from the date on which the judgment finding that contract to be null and void becomes final. That court understands from this that, in order to be consistent with that directive, it is necessary to use an earlier date.
19 To that end, the referring court proposes three options, namely, first of all, the date on which the seller or supplier made the loan capital available to the consumer; next, the date on which the terms corresponding to the terms which render the agreement concluded between the consumer and the seller or supplier null and void were entered in the register of unlawful terms; or, last, the date on which the consumer challenged for the first time before the seller or supplier the binding nature of one or more terms contained in that agreement.
20 In the first place, as concerns the date on which the loan capital was made available, the referring court explains that Polish case-law on claims for restitution of undue payments made in performance of contracts that have become null and void does support the view that the limitation period for actions for the recovery of sums unduly paid begins to run in a majority of cases on the date on which the payments were made.
21 However, according to the referring court, such a solution is not appropriate with regard to actions for restitution of undue payments made in performance of contracts that have been found to be null and void on the ground that they contained unfair terms. In particular, in the case of a mortgage loan agreement, the seller or supplier does not have any reason to doubt the validity of that agreement as long as the borrower makes regular payments, which may take place over many years.
22 In addition, noting that the seller or supplier’s claim could thus be time-barred before the seller or supplier was able to realise that it had such a claim, that court has doubts as to whether the first option contemplated is consistent with the right to effective judicial protection as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of proportionality.
23 In the second place, the referring court states that the solution which takes as a starting point for the limitation period of the seller or supplier’s claim the date on which the unfair terms in question were entered in the register of unlawful terms could be based, inter alia, on the judgment of 18 January 2024, Getin Noble Bank and Others (Review by a national court of its own motion of unfair contractual terms) (C‑531/22, EU:C:2024:58, paragraph 78), from which it follows that such a registration has the effect that those terms could be regarded as unfair in any proceedings involving a consumer.
24 Nevertheless, in its view, that entry in the register does not mean automatically that the agreement containing those terms is null and void in its entirety. This would require a finding from a court or tribunal that the agreement has become null and void on the ground that it is incapable of continuing in existence without those terms.
25 In the third place, the referring court takes the view that the solution consisting in taking as a starting point for the limitation period of the seller or supplier’s claim the date on which the consumer challenged for the first time before the seller or supplier the binding nature of one or more terms used in the agreement that they concluded constitutes a fair solution.
26 In that regard, that court elaborates that such a challenge which triggers the limitation period of the seller or supplier’s claim must not necessarily take the form of judicial proceedings. In its view, a complaint or notice of default to pay sent to the seller or supplier would suffice to prompt the seller or supplier to check whether the agreement concluded with that consumer does indeed contain unfair terms which are liable to lead to that agreement becoming null and void.
27 According to the referring court, from the date on which the agreement is challenged, the seller or supplier has three years to analyse the contractual relationship and to decide, as the case may be, to ask the consumer to settle his or her debt or to reach an amicable agreement with the consumer determining how to treat reciprocal claims.
28 The referring court is of the view that that solution is consistent with the principles of equivalence, proportionality and legal certainty, and the right of access to a court or tribunal, as that solution enables the seller or supplier to exercise its own rights effectively while also protecting the rights of the consumer.
29 In those circumstances, the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of [Directive 93/13], Article 47 of the [Charter] and the principles of effectiveness, equivalence, proportionality, legal certainty and of the right of access to a court or tribunal be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation according to which the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s claim against a consumer for the reimbursement of undue payments made under a contract that has become null and void because it contains unfair terms starts to run from the date on which the consumer questioned the bank regarding the binding nature of the contractual terms?’
Case C‑262/25
30 On 14 December 2006, MZ concluded with EFG Eurobank Ergasis S.A., the predecessor of Raiffeisen Bank, a mortgage loan agreement for a duration of 360 months determined in Swiss francs, under which he received a sum of PLN 149 369.29 (approximately EUR 35 325).
31 On 17 November 2020 and 11 December 2023, MZ and Raiffeisen Bank, respectively, brought before the referring court actions similar to those referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the present judgment.
32 In response to the action brought by Raiffeisen Bank, MZ contended that the bank’s claim was time-barred, for reasons corresponding, in essence, to those stated in paragraph 13 of the present judgment.
33 By judgment of 20 June 2024, the referring court, ruling on the action brought by MZ, granted the latter’s applications.
34 Relying, in essence, on the same considerations as those reiterated in paragraphs 14 to 28 of the present judgment, the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of [Directive 93/13], Article 47 of the [Charter] and the principles of effectiveness, equivalence, proportionality, legal certainty and of the right of access to a court or tribunal be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation according to which the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s claim against a consumer for the reimbursement of undue payments made under a contract that has become null and void because it contains unfair terms starts to run from the date on which the consumer questioned the bank regarding the binding nature of the contractual terms?’
Procedure before the Court
35 By decision of the President of the Court of 22 May 2025, Cases C‑259/25 to C‑262/25 were joined for the purposes of the written and oral parts of the procedure and the judgment.
36 Following the withdrawal of the requests for a preliminary ruling which gave rise to Cases C‑259/25 and C‑260/25, those cases were disjoined from the other cases and removed from the Register of the Court by orders of the President of the Court of 11 August 2025, Juminek (C‑259/25, EU:C:2025:722), and of 3 September 2025, Olteski (C‑260/25, EU:C:2025:721).
Whether there is a need for a decision in Case C‑262/25
37 According to settled case-law, the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court and the national courts by means of which the Court provides national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see order of 26 January 1990, Falciola, C‑286/88, EU:C:1990:33, paragraph 7, and judgment of 29 July 2024, LivaNova, C‑713/22, EU:C:2024:642, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
38 Since it is apparent from both the wording and the scheme of Article 267 TFEU that the preliminary ruling procedure presupposes that a dispute is actually pending before the national courts in which they are called upon to give a decision which is capable of taking account of the preliminary ruling, the Court must find that there is no need to adjudicate if the dispute in the main proceedings has become devoid of purpose (judgment of 24 November 2022, Banco Cetelem, C‑302/21, EU:C:2022:919, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
39 In the present case, by letter of 8 December 2025, the referring court informed the Court of Justice that, on 29 August 2025, Raiffeisen Bank had withdrawn its action in the proceedings which gave rise to Case C‑262/25 while submitting a copy of its order of 13 November 2025 by which, on the basis of Article 203(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it ruled that that discontinuance was inadmissible.
40 In its order, the referring court found that the true objective of that discontinuance was to achieve the withdrawal of the request for a preliminary ruling pending before the Court of Justice and that, therefore, the conduct of Raiffeisen Bank was contrary to the rules of social conduct and constituted a circumvention of the law.
41 Following the request for information sent to it by the Court, the referring court, by letter lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 2 January 2026, informed the Court of the wording of Article 203(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clarified that its order of 13 November 2025 was not subject to any possibility of appeal and therefore had acquired the force of res judicata.
42 Therefore, it is apparent from the file before the Court that the dispute in the main proceedings has not become devoid of purpose.
43 In those circumstances, there is a need to adjudicate on the request for a preliminary ruling giving rise to the present case.
Admissibility
44 In the first place, Bank BPH maintains that the answer to the question referred is not necessary for resolving the dispute in the main proceedings which gave rise to Case C‑261/25, which renders that question hypothetical. According to Bank BPH, the resolution of that dispute is based on the premiss that the referring court follows the national case-law applying the ‘two claims’ theory under which, in essence, in the event of a mortgage loan agreement that has become null and void, the consumer may ask for the restitution of all the payments made and the seller or supplier may ask to have the full amount of the loan capital returned. However, according to Bank BPH, in the judgment of 19 June 2025, Lubreczlik (C‑396/24, EU:C:2025:460), the Court called into question that national case-law by stating that the payments made by the consumer must be deducted from the total of the capital loaned by the seller or supplier.
45 Bank BPH specifies that the payments made by AS and NS correspond to a sum exceeding the loan capital, with the result that, should it be impossible to apply the national case-law referred to in the preceding paragraph, it would not have any claim that could be invoked against the claim over a higher sum that AS and NS have in respect of the bank.
46 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see judgments of 29 November 1978, Redmond, 83/78, EU:C:1978:214, paragraph 25, and of 11 December 2025, Kuszycka, C‑767/24, EU:C:2025:962, paragraph 33).
47 It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see judgments of 7 September 1999, Beck and Bergdorf, C‑355/97, EU:C:1999:391, paragraph 22, and of 11 December 2025, Kuszycka, C‑767/24, EU:C:2025:962, paragraph 34).
48 In the present case, it is undisputed that the question referred concerns the interpretation of provisions and principles of EU law, with the result that it enjoys that presumption of relevance.
49 Moreover, in the judgment of 19 June 2025, Lubreczlik (C‑396/24, EU:C:2025:460, paragraph 44), the Court has ruled that Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding national case-law according to which, where a term of a loan agreement classified as unfair renders that agreement null and void, the seller or supplier is entitled to require the consumer to repay the full nominal amount of the loan obtained, irrespective of the value of repayments made by the consumer in performance of that agreement and irrespective of the amount remaining due.
50 However, as is apparent from paragraph 11 of the present judgment, the referring court has, by judgment of 30 October 2023, which therefore predates the judgment of 19 June 2025, Lubreczlik (C‑396/24, EU:C:2025:460), granted the applications brought before it by AS and NS by means of an action separate from that brought by Bank BPH, which gave rise to the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C‑261/25. Those consumers were therefore awarded the right to reimbursement of all payments made in performance of the agreement found to be null and void, without being required to return the loan capital.
51 Therefore, it is not obvious that the question referred in that case is hypothetical on the ground that Bank BPH’s claim corresponding to that capital would be extinguished following the judgment of the referring court referred to in the preceding paragraph.
52 In the second place, in Case C‑262/25, Raiffeisen Bank submits that the question referred is inadmissible on the ground that the assessment of the effects of an agreement containing unfair terms becoming null and void, including the starting point for the limitation period for the seller or supplier’s action for restitution, falls within national law and not within Directive 93/13.
53 In that regard, first, as is stated in paragraph 48 of the present judgment, the question referred, which concerns an interpretation of EU law, enjoys a presumption of relevance.
54 Second, where, as in the present case, it is not obvious that the interpretation of an act of EU law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, the objection alleging that that act is inapplicable to the case in the main proceedings goes to the substance of the questions (judgments of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 114, and of 11 December 2025, Kuszycka, C‑767/24, EU:C:2025:962, paragraph 39).
55 Consequently, the question referred for a preliminary ruling is admissible, both in Case C‑261/25 and in Case C‑262/25.
Substance
56 In its questions, the referring court refers, inter alia, to Article 47 of the Charter and the right of access to a court or tribunal.
57 The Court has had occasion to state that the principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 comprises various elements: in particular, the right of access to a court or tribunal (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2016, Toma and Biroul Executorului Judecătoresc Horaţiu-Vasile Cruduleci, C‑205/15, EU:C:2016:499, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
58 Consequently, by its identical questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter and the principles of effectiveness, equivalence, proportionality and legal certainty, must be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation according to which the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s claim against a consumer for the restitution of undue payments made in performance of an agreement that has been found to be null and void as a result of unfair terms contained therein, begins to run from the date on which the consumer challenged for the first time before the seller or supplier the binding nature of those terms and of the agreement containing those terms.
59 According to settled case-law, pursuant to Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, a contractual term found to be unfair must be regarded, in principle, as never having existed, so that it cannot have any effect on the consumer. Therefore, the determination by a court that such a term is unfair must, in principle, have the consequence of restoring the consumer to the legal and factual situation that he or she would have been in if that term had not existed by, inter alia, creating a right to restitution of advantages wrongly obtained, to the consumer’s detriment, by the seller or supplier on the basis of that unfair term. This is the case also where the unfair nature of one or more terms in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier results not only in the nullity of those terms, but also in the invalidity of the contract in its entirety (judgment of 16 April 2026, Jangielak, C‑752/24, EU:C:2026:307, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
60 That objective of restoring the consumer’s legal and factual situation to what it would have been in the absence of one or more unfair terms must be pursued in a manner that complies with the principle of proportionality, a general principle of EU law, which requires that the national legislation implementing that law must not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued (judgment of 16 April 2026, Jangielak, C‑752/24, EU:C:2026:307, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
61 That principle of proportionality would be infringed if restitutio in integrum were to be excluded in respect of the seller or supplier. Accordingly, the obligation to restore the parties to their original position, following the invalidation of a loan agreement containing unfair terms, must be mutual; the bank may not, however, seek a sum from the consumer going beyond reimbursement of the capital paid in respect of the performance of that agreement together with the payment of default interest at the statutory rate from the date on which notice is served (judgment of 16 April 2026, Jangielak, C‑752/24, EU:C:2026:307, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
62 Furthermore, the restitutory effect attached to the invalidation of a loan agreement containing unfair terms, which also justifies the bank’s action for restitution, ensures that the protection of the rights guaranteed by the legal order of the European Union does not entail the unjust enrichment of the consumer (judgment of 16 April 2026, Jangielak, C‑752/24, EU:C:2026:307, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
63 It should be added that such an action for restitution by the seller or supplier guarantees respect for the principle of equality of arms. According to settled case-law, that principle, which is a corollary of the very concept of a fair trial, guaranteed in particular by Article 47 of the Charter, and aims to ensure a balance between the parties to the proceedings, requires that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case under conditions that do not place them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent (judgments of 28 July 2016, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others, C‑543/14, EU:C:2016:605, paragraph 40, and of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 128).
64 Accordingly, since the consumer, following the agreement which he or she has concluded with the seller or supplier being found to be null and void as a result of the unfair terms contained therein, may apply for the restitution of the payments he or she has made under the agreement, that seller or supplier must, in turn, have the right to apply for the restitution of the loan capital, for which, however, it does not have the right to be remunerated (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2023, Bank M. (Consequences of the annulment of the contract) C‑520/21, EU:C:2023:478, paragraph 78).
65 Consequently, the lodging of such an action by the seller or supplier, including in the context of proceedings separate from those brought by the consumer, not only does not, in principle, interfere with the exercise, by the latter, of his or her right to restitution of advantages wrongly obtained by that seller or supplier on the basis of unfair terms, but also contributes to restoring the legal and factual situation which that consumer would have been in in the absence of those terms (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 April 2026, Jangielak, C‑752/24, EU:C:2026:307, paragraphs 36 and 37).
66 As regards the limitation period applicable to the seller or supplier’s claim for restitution, it should be noted that in the absence of specific EU legislation on the subject, the detailed rules for implementing the consumer protection provided for by Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with the principles of proportionality, the prohibition of unjust enrichment and equality of arms, are a matter for the domestic legal order of the Member States by virtue of the principle of their procedural autonomy. However, those rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence), nor may they be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 April 2026, Jangielak, C‑752/24, EU:C:2026:307, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
67 As concerns the principle of equivalence, it is sufficient to observe that there is nothing in the file available to the Court liable to raise any doubt with regard to the compliance of the national rules governing the limitation periods at issue in the main proceedings with that principle.
68 Furthermore, as regards the principle of effectiveness, first, it is apparent from the requests for a preliminary ruling that Polish case-law on claims for restitution of undue payments made in performance of contracts that have become null and void supports the view that the limitation period for actions for the restitution of undue payments begins to run, in a majority of cases, on the date on which the payments were made. Therefore, where that Polish case-law applies, the limitation period for the seller or supplier’s claim which corresponds to the capital loaned to the consumer in performance of a contract that has been found to be null and void as a result of unfair terms therein, begins to run on the date on which that capital was made available to that consumer.
69 It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the system of protection of the consumer provided for in Directive 93/13 is not applicable if the consumer objects to it. Accordingly, the latter is entitled, after having been informed by the national court, not to assert the unfair and non-binding nature of a term, thus giving free and informed consent to the term in question and thereby avoiding the invalidation of the contract (judgments of 16 March 2023, M.B. and Others (Effects of the invalidation of a contract), C‑6/22, EU:C:2023:216, paragraph 38, and of 11 December 2025, Kuszycka, C‑767/24, EU:C:2025:962, paragraph 53).
70 Consequently, as long as the consumer has not expressed his or her intention to have that contract become null and void, the seller or supplier cannot have a claim for restitution, with the result that the limitation period applicable to the seller or supplier cannot begin to run before such an intention is expressed.
71 Second, for that reason, the date on which the terms corresponding to those in an agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer were entered in the register of unlawful terms cannot be accepted as the starting point for the limitation period of the seller or supplier’s claim for restitution. Indeed, such an entry in the register does not result in the contract becoming null and void as the finding that a contract is null and void must come from a national court or tribunal which must take into consideration the consumer’s intention in that regard.
72 Third, by contrast, the exercise of the seller or supplier’s right to apply for the restitution of the loan capital, if applicable with default interest, within the meaning of the case-law reiterated in paragraphs 61 to 64 of the present judgment, does not appear in practice impossible or excessively difficult if the limitation period applicable to exercising that right begins to run from the date on which the consumer challenged for the first time before that seller or supplier the binding nature of the contract concluded between those parties.
73 Furthermore, such a solution eliminates the risk, raised by the referring court by citing the judgment of 14 December 2023, Getin Noble Bank (Limitation period for actions for restitution) (C‑28/22, EU:C:2023:992, paragraphs 70 and 72), that the seller or supplier could remain inactive while waiting for the limitation period of the consumer’s claim to expire, without risking its own claim being time-barred.
74 In addition, it should be noted that the interpretation of national law preferred by the referring court is supported by the principle of legal certainty, to which that court also refers, which, according to settled case-law, is aimed at ensuring foreseeability of situations and legal relations (judgment of 16 October 2019, Agrárminiszter, C‑490/18, EU:C:2019:863, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
75 In that regard, it should be observed that to accept, as the starting point for the limitation period of the seller or supplier’s claim, the date on which the consumer contested, for the first time, the binding nature of the contract concluded between those parties guarantees the foreseeability required by that principle, as, from that date, the seller or supplier is informed of the consumer’s intention to rely on the alleged invalidity of the contract and may therefore reasonably anticipate the consequences that are liable to follow therefrom.
76 Moreover, it should be observed that, in the scenario presented by Raiffeisen Bank in which, despite a challenge before the seller or supplier, the consumer would decide subsequently to give his or her consent to the unfair terms in the agreement in question, thereby preventing the agreement from becoming null and void, neither of the parties to the agreement would have a claim for restitution and the seller or supplier would continue to benefit from the unfair terms in the agreement. Therefore, the question of whether the seller or supplier’s claim might be time-barred does not arise, with the result that the principle of legal certainty does not preclude the limitation period for the seller or supplier’s claim from beginning to run from the date of that challenge.
77 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter and the principles of effectiveness, equivalence, proportionality and legal certainty, must be interpreted as not precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation according to which the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s claim against a consumer for the restitution of undue payments made in performance of a contract found to be null and void as a result of unfair terms contained therein, begins to run from the date on which the consumer challenged for the first time before the seller or supplier the binding nature of those terms and of the contract containing them.
Costs
78 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby rules:
Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principles of effectiveness, equivalence, proportionality and legal certainty,
must be interpreted as not precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation according to which the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s claim against a consumer for the restitution of undue payments made in performance of a contract found to be null and void as a result of unfair terms contained therein, begins to run from the date on which the consumer challenged for the first time before the seller or supplier the binding nature of those terms and of the contract containing them.
[Signatures]