Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
16 July 2026 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation between the courts of Member States in civil or commercial matters – Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 – Article 12(2) – Request made to the requested court for the execution of a measure of inquiry adopted by the requesting court – Grounds for refusal to execute such a request – Rule of substantive law of the requested Member State – Taking of the evidence considered to be contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of the requested Member State – Exhumation of a body for the purpose of establishing parentage – Post-mortem genetic testing – Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to respect for human dignity – Right to know one’s genetic origins )
In Case C‑196/24 [Aucrinde], (i)
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the tribunal judiciaire de Chambéry (France), made by decision of 16 January 2024, received at the Court on 20 February 2024, in the proceedings
xx
v
ww,
yy,
zz,
vv,
joined parties:
Ministère public,
THE COURT (Grand Chamber),
composed of K. Lenaerts, President, T. von Danwitz (Rapporteur), Vice‑President, K. Jürimäe, C. Lycourgos, I. Jarukaitis, M. Condinanzi and F. Schalin, Presidents of Chambers, S. Rodin, E. Regan, N. Piçarra, A. Kumin, M. Gavalec, S. Gervasoni, N. Fenger and R. Frendo, Judges,
Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,
Registrar: C. Di Bella, Administrator,
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 29 April 2025,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
– xx, by M. Coppola, avocate,
– the French Government, by B. Dourthe, O. Duprat‑Mazaré and B. Fodda, acting as Agents,
– the European Commission, by S. Noë, P. J. O. Van Nuffel and W. Wils, acting as Agents,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 11 September 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (taking of evidence) (OJ 2020 L 405, p. 1) and of Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between, in Italy, xx, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, ww, yy, zz and vv, aa’s legitimate children, concerning the establishment of parentage between xx and aa, buried in France, and having given rise to a request for the execution, in the latter Member State, of a measure of inquiry ordered by an Italian court and seeing the exhumation of aa’s body with a view to the drawing up of a genetic expert’s report post-mortem.
Legal context
European Union law
The Charter
3 Article 1 of the Charter, entitled ‘Human dignity’, provides:
‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’
4 Article 7 of the Charter, entitled ‘Respect for private and family life’ provides:
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’
Regulation 2020/1783
5 Recitals 3, 4, 15 and 16 of Regulation 2020/1783 state as follows:
‘(3) For the purposes of the proper functioning of the internal market and the development of an area of civil justice in the [European] Union, it is necessary to further improve and expedite cooperation between the courts of the different Member States in relation to the taking of evidence. This Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and speed of judicial proceedings by simplifying and streamlining the mechanisms for cooperation in the taking of evidence in cross-border proceedings, while at the same time helping to reduce delays and costs for individuals and businesses. …
(4) This Regulation lays down rules on cooperation between the courts of the different Member States in relation to the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters.
…
(15) Requests for the taking of evidence should be executed expeditiously. …
(16) To ensure that this Regulation is effective, the circumstances in which it is possible to refuse to execute a request for the taking of evidence should be confined to strictly limited exceptional situations.’
6 Article 1 of that regulation, headed ‘Scope’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘This Regulation applies in civil or commercial matters in which the court of a Member State, in accordance with the law of that Member State, requests:
(a) the competent court of another Member State to take evidence; or
(b) the taking of evidence directly in another Member State.’
7 Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Direct transmission between courts’ provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Requests referred to in point (a) of Article 1(1) shall be transmitted by the court before which the proceedings are commenced or contemplated (“requesting court”), directly to the competent court of another Member State (“requested court”), for the taking of evidence.’
8 Article 5 of that regulation, entitled ‘Form and content of requests’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Requests shall be made using form A or, where appropriate, form L in Annex I ….’
9 Article 10 of Regulation 2020/1783, entitled ‘Incomplete requests’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘If a request cannot be executed because it does not contain all of the necessary information referred to in Article 5, the requested court shall inform the requesting court thereof without delay and, at the latest, within 30 days of receipt of the request using form D in Annex I, and shall request the requesting court to send the missing information, specifying the information missing as precisely as possible.’
10 Section 3, entitled ‘Taking of evidence by the requested court’, of Chapter II of that regulation contains, inter alia, Articles 12 and 16 of that regulation.
11 Article 12 of that regulation, entitled ‘General provisions on the execution of a request’, is worded as follows:
‘1. The requested court shall execute the request without delay and, at the latest, within 90 days of receipt of the request.
2. The requested court shall execute the request in accordance with its national law.
3. The requesting court may call for the request to be executed in accordance with a special procedure provided for in its national law, using form A in Annex I. The requested court shall execute the request in accordance with the special procedure unless doing so would be incompatible with its national law or it is unable to do so because of major practical difficulties. If the requested court does not comply with the call for the request to be executed in accordance with a special procedure for one of those reasons, it shall inform the requesting court using form H in Annex I.
…’
12 Article 16 of Regulation 2020/1783, entitled ‘Refusals to execute requests’, provides, in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof:
‘2. The execution of a request may only be refused on grounds other than those referred to in paragraph 1, where one or more of the following grounds applies:
(a) the request does not fall within the scope of this Regulation;
(b) the execution of the request does not fall within the functions of the judiciary under the law of the Member State of the requested court;
(c) the requesting court does not comply with the request of the requested court to complete the request for the taking of evidence pursuant to Article 10 within 30 days of the requested court asking it to do so; or
(d) a deposit or advance asked for in accordance with Article 22(3) is not made within 60 days of the requested court asking for such a deposit or advance.
3. A requested court shall not refuse to execute a request solely on the ground that under its national law another court of that Member State has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or that the law of that Member State would not admit the right of action on the subject matter.’
13 Article 19 of Regulation 2020/1783 is included in Section 4, entitled ‘Direct taking of evidence by the requesting court and taking of evidence by diplomatic agents or consular officers’, of Chapter II thereof, and concerns, in line with its title, the direct taking of evidence by the requesting court. Under Article 19 of that regulation:
‘1. Where a court requests the taking of evidence directly in another Member State, it shall submit a request to the central body or to the competent authority of that Member State, using form L in Annex I.
…
7. The central body or the competent authority of the requested Member State may refuse a request for direct taking of evidence only if:
(a) it does not fall within the scope of this Regulation;
(b) it does not contain all of the necessary information referred to in Article 5; or
(c) the direct taking of evidence requested is contrary to fundamental principles of law in its Member State.
…’
French law
14 Article 16 of the code civil (Civil Code), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the French Civil Code’), provides:
‘The law shall safeguard the primacy of the person, shall prohibit any violation of human dignity and shall guarantee respect for the human being as of the outset of life.’
15 Article 16-1-1 of that code provides:
‘The respect with which the human body is to be treated shall not cease upon death.
The remains of deceased persons, including the ashes of those whose body has been cremated, must be treated with respect, dignity and decency.’
16 Article 16-9 of that code provides:
‘The provisions of the present chapter are a matter of public policy.’
17 Article 16-11 of that code provides:
‘The identification of an individual by DNA fingerprinting may be sought only:
1o In the context of investigative measures conducted in the course of judicial proceedings;
2o For medical or scientific research purposes;
3o For the purpose of establishing, when it is unknown, the identity of deceased persons;
4o Under the conditions provided for in Article L. 2381-1 of the code de la défense [(Defence Code)];
5o For the purpose of combating doping, under the conditions provided for in Article L. 232-12-2 of the code du sport [(Sports Code)].
In civil matters, such identification may be sought only by execution of a measure of investigation ordered by a court before which an action is brought, seeking either to establish or to contest parentage, or to obtain or remove subsidies. The consent of the person concerned must be obtained expressly and in advance. An identification cannot be made by DNA fingerprinting after a person’s death unless that person gave his or her express consent during his or her lifetime.
…’
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
18 The applicant in the main proceedings, xx, brought an action before the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa, Italy) seeking a finding that he is the illegitimate son of aa, who is buried in France, authorisation to use his paternal surname, to order the competent registrar to enter into the record the judgment to be delivered once it has become final and to have an expert’s report drawn up to establish the biological parentage after exhumation of the body of the putative father.
19 The legitimate children of aa, who are the defendants in the main proceedings, objected to the tests necessary for an expert’s report by a haematologist to determine whether the applicant in the main proceedings has genetic characteristics matching their own genetic characteristics. They requested that genetic testing be carried out on the body of their deceased father at the place where his remains are buried. The Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa) ordered an expert’s report by a haematologist and appointed an expert to carry out a genetic comparison between the applicant in the main proceedings and the remains of the putative father, after the latter had been exhumed.
20 On 18 November 2022, the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa) transmitted a request under Regulation 2020/1783 to the tribunal judiciaire de Chambéry (Court of Chambéry, France), which is the referring court, seeking the taking of evidence, namely the exhumation of the body of the putative father, together with the collection of a sample of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) for the purposes of the haematologist’s report concerned.
21 The referring court notes that the request made by the Italian court falls within the scope of Regulation 2020/1783 and is admissible. That request has been made by a court of a Member State and should be executed by a court of another Member State; in the present case, the request falls within the jurisdiction of the referring court. The evidence which the latter court is requested to take is intended to be used in a judicial procedure in a civil matter.
22 In that regard, the referring court observes that it is not a mere executing authority of measure of inquiry ordered by the Italian court, but that it must issue a judicial decision in order to determine whether the conditions laid down in Regulation 2020/1783 are satisfied. That determination cannot be regarded as a mere formality in the light of Article 12(2) of that regulation, which requires the requesting court to ‘execute the request in accordance with its national law’.
23 In the present case, the referring court takes the view that there is no ground precluding the execution of that request under Article 16 of Regulation 2020/1783. A request to exhume a body in order to obtain a DNA sample constitutes a request for the taking of evidence. The execution of such a request falls within the functions of the French judiciary, the right of action to establish parentage being recognised under French law. In addition, the referring court did not consider it necessary to make any request seeking that the request to take evidence be completed by the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa), as it has the option of doing under Article 10(1) of that regulation.
24 The referring court observes that, had the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa) wished to see its request executed, in France, in accordance with a ‘special procedure’, within the meaning of Article 12(3) of Regulation 2020/1783, that court should have filled in point 12 of form A in Annex I to that regulation, which it did not do in the present case. The issue of the compatibility of such a special procedure with the law of the requested Member State therefore does not arise.
25 However, the referring court harbours doubts as to the issue of whether Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783 allows a requested court to refuse to apply that regulation and to refuse to comply with a request for the taking of evidence on the ground that the ‘procedure’ specified in that request appears to it to be contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of the Member State of the requested court. According to that court, it is apparent from the Practice Guide, drafted by the European Commission’s departments, for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 174, p. 1), that regulation having been repealed and replaced, as of 1 July 2022, by Regulation 2020/1783, that a ‘procedure’ could be considered to be incompatible with the law of that Member State if it is in conflict with fundamental principles of that law. That is the case here, since French law, namely Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code, prohibits the exhumation of a body for the purpose of establishing parentage, unless the person concerned has given express consent to it during his or her lifetime.
26 Although the situations where a request for the taking of evidence may be refused are exhaustively set out in Article 16 of Regulation 2020/1783, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether Article 12(2) of that regulation, which provides that the requested court is to ‘execute the request in accordance with its national law’ allows the execution of such a request to be refused on other grounds.
27 If Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783 applies without account being taken of the law of the requested Member State, the referring court also raises the issue of how Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter should be interpreted and the links between them be determined in the implementation of the provisions of that regulation.
28 In particular, the referring court requests the Court to determine whether the right to know one’s parentage and to have it recognised, which it regards as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter, prevails or can prevail over the right of a deceased person not to have to undergo a genetic test post-mortem without having given their consent during their lifetime, a right which follows, in its view, from the principle of respect for human dignity enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter.
29 It further states that the request for the taking of evidence ordered by the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa) is contrary to Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code, which lists the situations in which the identification of a person by DNA fingerprinting is allowed. However, that national provision may itself be contrary to Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (ECHR). The question therefore also arises of whether Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code is consistent with the Charter, in particular Article 1 thereof, which guarantees respect for human dignity and, by extension, the respect due to the dead, and with Article 7 which, as the counterpart of Article 8 ECHR, grants everyone the right to respect for his or her private life.
30 In those circumstances, the tribunal judiciaire de Chambéry (Court of Chambéry) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Does Article 12 of [Regulation 2020/1783] allow a national court to refuse to apply that regulation and to comply with the request from the requesting State, on the ground that the procedure specified in the request is contrary to fundamental principles of the national law of the requested State, and in particular Article 16-11 of the [French Civil Code]?
(2) If Article 12 of [Regulation 2020/1783] applies regardless of national law, how should Article 1 (right to dignity) and Article 7 (right to respect for private life) of the [Charter] be interpreted and the links between them determined in order to establish whether or not such an application of the Regulation infringes the [Charter]?’
Consideration of the questions referred
31 By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783, read in the light of Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter, must be interpreted as allowing a requested court to refuse to execute a request for a measure of inquiry seeking the taking of evidence, consisting of a genetic sample collected after exhumation of the body of the putative parent, that request having been transmitted pursuant to that regulation by the requesting court before which proceedings concerning parentage have been brought, by justifying that refusal on the ground that a rule of substantive law of the Member State of the requested court prohibits the taking of such evidence.
32 In the present case, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether it can apply a rule of substantive national law, namely Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code, which prohibits the exhumation of a body with a view to post-mortem genetic testing unless the person concerned has given his or her express consent during his or her lifetime, in order to refuse to execute a request for the taking of evidence transmitted by an Italian court on the basis of Article 1(1)(a) and Article 12 of Regulation 2020/1783.
33 It should be noted at the outset that Articles 1 and 12 of Regulation 2020/1783 correspond, in essence, to Articles 1 and 10 of Regulation No 1206/2001, which Regulation 2020/1783 repealed and replaced. Therefore, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of the repealed regulation remains relevant for the purposes of the examination of the present request for a preliminary ruling.
34 In the first place, so far as concerns the scope of Regulation 2020/1783, it must be recalled that that regulation applies as a general rule only if the court of a Member State decides to take evidence according to one of the methods provided for by that regulation, in which case it is required to follow the procedures relating to those methods (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2013, ProRail, C‑332/11, EU:C:2013:87, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
35 In accordance with Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2020/1783, that regulation is applicable in civil or commercial matters in which the court of a Member State, in accordance with the law of that Member State, either requests the competent court of another Member State to take evidence, or requests the taking of evidence directly itself in another Member State.
36 It follows that the scope ratione materiae of Regulation 2020/1783, as defined under Article 1(1) thereof and as is also confirmed by the scheme of that regulation, is limited to two methods of taking evidence, namely on the one hand, the taking of evidence by the requested court in accordance with Articles 12 to 18 thereof following a request from the requesting court of another Member State and, on the other hand, the taking of evidence by the requesting court directly in another Member State, the detailed rules for which are set out in Article 19 of that regulation.
37 In the present case, it is common ground that the referring court is deciding on the request for the taking of evidence transmitted by the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa), as a requesting court, by using form A in Annex I to Regulation 2020/1783, concerning the indirect taking of evidence as referred to in Article 1(1)(a) of that regulation. Such a request is transmitted by the requesting court, under Article 3(1) of that regulation ‘directly to the [requested court], for the taking of evidence’.
38 It follows that the indirect taking of evidence, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by the requested court must be carried out in accordance with the detailed arrangements provided for under Articles 12 to 18 of that regulation.
39 In that context, the division of jurisdiction and of responsibilities between those two courts in the implementation of those provisions, as envisaged by Regulation 2020/1783, is based on a clear distinction between the aspects falling within the scope of the substantive law applicable to a dispute and the procedural rules governing the taking of evidence.
40 In that regard, it is apparent from the very wording of Article 1(1) of Regulation 2020/1783 that the adoption, by the court of a Member State adjudicating on a dispute in a civil or commercial matter, of a measure of inquiry seeking to take evidence which is to be gathered in another Member State is governed by the law of the Member State of the requesting court. Only that court, which knows all the facts of that dispute, is able to assess, having regard to the applicable substantive law, what evidence is required.
41 Where the evidence sought falls within the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State and the court adjudicating on a dispute in a civil or commercial matter decides, pursuant to Regulation 2020/1783, to use the indirect method of taking evidence provided for by that regulation, by requesting the competent court of the other Member State to execute a measure of inquiry, the detailed procedural arrangements for gathering that evidence are governed by the law of the Member State of the latter court.
42 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Regulation 2020/1783 establishes a judicial cooperation mechanism which is strictly limited to the procedural aspects of the taking of evidence in judicial proceedings with cross-border effects. That regulation thus does not seek to harmonise the law of evidence between the different Member States but, as is apparent from recitals 3 and 4 thereof, to improve the effectiveness and speed of judicial proceedings by simplifying and streamlining the mechanisms for cooperation between the courts of those States in relation to the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters in cross-border proceedings. That enables the proper functioning of the internal market to be ensured and the development of an area of freedom, security and justice based on the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States.
43 It follows that, in accordance with the system under Regulation 2020/1783, the requesting court, before which a dispute on a civil or commercial matter having a cross-border effect has been brought, is the sole court authorised to decide on which means of evidence it considers relevant and it adopts to that effect the measure of inquiry which it requests the requested court to execute in another Member State. Thus, contrary to what the French Government argued before the Court, it is neither for the referring court nor for the Court of Justice to redefine the subject matter of that measure of inquiry, as defined by the requesting court in its request for the taking of evidence.
44 In the event of doubt as to the method of taking evidence chosen by the requesting court or in the event of missing information, Regulation 2020/1783 merely grants the requested court the option, under Article 10 thereof, to inform the requesting court thereof without delay, requesting that court to send the missing information, specifying the latter as precisely as possible. In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court, in its capacity as the requested court, sent no request to the requesting court seeking that the latter complete the request for the taking of evidence at issue in the main proceedings.
45 In the second place, Article 12(1) of Regulation 2020/1783 provides that the requested court must execute the request without delay and, at the latest, within 90 days of receipt of the request. Pursuant to Article 12(2) of that regulation, the requested court is to execute the request in accordance with its national law.
46 It is settled case-law that it is necessary, when interpreting a provision of EU law, to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part (judgments of 4 May 2010, TNT Express Nederland, C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 44; of 28 October 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Extradition and ne bis in idem), C‑435/22 PPU, EU:C:2022:852, paragraph 67; and of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council, C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245, paragraph 99).
47 As regards the wording of Article 12 of Regulation 2020/1783, it is apparent, first, from Article 12(1), which uses, in particular, the words ‘without delay’ and which must be read in the light of recital 15 of that regulation, that the EU legislature intended to require the requested court to execute swiftly the measure of inquiry requested of it.
48 Secondly, Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783 establishes the principle that a request for the taking of evidence is executed by the requested court ‘in accordance with its national law’, without making clear the scope of that reference to ‘national law’.
49 However, it is apparent from the context of that provision that the reference to ‘national law’ therein must be understood as referring to the detailed procedural rules established by the law of the Member State of the requested court. Article 12(3) of that regulation introduces an exception to that principle, by providing that, subject to observing the conditions provided for by that provision, the requesting court may request the requested court to comply, for the purposes of executing the request for the taking of evidence, with a ‘special procedure’ such as provided for by the law of the State of the requesting court.
50 In that regard, as the Advocate General observed in point 58 of her Opinion, the reference to the expression ‘national law’ in Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783 relates to the procedural rules for the taking of evidence. The purpose of Article 12(3) of the regulation, for its part, is to allow, in exceptional situations, for a change to the applicable procedure, by substituting for the procedural law of the Member State of the requested court that of the Member State of the requesting court, even though the procedure for the taking of evidence still falls within the jurisdiction of the requested court.
51 The foregoing considerations support an interpretation of Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783 according to which that provision applies only to the detailed procedural rules for the execution of measures of inquiry, so that only those detailed rules are governed, in principle, by the law of the requested Member State.
52 That interpretation is also borne out by the objectives of Regulation 2020/1783, which are, as has already been observed in paragraph 42 above, to improve the effectiveness and speed of judicial proceedings by simplifying and streamlining the mechanisms for cooperation between the courts of the Member States in relation to the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters in judicial proceedings having cross-border effects. That regulation thus seeks to enable the proper functioning of the internal market to be ensured and the development of an area of freedom, security and justice based on the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States.
53 Having regard to that aim, Regulation 2020/1783 established a regime which Member States are required to comply with in order to remove the obstacles which may arise in that field. Thus, that regulation may not be interpreted as restricting the options to take evidence which is located in other Member States. On the contrary, it aims to increase those options, by encouraging cooperation between the courts in that area (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 February 2011, Weryński, C‑283/09, EU:C:2011:85, paragraph 62; of 6 September 2012, Lippens and Others, C‑170/11, EU:C:2012:540, paragraph 29; and of 21 February 2013, ProRail, C‑332/11, EU:C:2013:87, paragraphs 43 and 44).
54 With that in mind, Article 16 of Regulation 2020/1783, which is part of the relevant context for the interpretation of Article 12(2) of that regulation, lists exhaustively the grounds on which indirect execution of a measure of inquiry may be refused. That exhaustive nature is expressly referred to in recital 16 of Regulation 2020/1783, which states that ‘to ensure that this Regulation is effective, the circumstances in which it is possible to refuse to execute a request for the taking of evidence should be confined to strictly limited exceptional situations’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 February 2011, Weryński, C‑283/09, EU:C:2011:85, paragraph 53).
55 Moreover, it follows therefrom that since such grounds for refusing the indirect execution of measure of inquiry must be construed as exceptions, they must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands, C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
56 That applies a fortiori as the judicial cooperation mechanism established by Regulation 2020/1783 in the field of the taking of evidence in cross-border judicial proceedings seeks, as recital 3 of that regulation shows, to facilitate the taking of evidence, while helping to reduce delays and costs for individuals and businesses. Therefore, that mechanism supports the right to effective judicial protection.
57 In those circumstances, an interpretation of Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783 which involves adding a ground, not provided for in Article 16 of that regulation, for refusal to execute a request for measures of inquiry, would be such as to call into question the effectiveness of the system of judicial cooperation established by that regulation as regards the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters between the courts of the Member States, one of the essential components of which consists of the obligation, in principle, to execute such a request for measures of inquiry.
58 It follows that the requested court, before which a request for the taking of evidence transmitted by the requesting court on the basis of Article 1(1)(a) and Article 12 of Regulation 2020/1783 has been brought, must, in order to guarantee effective cooperation in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, execute the measure of inquiry requested, in accordance with the procedural law of the requested Member State. In that regard, the power of the requested court to refuse to execute such a measure of inquiry is restricted solely to the grounds for refusal set out in Article 16 of that regulation, without, in particular, grounds derived from the substantive law of the Member State of the requested court, including grounds derived from fundamental principles of the law of the State of the requested court, being capable of justifying a refusal to execute the measure of inquiry, for the purposes of Article 12 of Regulation 2020/1783.
59 It follows therefrom that it is for the requesting court to assess, in the light of the substantive law of its Member State, the circumstances in which it is possible to adopt the measure of inquiry with a view to the taking of evidence located in another Member State. In the present case, those circumstances must thus be assessed not by the referring court in the light of Article 16-11 of the French Civil Code, but by the requesting court in the light of the substantive Italian law.
60 In that regard, the file before the Court shows that substantive Italian law recognises a person’s right to know his or her origins and allows, in the context of judicial proceedings seeking to determine parentage, post-mortem genetic testing upon exhumation of the body of the putative parent.
61 In the third place, since the application of Regulation 2020/1783 constitutes an implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, the national courts which give effect to the cooperation under that regulation must comply with the requirements arising from the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.
62 As an instrument for judicial cooperation, Regulation 2020/1783 gives specific expression, in civil and commercial matters, to the principle of mutual trust between the Member States, which is of fundamental importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 191).
63 Thus, when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union (Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 192).
64 As is apparent from paragraph 43 above, under Regulation 2020/1783, it is for the requesting court to determine, in accordance with the law of its Member State, the measure of inquiry which should be adopted in judicial proceedings pending before it. Accordingly, it is also for that requesting court alone to verify that its decision to order such a measure is consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union.
65 In the present case, having regard to the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings summarised in paragraph 19 above, it appears that the measure of inquiry at issue, namely the exhumation of the body of the putative father together with the collection of a DNA sample with a view to the genetic expert’s report concerned, was ordered only after the refusal of the latter’s legitimate children to undergo the tests necessary for an expert’s report by a haematologist to be drawn up to determine whether the applicant in the main proceedings had genetic characteristics corresponding to those of the defendants in the main proceedings, and after their request that genetic testing be carried out on the body of their deceased father at the place where his remains are buried.
66 In that regard, it must be observed that Article 7 of the Charter, on the right of everyone to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications, contains, at least, the same guarantees as those provided for in Article 8 ECHR, which must be taken into consideration, under Article 52(3) of the Charter, as a minimum threshold of protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
67 In accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 8 ECHR, the right to an identity is considered to be an integral part of the notion of private life, also including a person’s right to know and have recognised his or her parentage. According to that case-law, the interest of persons seeking to establish their parentage to obtain information necessary to uncover the truth about an important aspect of their personal identity is a vital interest, protected by the ECHR, even if that interest must be balanced with the right of third parties to the inviolability of the deceased’s body, the right to respect for the dead and the public interest in preserving legal certainty (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 13 July 2006, Jäggi v. Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2006:0713JUD005875700, §§ 38 and 39).
68 In that context, the European Court of Human Rights has already observed that the protection of the interests of the putative parent cannot, on its own, be a sufficient argument to deny the person seeking to establish his or her parentage his or her rights in the light of Article 8 ECHR. It has held, inter alia, having regard to the facts specific to the case concerned, that the refusal to draw up a genetic expert’s report post-mortem based on the lack of the express, prior consent of the putative biological parent constituted an unjustified interference with the right of the applicant to know his or her origins (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 16 June 2011, Pascaud v. France, CE:ECHR:2011:0616JUD001953508, §§ 64, 65 and 68).
69 As regards the questions of the referring court concerning the respect for the right to human dignity enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, it is not apparent in any way from the file before the Court of Justice that, when weighing up the competing interests in the case in the main proceedings, the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa) failed to give proper consideration to that right.
70 In addition, it is sufficient to note that, here, there is no fact which gives grounds for assuming that the situation is an exceptional case, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law recalled in paragraphs 62 and 63 above, in which the requested court would be justified in calling into question whether the measure of inquiry at issue in the main proceedings is consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union.
71 Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 12(2) of Regulation 2020/1783, read in the light of Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not allowing a requested court to refuse to execute a request for a measure of inquiry seeking the taking of evidence, consisting of a genetic sample collected after exhumation of the body of the putative parent, that request having been transmitted pursuant to that regulation by the requesting court before which proceedings concerning parentage have been brought, by justifying that refusal on the ground that a rule of substantive law of the Member State of the requested court prohibits the taking of such evidence.
Costs
72 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (taking of evidence), read in the light of Articles 1 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
must be interpreted as not allowing a requested court to refuse to execute a request for a measure of inquiry seeking the taking of evidence, consisting of a genetic sample collected after exhumation of the body of the putative parent, that request having been transmitted pursuant to that regulation by the requesting court before which proceedings concerning parentage have been brought, by justifying that refusal on the ground that a rule of substantive law of the Member State of the requested court prohibits the taking of such evidence.
[Signatures]