JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Third Chamber)

5 November 2026 (*)

( Appeal – State aid – Article 107(3)(c) TFEU – Air transport sector – COVID-19 pandemic – Restructuring aid granted to an airline by the Federal Republic of Germany – Decision by the European Commission not to raise objections – Action for annulment – Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty – Adequate burden sharing )

In Case C‑505/24 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 18 July 2024,

Condor Flugdienst GmbH, established in Neu-Isenburg (Germany), represented by S. Lünenbürger, K. Reiter and A. Rosenfeld, Rechtsanwälte,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Ryanair DAC, established in Swords (Ireland), represented by I.‑G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, dikigoros, S. Rating, abogado, and E. Vahida, avocat,

applicant at first instance,

European Commission, represented by I. Barcew, V. Bottka and L. Nicolae, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

Federal Republic of Germany, represented initially by J. Möller and P.-L. Krüger, acting as Agents, subsequently by J. Möller and V. Piegsa, acting as Agents,

intervener at first instance,

THE COURT (Third Chamber),

composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, N. Fenger, S. Rodin, O. Spineanu-Matei and N. Piçarra, Judges,

Advocate General: A. Biondi,

Registrar: M. Longar, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 20 November 2025,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 26 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By its appeal, Condor Flugdienst GmbH (‘Condor’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 8 May 2024, Ryanair v Commission (Condor; restructuring aid) (T‑28/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:301), by which the General Court annulled Decision C(2021) 5729 final of the European Commission of 26 July 2021 on State aid SA.63203 (2021/N) – Germany – Restructuring aid for Condor (‘the decision at issue’).

I.      Legal context

A.      The FEU Treaty

2        Article 107 TFEU provides:

‘1.      Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

2.      The following shall be compatible with the internal market:

…

(b)      aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;

…

3.      The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market:

…

(c)      aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;

…’

B.      The Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring

3        Point 9 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (OJ 2014 C 249, p. 1; ‘the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring’) states:

‘A further concern is the moral hazard problem created by State aid. Undertakings anticipating that they are likely to be rescued when they run into difficulty may embark upon excessively risky and unsustainable business strategies. In addition, the prospect of rescue and restructuring aid for a given undertaking may artificially reduce its cost of capital, giving it an undue competitive advantage in the marketplace.’

4        Point 61 of subsection ‘3.5.2. Restructuring aid’ of those guidelines, included in the section headed ‘3.5 Proportionality of the aid/aid limited to the minimum’, states that ‘the amount and intensity of restructuring aid must be limited to the strict minimum necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken, in the light of the existing financial resources of the beneficiary, its shareholders or the business group to which it belongs. In particular, a sufficient level of own contribution to the costs of the restructuring and burden sharing must be ensured, as set out in more detail in this section (3.5.2)’. In that regard, points 62 to 64 of those guidelines, appearing in subsection ‘3.5.2.1. Own contribution’ thereof, set out the requirements in respect of ‘own contribution’. In particular, point 64 states that own contribution will normally be considered to be adequate if it amounts to at least 50% of the restructuring costs.

5        Points 65 to 69 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, set out in subsection ‘3.5.2.2. Burden Sharing’, provide:

‘65.      Where State support is given in a form that enhances the beneficiary's equity position, for example where the State provides grants, injects capital or writes off debt, this can have the effect of protecting shareholders and subordinated creditors from the consequences of their choice to invest in the beneficiary. That can create moral hazard and undermine market discipline. Consequently, aid to cover losses should only be granted on terms which involve adequate burden sharing by existing investors.

66.      Adequate burden sharing will normally mean that incumbent shareholders and, where necessary, subordinated creditors must absorb losses in full. Subordinated creditors should contribute to the absorption of losses either via conversion into equity or write-down of the principal of the relevant instruments. Therefore, State intervention should only take place after losses have been fully accounted for and attributed to the existing shareholders and subordinated debt holders … In any case, cash outflows from the beneficiary to holders of equity or subordinated debt should be prevented during the restructuring period to the extent legally possible, unless that would disproportionately affect those that have injected fresh equity.

67.      Adequate burden sharing will also mean that any State aid that enhances the beneficiary's equity position should be granted on terms that afford the State a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary, in view of the amount of State equity injected in comparison with the remaining equity of the company after losses have been accounted for.

68.      The [European] Commission may allow exceptions from full implementation of the measures set out in point 66 where those measures would otherwise lead to disproportionate results. Such situations could include cases where the aid amount is small in comparison with the own contribution, or the Member State concerned demonstrates that subordinated creditors would receive less in economic terms than under normal insolvency proceedings and if no State aid were granted.

69.      The Commission will not systematically require a contribution by senior debt holders to restoring a beneficiary's equity position. However, it may treat any such contribution as grounds for a reduction in the necessary extent of measures to limit distortions of competition in accordance with point 90.’

6        Point 70 of subsection ‘3.6.1. “One time, last time” principle’ of those guidelines, which is included in the section headed ‘3.6 Negative effects’ states that:

‘In order to reduce moral hazard, excessive risk-taking incentives and potential competitive distortions, aid should be granted to undertakings in difficulty in respect of only one restructuring operation. This is referred to as the “one time, last time” principle. …’

7        Section ‘3.6. Negative effects’ of those guidelines also contains subsection ‘3.6.2. Measures to limit distortions of competition’, which includes points 76 to 93 of the guidelines.

II.    Background to the dispute and the decision at issue

8        The background to the dispute, as set out in paragraphs 2 to 10 of the judgment under appeal, may be summarised as follows.

9        Condor is a German airline which operates charter flights. It provides air transport services to individual customers, tour operators and travel agencies from several airports, in particular in Germany, with a focus on the leisure travel market.

10      During the period of 2019-2021, Condor benefited from several aid measures which may be categorised into two groups, namely on the one hand, aid measures intended to resolve its financial difficulties caused by the insolvency of its former parent company, Thomas Cook Group plc (‘Thomas Cook’), and, on the other hand, aid measures to make good the damage it had suffered as a result of the imposition of travel restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.

11      In respect of the latter, Condor was granted two consecutive individual aid measures in order to make good the damage incurred as a result of the imposition of travel restrictions linked to that pandemic, the first measure relating to the period from 17 March to 31 December 2020 (‘the COVID-19 aid of 2020’), which was in the form of two loans amounting to a total of EUR 550 million (‘the COVID-19 loans of 2020’), backed by a State guarantee, and the second measure relating to the period from 1 January to 31 May 2021.

12      Following delivery of the judgment of 9 June 2021, Ryanair v Commission (Condor; COVID-19) (T‑665/20, EU:T:2021:344), by which the General Court annulled a first decision by the Commission relating to the COVID-19 aid of 2020, the Commission, by Decision C(2021) 5730 final of 26 July 2021 on State aid SA.56867 (2020/N, ex 2020/PN) – Germany – Compensation for the damage caused by the COVID-19 outbreak to Condor Flugdienst GmbH (‘the amended decision on the COVID-19 aid of 2020’), found that the COVID-19 aid of 2020 was compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU. The Commission found, inter alia, in the amended decision on the COVID-19 aid of 2020, on the basis of ex post data provided by the German authorities, that Condor had received overcompensation of EUR 91.745 million, plus interest.

13      By the decision at issue, the Commission, on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, approved an aid measure to support the restructuring and continuation of Condor’s business (‘the measure at issue’), which comprises two parts. The first part consists in a modification to the terms of the COVID-19 loans of 2020 and also a partial write-off of EUR 90 million of debt resulting from those loans. The second part involves the write-off of EUR 20.2 million of debt corresponding to the interest payable by Condor following the amended decision on the COVID-19 aid of 2020.

III. The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

14      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 14 January 2022, Ryanair DAC brought an action for annulment of the decision at issue.

15      In support of its action, Ryanair relied on 10 pleas in law, alleging, in essence: (i) that the measure at issue falls outside the scope of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring; (ii) a manifest error of assessment with regard to demonstrating market failure and social hardship; (iii) to (vi), that the Commission failed to establish the need for State intervention and its incentive effect, that the restructuring plan is realistic, coherent and far-reaching and suitable to restore Condor’s long-term viability, and the appropriateness or proportionality of the aid at issue; (vii) that the Commission erred in its examination of the negative effects of the measure at issue; (viii) infringement of the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment; (ix) infringement of its procedural rights; and (x) breach of the duty to state reasons.

16      In the judgment under appeal, the General Court, after rejecting the first to eighth pleas as inadmissible, examined Ryanair’s ninth plea, alleging infringement of its procedural rights, in which it, in essence, relied on eight limbs (which the General Court referred to as ‘items of evidence’) relating to the content of the decision at issue, corresponding to the elements referred to in the first eight pleas of its action for annulment, which were alleged to show that the Commission should have had doubts during the preliminary examination of the measure at issue.

17      After rejecting the first five of those limbs, the General Court found, as regards the sixth limb, that Ryanair had demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the Commission should have had doubts as to whether the measure at issue satisfied the requirement set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring. The General Court, after carrying out a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of that point, found in paragraph 233 of the judgment under appeal that, having regard to that interpretation, the Commission was not entitled, without having any doubts, to find that the measure at issue did not fall within the scope of point 67 and to fail to examine whether that measure complied with the requirements set out in that point.

18      In addition, as regards the seventh limb, alleging that the Commission had erred in its review of the negative effects of the measure at issue, the General Court found in paragraph 237 of the judgment under appeal that it was apparent, in essence, from recital 150 of the decision at issue that, in the context of the calibration of measures to limit distortions of competition, the Commission had taken into consideration, among other factors, the extent of own contribution and burden sharing in the present case. The General Court accordingly found, in paragraph 238 of the judgment, that the doubts that the Commission should have had as regards compliance with the requirement set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring in respect of adequate burden sharing necessarily affected the Commission’s assessment in recitals 141 to 152 of the decision at issue as regards the scope of measures to limit distortions of competition that are applicable to Condor.

19      In paragraph 241 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the Commission’s failure to examine compliance with the requirement set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring on adequate burden sharing rendered that examination incomplete and insufficient as regards the negative effects of the measure at issue and, in particular, the calibration of measures to limit distortions of competition, the scope of which depends, inter alia, on the degree of burden sharing. The General Court concluded in paragraph 242 of that judgment that the incomplete and insufficient examination with respect to the burden-sharing requirements and the negative effects of the measure at issue was indicative of the doubts that the Commission should have had in that regard.

20      In those circumstances, the General Court held that Ryanair had demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the Commission should have had doubts justifying the initiation of the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU. The General Court thus annulled the decision at issue, finding that there was no need to examine the eighth limb put forward by Ryanair, relating to infringement of the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment, or its tenth plea, alleging breach of the duty to state reasons.

IV.    Forms of order sought by the parties

21      Condor claims that the Court of Justice should:

–        set aside the judgment under appeal;

–        dismiss the action brought in Case T‑28/22; and

–        order Ryanair to pay the costs relating to the first-instance and appeal proceedings.

22      Ryanair contends that the Court of Justice should:

–        dismiss the appeal; and

–        order Condor to pay all the costs incurred by Ryanair in the present proceedings.

23      The Commission contends that the Court of Justice should:

–        uphold the appeal, set aside the judgment under appeal and dismiss the action brought in Case T‑28/22; and

–        order Ryanair to pay the costs relating to the first-instance and appeal proceedings.

24      The Federal Republic of Germany contends that the Court of Justice should:

–        uphold the appeal, and

–        order Ryanair to pay the costs.

V.      Application to reopen the oral part of the procedure

25      After delivery by the Advocate General of his Opinion on 26 March 2026, Condor, by document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 5 May 2026, requested that the oral part of the procedure be reopened.

26      In support of that request, Condor argues, first, that the Advocate General’s Opinion does not sufficiently address the question of whether recital 135 of the decision at issue contains an analysis which complies with the one required by point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring.

27      It argues that the Advocate General proposed in the Opinion not to answer that question and to dismiss the second ground of appeal for reasons of admissibility, based on an overly restrictive reading of the arguments raised by Condor, the Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany. However, it submits that that question requires a more thorough examination.

28      Second, Condor submits that the Advocate General’s Opinion failed to carry out a sufficient examination of the uncertainty related to the interpretation of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring and erred in determining the obligation to state reasons imposed on the Commission.

29      In that regard, it should be borne in mind, first, that under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require his or her involvement. The Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based (judgment of 21 May 2026, Mr Green, C‑198/24, EU:C:2026:415, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

30      Second, the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of that statute to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion. Therefore, the fact that a party or an interested person disagrees with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions examined in the Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (judgment of 21 May 2026, Mr Green, C‑198/24, EU:C:2026:415, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

31      Accordingly, to the extent that, by its request to reopen the oral part of the procedure, Condor is seeking to respond to the stance taken by the Advocate General in his Opinion and to clarify certain factual and legal aspects, which, moreover, have already been discussed in the written and oral parts of the procedure before the Court of Justice, that request must be rejected.

32      It is true that, under Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may at any time, after hearing the Advocate General, order the reopening of the oral part of the procedure, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court, or where the case must be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

33      However, the Court finds in the present case that, after the written part of the procedure and the hearing held before it, it has all the information required to rule on the appeal.

34      In those circumstances, the Court finds, after hearing the Advocate General, that there is no need to order the reopening of the oral part of the procedure.

VI.    The appeal

35      By its appeal, Condor raises three grounds of appeal. The first claims that point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring is not applicable to the measure at issue. The second argues that there were no doubts as to whether point 67 has been complied with. Lastly, the third ground of appeal claims that the alleged error had no impact on the outcome of the decision at issue.

A.      Admissibility

1.      Arguments of the parties

36      Ryanair observes that the Commission, following the delivery of the judgment under appeal, adopted Decision C(2024) 5322 final of 29 July 2024 on State Aid SA.63203 (2024/C) (ex 2021/N) – Germany – Restructuring aid for Condor, which initiates a formal investigation procedure with a view to the adoption of a new decision on Condor’s restructuring aid. Ryanair claims that the probable adoption of such a decision raises doubts concerning not only Condor’s legal interest in bringing proceedings in the present appeal but also as regards the ‘status’ of any new decision if the judgment under appeal were to be set aside.

37      Condor, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Commission contend that the appeal is admissible.

2.      Findings of the Court

38      It follows from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that any natural or legal person who brings an appeal must have an interest in bringing proceedings, the existence of which must be assessed in the light of the subject matter of that appeal, on the one hand, and the date on which it is brought, on the other. Failure to comply with this essential requirement constitutes a ground of inadmissibility of public policy which may, at any time, be raised ex officio by the EU judicature of its own motion (judgment of 26 September 2024, Orlen v Commission, C‑255/22 P, EU:C:2024:790, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

39      Furthermore, that interest in bringing proceedings must, like the purpose of the dispute itself, continue until the final decision. Consequently, the disappearance of that interest or that subject matter during the proceedings may lead the EU judicature to find, if necessary of its own motion, that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action (judgment of 26 September 2024, Orlen v Commission, C‑255/22 P, EU:C:2024:790, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

40      In general, both the existence and the continuing existence of an interest in bringing proceedings presuppose that the appeal is liable, if successful, to procure an advantage to the natural or legal person who brought it. In all cases, that question must be assessed specifically (judgment of 26 September 2024, Orlen v Commission, C‑255/22 P, EU:C:2024:790, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

41      In the present case, Ryanair contests the admissibility of the appeal on the ground that the Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure with a view to adopting a new decision on Condor’s restructuring aid and that, therefore, the probable adoption of that decision implies that Condor no longer has a legal interest in pursuing the present appeal.

42      It was confirmed at the hearing before the Court that, following the adoption of the decision to initiate the procedure referred to in paragraph 36 above, the Commission had indeed adopted Decision (EU) 2025/2178 of 28 April 2025 on State aid SA.63203 (2024/C) (ex 2021/N) implemented by Germany for Condor Flugdienst GmbH, by which it found that the measure at issue was compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.

43      In that regard, it should be stated, as observed by Condor and the Commission, that the adoption of Decision 2025/2178 cannot call into question Condor’s legal interest in pursuing the present appeal. That decision, which comes to the conclusion that the measure at issue is compatible with the internal market, does not have the effect of retroactively rectifying the decision at issue that was found by the General Court to be unlawful. However, if Condor’s appeal is upheld, the decision at issue would again produce legal effects as of its adoption. It follows that the present appeal, despite the adoption of Decision 2025/2178, is capable of procuring an advantage to Condor.

44      The appeal is therefore admissible.

B.      Substance

1.      The first ground of appeal

(a)    Arguments of the parties

45      By its first ground of appeal, which has three limbs, Condor claims that the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraphs 208 to 231 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission should have applied point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring to a partial write-off of debt such as that included in the measure at issue.

46      In the first place, Condor argues that the General Court misinterpreted the scope of point 67.

47      First of all, as regards the literal interpretation of point 67, the words ‘in view of the amount of State equity injected’, in the second half of that point, refer, as was noted by the General Court in paragraph 215 of the judgment under appeal, only to a situation where there has been an injection of capital. However, the General Court extended the scope of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring to all other forms of aid which enhance the beneficiary’s equity position, including the write-off of debt, which are referred to in point 65 of those guidelines.

48      The General Court thereby, in paragraphs 216 to 218 of the judgment under appeal, created an artificial inconsistency between the second part of point 67 and the first part thereof, which uses the generic terms ‘aid that enhances the beneficiary’s equity position’. In that regard, Condor asserts that a debt that is written off by the State is no longer due and will therefore no longer have to be repaid by the debtor, such that it cannot be considered, in such a situation, that the amount the State gives up is ‘paid’ to the beneficiary of the write-off of debt. Moreover, it is necessary to take account of the fact that points 65 to 68 of the guidelines, which explain the concept of burden sharing, are not drafted in a conclusive and exhaustive manner.

49      Next, as regards the contextual interpretation of point 67, Condor argues that even though the General Court recognises that the requirements laid down by points 66 and 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring are autonomous, it states, however, in paragraph 214 of the judgment under appeal, that point 67 should have the same scope as that of points 65 and 66 thereof. However, the scope of point 67 of the guidelines is narrower than that of point 66 and does not cover the write-off of debt.

50      Point 67 thus concerns only capital injections since they entail a shareholding in the beneficiary’s capital and as such normally create an entitlement to a share of gains in value. Point 67 thus makes it possible to verify that State capital injections are not granted on unusual terms and that the State is afforded a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure in comparison with the remaining equity. If the scope of point 67 were extended to the provision of grants and the write-off of debt, that would entail an excessive benefit for the State.

51      Condor adds that, in contrast to what was found by the General Court in paragraph 225 of the judgment under appeal, State aid law does not require that a State, when it grants restructuring aid, regardless of its form, should benefit from future gains in value of the beneficiary of that aid. First, not all forms of State aid allow for the same burden sharing and, second, a share in future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure is inherent only to a capital injection.

52      Condor argues that, contrary to what is stated in paragraph 218 of the judgment under appeal, the alleged inconsistency of the wording of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, which, according to the General Court, is ‘attributable to the Commission, as it drew up those guidelines’, cannot, in any event, oblige the Commission to initiate the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU.

53      Lastly, as regards the objective of point 67 of those guidelines, the General Court, in paragraphs 226 to 229 of the judgment under appeal, unlawfully extended that objective to the one underlying points 65 and 66 of the guidelines, namely to avoid the risk of moral hazard. However, the writing off of debt does not lead to the same moral hazard as that which arises from an injection of capital. In that regard, Condor states that affording the State a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the State aid measure does not necessarily reduce incentives for an undertaking to take excessive risks in order to generate more profits. Indeed, point 67 does not follow the same logic or objective as point 66, given that points 66 and 67 differ in both their content and their temporal application. Moreover, the Commission, in its previous decision-making practice related to State aid, has required that a share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure be afforded to the State only in the context of State aid in the form of a capital injection.

54      In any event, Condor claims that extending the scope of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring is not justified in a situation such as the one at hand, in which the restructuring is implemented with the support of a private investor which invests in the beneficiary of the aid measure on the best terms for Condor and for the repayment of the public loans. It observes that the acquisition of Condor by Attestor Ltd, an investment fund, was conditional on the grant of the measure at issue and that that acquisition offered the best conditions for the repayment of the public loans. Accordingly, in such a situation, the amount of debt written off and the future profits of the beneficiary of the aid measure, as well as their distribution between the State and the private investor, are reflected in the conditions accepted by that private investor for the acquisition of the beneficiary.

55      In the second place, Condor argues that, assuming that the General Court did not err in the interpretation of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, it in any event unduly interfered with the competences of the Commission and the discretion the latter enjoys in interpreting its own guidelines.

56      The question of whether point 67 applies to the write-off of debt falls within the Commission’s discretion in applying those guidelines. In that regard, the General Court found in paragraph 219 of the judgment under appeal that the wording of point 67 ‘is open to several interpretations’. The Commission’s approach of limiting the scope of point 67 to capital injections by the State is, at the very least, plausible. By failing to limit its examination thereof to a plausibility test, the General Court unlawfully substituted its assessment for that of the Commission.

57      In addition, the General Court failed to take account of the fact that the Commission, in its previous decision-making practice, has never required that a share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure be afforded to the State in the case of State aid consisting of a partial write-off of debt.

58      In the third place, Condor submits that the General Court erred in law in stating in paragraph 223 of the judgment under appeal ‘that the Member States and the Commission do not enjoy discretion as regards their obligation to satisfy the requirement of point 67 of the [Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring]’.

59      First, the General Court applied an overly narrow interpretation of point 68 of those guidelines. If it should be accepted, as indicated by the General Court in paragraph 225 of the judgment under appeal, that the respective scopes of points 66 and 67 of those guidelines coincide, then point 68 thereof should be read broadly in order to cover both point 66 and point 67. Such an interpretation is all the more necessary in that the application of point 67 to the write-off of debt could privilege the State in comparison to private providers of funds or holders of written-off debt who do not enjoy the same benefit.

60      Second, the General Court, in paragraph 223 of the judgment under appeal, infringed Article 107(3) TFEU. It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that Member States retain the right to notify the Commission of proposed State aid which does not meet all the criteria laid down by the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring. Accordingly, even an aid measure that does not satisfy the requirements on burden sharing, for the purposes of points 65 to 69 of those guidelines, does not prevent the Commission from applying Article 107(3) TFEU directly. In the present case, at the very least, Attestor’s involvement in the restructuring of Condor justified a departure from point 67 of those guidelines and the direct application of Article 107(3) TFEU.

61      Ryanair contends that the first ground of appeal should be rejected.

(b)    Findings of the Court

62      As regards the first limb of the first ground of appeal, which concerns, in essence, the scope of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, referred to in paragraph 209 of the judgment under appeal, in interpreting a rule of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 23 April 2026, NOI – Blagoevgrad, C‑116/25, EU:C:2026:336, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

63      The same applies to guidelines adopted by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 October 2023, Est Wind Power, C‑11/22, EU:C:2023:765, paragraph 46).

64      It must be found that the General Court did not err in law in considering that it is apparent from the literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring that the requirement related to ‘adequate burden sharing’ provided for by that point also concerns a situation in which the aid measure consists of a write-off of debt.

65      Indeed, point 67 states that ‘adequate burden sharing will also mean that any State aid that enhances the beneficiary's equity position should be granted on terms that afford the State a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary, in view of the amount of State equity injected in comparison with the remaining equity of the company after losses have been accounted for’.

66      As the General Court found in paragraphs 210 to 213 of the judgment under appeal, point 67 is thus intended to apply to ‘any State aid that enhances the beneficiary’s equity position’, namely inter alia, as is apparent from point 65 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, grants, injections of capital and debt write-offs.

67      In that regard, the fact that point 67 of those guidelines refers to ‘State equity injected’ is not such as to limit the scope of that point solely to aid involving an injection of capital. First, as the General Court pointed out in paragraph 217 of the judgment under appeal, that part of point 67 of the guidelines refers to the requirement related to the ‘reasonable share’ of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid that the State must obtain. Second, and principally, as the General Court stated in paragraph 222 of that judgment, the application of point 67 to any State aid that enhances the equity position of the beneficiary of the aid measure accords with the scopes of points 65 and 66 of those guidelines, with those three points falling under the same subsection of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, headed ‘3.5.2.2. Burden sharing’.

68      In that regard, Condor cannot validly claim that point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring has a narrower scope than that of points 65 and 66 thereof. As the General Court found in paragraph 225 of the judgment under appeal, it should be held that there is nothing to indicate that points 65 to 67 of those guidelines should have differing scopes, depending on the form taken by the State support, provided that such support enhances the equity position of the beneficiary of the aid measure. In particular, the general scheme of the requirements set out in points 66 and 67 of those guidelines and the fact that they are cumulative suggest that, as with point 65 thereof, those requirements are intended to apply to any State aid aimed at achieving such an enhancement.

69      Lastly, the General Court was correct to find, in paragraph 226 of the judgment under appeal, that, as is apparent from several points of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, the objective of point 67 thereof, and of the other points related to burden sharing, is to prevent moral hazard, where the latter refers, as is clear from point 9 of those guidelines, to situations where undertakings, anticipating that they are likely to be rescued or restructured when they run into difficulty, may embark upon excessively risky and unsustainable business strategies. Such moral hazard exists, as the General Court found in essence in paragraph 227 of that judgment, regardless of the type of State support that enhances the equity position of the beneficiary of the aid measure, whether that support consists of a grant, a capital injection or a debt write-off.

70      It follows that the General Court was entitled to find, having regard to the literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, that that point is applicable to an aid measure such as that at issue in the present case, which consists of a partial write-off of debt. Since that interpretation of the scope of point 67 is not vitiated by any error of law, it is necessary to reject the first limb of the first ground of appeal.

71      As regards the second limb of that ground of appeal, concerning the scope of judicial review of the Commission’s exercise of its powers in relation to the adoption and interpretation of its own guidelines, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the adoption by the Commission of guidelines forms part of the exercise by the latter of its exclusive competence to assess the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market under Article 107(3) TFEU. It enjoys a wide discretion in that regard (judgment of 11 January 2024, Wizz Air Hungary v Commission, C‑440/22 P, EU:C:2024:26, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

72      However, by laying down such guidelines, in order to establish the criteria on the basis of which it proposes to assess the compatibility, with the internal market, of aid measures envisaged by the Member States and announcing, by publishing them, that it will, from now on, apply them to the cases covered by those guidelines, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of the discretion granted to it in that respect by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and cannot, as a general rule, depart from those guidelines, at the risk of being found to be in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).

73      In the present case, the General Court, in interpreting point 67 of the guidelines, assessed, in paragraphs 208 et seq. of the judgment under appeal, whether, as the Commission had maintained in the proceedings before it, that institution was able to take the view, without entertaining any doubts, that the measure at issue did not fall within the scope of point 67, meaning that it was not required to carry out a review of whether that measure complied with the requirement set out in that point.

74      In that regard, the General Court did not at all encroach on the discretion enjoyed by the Commission when applying the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring. The General Court in fact carried out a strictly legal review, as it was bound to do, of the interpretation of the scope of point 67 of those guidelines, without in any way substituting its own assessment for the complex economic assessments of the Commission.

75      Furthermore, contrary to what is claimed by Condor and the Commission, the argument, to the effect that the interpretation of point 67 put forward by the Commission before the General Court is ‘plausible’ and should therefore have been accepted by the latter, cannot succeed. Indeed, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 67 of his Opinion, accepting the Commission’s point of view would amount to weakening the judicial review carried out by the EU judicature and to eroding legal certainty since the Commission would be able to rely on a lack of precision in guidelines in order to avoid applying its own self-imposed rules correctly.

76      In addition, Condor's argument that the General Court failed to take account of the fact that the Commission, in previous decisions, has never required that the State should be afforded a share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure where the State aid consists of a partial write-off of debt, must be rejected since the validity of a Commission decision cannot be assessed in the light of the decision-making practice of that institution (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑321/21 P, EU:C:2023:713, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

77      The second limb of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.

78      As regards, lastly, the third limb of the present ground of appeal, it must be found that the General Court’s assessment in paragraph 223 of the judgment under appeal is not vitiated by any error of law. First, in contrast to what is stated by Condor, it is clear from the very wording of point 68 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring that that point constitutes an exception solely to the requirements laid down in point 66 of the guidelines and thus does not concern point 67 thereof.

79      Second, Condor cannot legitimately claim that Attestor’s participation in Condor’s restructuring justified a departure by the Commission from point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring and the direct application by that institution of Article 107(3) TFEU. In fact, Condor’s line of argument amounts to arguing that the fact that Attestor was chosen in order to enable repayment of the public loans that Condor had received means that it is no longer necessary to apply point 67. However, as the General Court indicates in paragraph 232 of the judgment under appeal, the future repayment of the remaining portion of Condor’s debt to the State cannot justify the lack of an examination of the State’s participation in future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure since that would amount to rendering the requirement set out in point 67 meaningless. Moreover, as the General Court observes in that same paragraph, by its very essence, a partial write-off of debt implies that the part of the debt not written off will be repaid.

80      It follows that the third limb of the first ground of appeal cannot be upheld. Accordingly, that ground of appeal must be dismissed as unfounded.

2.      The second ground of appeal

81      By the second ground of appeal, which has two limbs, Condor complains that the General Court erred in finding that the Commission should have had doubts as to whether the measure at issue satisfied the requirement set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring.

(a)    Admissibility

82      In the first place, Ryanair contends primarily that the second ground of appeal, which is based on the argument that the Commission correctly applied point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, is inadmissible. First, in claiming that ‘if the company performs well, a larger portion of the loan-amount should be repaid’ Condor is in fact asking the Court of Justice to revisit the facts of the case that the General Court has already reviewed, namely the contractual clauses governing the modification and the write-off of loans granted to Condor.

83      Second, Ryanair submits that the General Court found that the evidence set out in the decision at issue did not contain the relevant information that has to be taken into account in order to assess whether the measure at issue includes requirements that would afford the Federal Republic of Germany a share of future gains in value of the appellant, or which enables a determination to be made of whether the share of those future gains in value is reasonable or not. It argues that all those elements fall within factual assessments.

84      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law. The General Court alone has jurisdiction to establish and assess the relevant facts. The assessment of those facts does not therefore constitute, save in the case of their distortion, a question of law subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (judgment of 4 October 2024, Ferriere Nord v Commission, C‑31/23 P, EU:C:2024:851, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

85      However, in asking the Court of Justice to satisfy itself that the General Court was entitled to find, in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had failed to assess, in the decision at issue, whether the measure at issue complied with the requirements set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, the appellant seeks to call into question the General Court’s assessment of the reasoning given in that decision and, ultimately, its assessment of the legal test contained in point 67 related to burden sharing.

86      Such a question thus constitutes a point of law that may be subject to review by the Court of Justice in an appeal (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 September 2024, Commission v Ireland and Others, C‑465/20 P, EU:C:2024:724, paragraphs 111 and 112 and the case-law cited).

87      Accordingly, Ryanair’s plea of inadmissibility must be rejected.

88      In the second place, Ryanair, during the hearing held before the Court of Justice, raised a further plea of inadmissibility related to the second ground of appeal, arguing that the Commission’s claims in support of that ground of appeal, namely that recitals 135 and 136 of the decision at issue contain an assessment of the requirements arising from point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, should have been raised in a cross-appeal since those claims amount in reality to a new ground of appeal that was not raised by Condor in its appeal.

89      It should be borne in mind that the Commission, as a party to the case before the General Court having an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed, may submit a response under Article 172 of the Rules of Procedure. In accordance with Article 174 of the Rules of Procedure, the response is to seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part. Furthermore, under Article 176 of those rules, parties authorised to lodge a response may submit, by a document separate from the response, a cross-appeal, which, in accordance with Article 178(1) and (3), second sentence, of those rules, must seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the General Court on the basis of pleas in law and arguments separate from those relied on in the response.

90      It is apparent from those provisions, read together, that the response may not seek to have the judgment of the General Court set aside on the basis of distinct and independent grounds from those raised in the appeal, since such grounds may be raised only as part of a cross-appeal (judgments of 14 September 2023, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Deutsche Lufthansa, C‑466/21 P, EU:C:2023:666, paragraph 51, and of 1 August 2025, France and Commission v CWS Powder Coatings and Others, C‑71/23 P and C‑82/23 P, EU:C:2025:601, paragraph 57).

91      In the present case, it is true that the appellant did not specifically refer in the second ground of appeal to recital 135 of the decision at issue. In essence, it based its line of argument in relation to that ground of appeal on the fact that recital 126 of that decision contained the assessment required under point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring.

92      That being said, it should be stated that in its response, the Commission essentially made the same claim as that put forward by the appellant in the ground of appeal in question, namely that the General Court had erred in considering that the decision at issue did not contain an assessment that demonstrated the compliance of the measure at issue with point 67. The Commission states in the response that ‘in addition to the parts of that decision invoked by Condor, the Commission underlines that it duly assessed the burden sharing aspect of the aid in recital 135 of that decision’.

93      In those circumstances, the fact that the Commission referred to a different recital of the decision at issue from that cited by the appellant, whereas the arguments of both those parties are intended to bring about the same finding of an error of law purportedly committed by the General Court, namely that, in contrast to what the latter held, the decision at issue does indeed contain an assessment under point 67, does not mean that the Commission has raised an independent and distinct argument that should have been submitted separately in a cross-appeal.

94      The second plea of inadmissibility put forward by Ryanair must therefore be rejected.

95      It follows that the second ground of appeal and the arguments submitted by the Commission in support of that ground are admissible.

(b)    Substance

(1)    Arguments of the parties

96      The appellant’s second ground of appeal has two limbs.

97      In the first place, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in asserting, in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had failed to assess whether the measure at issue complied with the requirements set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring. It asserts that the decision at issue contains sufficient elements to consider that those requirements are complied with, while the lack of an explicit reference to point 67 in that decision does not call such an assertion into question.

98      In addition, in paragraph 232 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court wrongly rejected Condor’s argument that the future repayment of the remaining portion of the debt resulting from the COVID-19 loans of 2020 could be considered as ensuring the State ‘a reasonable share of future gains in value’ of that company, within the meaning of that point 67. In that regard, the appellant argues that the General Court manifestly distorted its submissions by redacting the essential content thereof and by finding that Condor had ‘supplemented the statement of reasons’ for the decision at issue during the proceedings. It is in fact apparent from recital 126 of that decision that Attestor’s bid offered the best conditions for the repayment of the public loans and that the financial package offered by Attestor also reflected the potential future profits that Condor could generate.

99      In the second place, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law by finding, in paragraph 232 of the judgment under appeal, that securing the best conditions for the repayment of the public loans through the package offered by Attestor could not be considered as affording the State a reasonable share of future gains of the appellant, for the purposes of the aforementioned point 67.

100    The appellant submits, in fact, that if the conditions under which the part of the debt not written off will be repaid are, as in the present case, ‘optimised’ through the contributions of a private investor, then the State is afforded such a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure. The appellant observes that it is apparent from recital 126 of the decision at issue that the financial package offered by Attestor includes a partial write-off and an earn-out mechanism for certain parts of the restructured loans, meaning that if the company performs well, a larger portion of the loan amount will have to be repaid. Accordingly, repayment conditional on a certain level of performance by Condor ensures that the State is afforded a reasonable share of the latter’s future gains in value.

101    The Commission submits that Condor is correct in arguing that the decision at issue contains sufficient elements to consider that the requirements under point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring have been complied with in the present case, despite the lack of an explicit reference to point 67 in that decision.

102    It states that, even in the light of the classical methods of interpretation of provisions of EU law, the General Court erred in interpreting point 67 by extending the latter’s scope beyond the categories of persons concerned by the risks of moral hazard, namely existing investors.

103    In that regard, the General Court completely disregarded the assessment in the decision at issue of whether the aid measure involved adequate burden sharing. The Commission argues that it is apparent from recital 135 of that decision that the former shareholder of Condor lost all the value of its shareholding and would in no way benefit from any advantage resulting from a successful restructuring of Condor, while Condor’s creditors wrote off almost all their claims. The Commission therefore concluded in recital 136 of that decision that the restructuring aid involved adequate burden sharing, which sufficed to show compliance with points 66 and 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring.

104    In that context, the Commission submits that it drew the General Court’s attention to the relevant factual elements that were the basis for its assessment set out in recitals 135 and 136 of that decision. However, the General Court failed to assess those crucial elements.

105    The Federal Republic of Germany argues, in essence, that even if the German State had a zero share in future gains in value of Condor, that would have been reasonable in the present case.

106    Ryanair argues that the present ground of appeal is unfounded. In contrast to what is claimed by the appellant, the decision at issue, in particular recital 126 thereof, does not address the question of whether the share of the State in future gains in value of the appellant is reasonable, for the purposes of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring.

107    As regards the claim that a failure to state reasons vitiates the General Court’s judgment, Ryanair asserts that it is apparent from paragraph 232 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court took into account the entire decision at issue, including recitals 126, 135 and 136 thereof.

(2)    Findings of the Court

108    As regards the first limb of the second ground of appeal, in which Condor complains that the General Court failed to assess the content of the decision at issue, it should be observed that the General Court found, in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had failed to assess in that decision whether the measure at issue complied with the requirements of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring. According to the General Court, there is nothing in that decision to suggest that the Commission examined the question of whether the measure at issue had been granted on terms that would afford the Federal Republic of Germany a reasonable share of future gains in value of Condor.

109    In order to assess whether the first limb is well founded, it is necessary, in the first place, to determine the scope of point 67, which must be done, as observed in paragraph 62 above, in the light of the wording of that point, its context and the objective that it pursues.

110    As regards the wording of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, as was stated in paragraph 65 above, that point states that adequate burden sharing also means that any State aid that enhances the equity position of the beneficiary of the aid measure should be granted on terms that afford the State a reasonable share of future gains in value of that beneficiary, in view of the amount of State equity injected in comparison with the remaining equity of the company after losses have been accounted for.

111    Point 67, which consists of only one sentence, thus provides both for the obligation that the State, in certain circumstances, should receive a reasonable share of future gains in that beneficiary and for the way in which it is necessary to assess whether that share is ‘reasonable’. That share must in fact be reasonable in view of the amount of State equity injected ‘in comparison with the remaining equity of the company after losses have been accounted for’. That equity remaining after losses have been accounted for is therefore the sole reference amount that makes it possible to assess whether the future gains in value that should be accorded to the State are ‘reasonable’. That constitutes an important textual indication that the State should receive a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure only where that beneficiary still has equity after losses have been accounted for.

112    The context of point 67 confirms that interpretation. Appearing in subsection ‘3.5.2.2. Burden Sharing’, points 65 and 66 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring refer specifically to existing investors, incumbent shareholders and subordinated creditors. Burden sharing within the meaning of those two latter points therefore does not concern the situation of new investors.

113    Indeed, point 65 of those guidelines states that aid to cover losses should only be granted on terms which involve adequate burden sharing by existing investors. Point 66 of the guidelines adds that adequate burden sharing normally means that incumbent shareholders and, as necessary, subordinated creditors must absorb losses in full.

114    It should therefore be found that the concept of ‘adequate burden sharing’ referred to in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring must have the same meaning as that which emerges clearly from the other two points appearing in the same subsection of those guidelines, namely that that concept refers to burden sharing among existing shareholders and subordinated creditors of the beneficiary of the aid measure, while that concept is not relevant in respect of new investors which invest in that undertaking after State aid has been granted.

115    It thus follows from a literal and contextual interpretation of point 67 that the requirement that the State should be afforded a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure is applicable only when there is remaining equity after the losses of that beneficiary have been accounted for by existing investors, namely the incumbent shareholders and, as necessary, the subordinated creditors of that beneficiary.

116    That interpretation is in keeping with the objective pursued by the aforementioned points 65 to 67, which is in particular, as is apparent from points 9, 11 and 65 of those guidelines, to avoid moral hazard. In that regard, point 9 of the guidelines shows that undertakings anticipating rescue and restructuring aid may embark upon unduly risky and unsustainable business strategies, while such aid may, in addition, artificially reduce the cost of capital of the recipient undertaking, giving it an undue competitive advantage in the marketplace. Point 65 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring states, furthermore, that it is necessary to prevent shareholders and subordinated creditors from being protected from the consequences of their choice to invest in the beneficiary of the aid measure, which requires adequate burden sharing by existing investors.

117    However, in the context of adequate burden sharing for the purposes of those points 65 to 67, where the existing investors of the beneficiary of the aid measure, that is, shareholders and, where necessary, subordinated creditors, have lost all their rights, that risk of moral hazard does not exist since those investors have borne the consequences of their choice to invest in that beneficiary.

118    In addition, that interpretation means that it is possible to avoid placing the requirement related to adequate burden sharing on new investors in the beneficiary of the aid measure. Indeed, the risk of moral hazard as regards new investors in the company that has benefited from the aid measure, and as regards that company itself, is mitigated by the principle set out in point 70 of those guidelines, according to which ‘in order to reduce moral hazard, excessive risk-taking incentives and potential competitive distortions, aid should be granted to undertakings in difficulty in respect of only one restructuring operation. This is referred to as the “one time, last time” principle’. Having regard to that principle, the behaviour of the undertaking that has benefited from the aid measure and of those who invest in it after it has been granted rescue and restructuring aid will take account of the fact that that undertaking will not receive any more such aid.

119    Furthermore, as Condor and the Commission have submitted, an application of point 67 of those guidelines to new investors, to the effect that they would always be required to share the benefits of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure with the State, even in situations where there is no, or almost no, equity remaining in the undertaking after losses have been accounted for, and where all the equity that exists after the grant of aid is from new investments, could have the consequence of discouraging the participation of investors that may be able to contribute to restructuring an undertaking in difficulty. That would cause an increase in the amounts of State aid needed for that restructuring, contrary to what is required by the principle of point 61 of the guidelines of limiting the aid to the minimum necessary.

120    In the second place, as regards whether, in the present case, the General Court erred in finding in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal that the Commission had failed to assess whether the measure at issue complied with the requirements set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, that institution claims that such an assessment may be found in recital 135 of the decision at issue.

121    In the present case, recital 135, which is part of the subsection of that decision entitled ‘Proportionality, own contribution and burden-sharing’, states that ‘as regards sharing the burden of the restructuring by former shareholders and subordinated creditors, it is apparent that the former controlling shareholder of Condor, [Thomas Cook], is wound-up and being liquidated, whilst the shares of Condor have been transferred to a trust (recitals (12) and (19)). [Thomas Cook] loses all the value of its shareholding and will in no way benefit from any upside of the successful restructuring of Condor. Likewise, Condor’s creditors write off almost all their claims in the insolvency procedure, and thus contribute to the restructuring plan. The write-off contribution exceeds the amount of the restructuring aid both in terms of partial write-off and continuation of restructured KfW [Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (the German public development bank)] loans made available to Condor. Former shareholders and creditors of Condor effectively contribute to the restructuring, thus diminishing the need for State aid and reducing moral hazard’.

122    The Commission concludes in recital 136 of that decision that ‘the restructuring aid is proportionate and involves appropriate burden-sharing’.

123    In that regard, it is true that recital 135 of that decision does not explicitly cite point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, or even points 65 and 66 thereof. That being said, recital 135 concerns the examination of the requirement for adequate burden sharing and for limiting the risk of moral hazard, specifically covered by those points, stating, first, that Thomas Cook, Condor’s former parent company, is losing all the value of its shareholding and will in no way benefit from any upside of the successful restructuring of Condor and, second, that Condor’s creditors are writing off almost all their claims in the insolvency procedure, thus contributing to the restructuring plan.

124    Accordingly, that assessment of Condor’s situation shows that the Commission ascertained whether burden sharing had indeed been put into place in order to avoid the risk of moral hazard on the part of existing investors, which reflects the analysis required by points 65 to 67 of the guidelines. In particular, the finding that all, or almost all, of the losses of that undertaking have been attributed to existing investors and that its former parent company is losing all the value of its shareholding and will in no way benefit from any upside of the successful restructuring of that undertaking, makes it possible to find that the Commission took the view, implicitly but necessarily, that there was no longer any need to carry out the assessment in relation to point 67 of those guidelines since there was no longer any equity in that undertaking that had to be taken into account in view of the amount of State equity injected in the framework of future gains in value of Condor.

125    It is apparent from the interpretation of point 67 of those guidelines carried out in paragraphs 110 to 119 above that adequate burden sharing, within the meaning of that point, which implies that the State should receive a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure, seeks to avoid the risk of moral hazard and applies only where that beneficiary still possesses equity after losses have been accounted for by that beneficiary’s existing investors.

126    It follows, having regard to the elements set out in recital 135 of the decision at issue, that it should be found that the Commission was no longer required to carry out a further examination of Condor’s situation in the light of point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring.

127    Consequently, the General Court erred in law in holding in paragraph 207 of the judgment under appeal that the Commission had failed in the decision at issue to assess whether the measure at issue complied with the requirements set out in point 67 of those guidelines.

128    It is apparent from the foregoing findings that the first limb of the second ground of appeal is well founded and that, therefore, that ground of appeal must be upheld, without there being any necessity to examine the other argument made in that first limb or the second limb of that ground of appeal.

3.      The third ground of appeal

(a)    Arguments of the parties

129    By its third ground of appeal, Condor argues that the General Court committed an error of law in paragraph 238 of the judgment under appeal by finding that alleged non-compliance with point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring had an impact on the outcome on the decision at issue.

130    Ryanair argues that the third ground of appeal should be rejected. It submits that the General Court did not commit an error of law by finding that lack of compliance with point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring had an impact on the outcome on the decision at issue. Since the Commission did not assess whether the State would receive a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary of the aid measure, it was not possible to determine whether the measures to limit distortions of competition were adequate. The Commission therefore could not conclude that the aid measure was compatible.

131    Sharing the view expressed by Condor, the Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany argue that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 238 of the judgment under appeal.

(b)    Findings of the Court

132    It should be borne in mind that the General Court found in paragraph 237 of the judgment under appeal that it was apparent from recital 150 of the decision at issue, in essence, that, in the context of the calibration of measures to limit distortions of competition, the Commission took into consideration, among other factors, the extent of own contribution and burden sharing in the present case.

133    The General Court thus found, in paragraph 238 of the judgment, that the doubts that the Commission should have had as regards compliance with the requirement set out in point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring in respect of adequate burden sharing necessarily affect the Commission’s assessment in recitals 141 to 152 of that decision as regards the scope of measures to limit distortions of competition that are applicable to Condor.

134    However, it is sufficient to find that the fact that the second ground of appeal has been upheld necessarily means that the third ground of appeal must also be accepted. It is apparent from the analysis related to the second ground of appeal that the Commission cannot be criticised for any failure to assess the aid measure in the light of the aforementioned point 67. Accordingly, the General Court erred in law in paragraph 238 of the judgment under appeal by relying on the absence of such an assessment in order to find that the Commission’s analysis in recital 150 of that decision, which explicitly refers to the considerations in recital 135 thereof, was mistaken.

135    It is apparent from all of the foregoing considerations that the second and third grounds of appeal must be upheld and that the judgment under appeal must therefore be set aside.

VII. The action before the General Court

136    Under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court is to quash the decision of the General Court if the appeal is well founded. It may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

137    As observed in paragraph 20 above, the General Court, in the judgment under appeal, upheld the seventh limb (described by the General Court as an ‘item of evidence’) of the ninth plea in law of Ryanair’s action for annulment, corresponding to the elements raised in the seventh plea in that action, alleging that the Commission had committed errors in its analysis of the negative effects of the measure at issue. The General Court therefore annulled the decision at issue without examining the eighth limb (also described by the General Court as an ‘item of evidence’) of the ninth plea, corresponding to the elements raised in the eighth plea of the action, related to an infringement of the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment, or the tenth plea in the action, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons.

138    In the light, in particular, of the fact that those pleas were the subject of an exchange of arguments before the General Court and that their examination does not require the adoption of any additional measure of organisation of procedure or inquiry, the Court of Justice considers that the state of the proceedings permits final judgment to be given.

A.      The seventh limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, alleging that the Commission erred in its review of the negative effects of the measure at issue

1.      Arguments of the parties

139    In the seventh limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, corresponding to the elements raised in the seventh plea of the action, which has five subsidiary limbs, Ryanair in essence contests recitals 137 to 152 of the decision at issue, in which the Commission assessed the measures taken to limit distortions of competition.

140    By the first subsidiary limb, Ryanair argues that the error raised in its sixth plea that vitiates the analysis in the decision at issue of own contributions, as required by the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring, also skews the assessment of the adequacy of measures to limit distortions of competition.

141    By the second subsidiary limb, Ryanair claims that the information provided in the decision at issue regarding fleet reduction is so limited that it is impossible to determine whether Condor is simply making a symbolic reduction in its capacity or if that reduction is substantial. Referring to point 78 of the guidelines, Ryanair argues that the Commission should have reviewed, first, the level of fleet reduction which would in any case be necessary to restore the long-term viability of Condor and, second, the level of fleet reduction proposed by Condor.

142    In the third subsidiary limb, Ryanair argues that the Commission committed an error of law by not applying point 74 of the guidelines, and a manifest error of assessment of the facts through the excessively narrow scope of its review of the ‘one time, last time’ condition set out in those guidelines. According to Ryanair, compliance with that condition must be verified at the level of the business group to which the beneficiary belongs, namely in the present case, the Attestor Group, which controls Condor and several other undertakings.

143    By the fourth subsidiary limb, Ryanair claims that the decision at issue exacerbates the negative effects of the aid measure in that the Commission found, in recital 148 of that decision, that the distortive effects of past aid justified further aid. It argues that the Commission found that the aid did not produce any distortive effect since it was a simple catch-up measure for Condor compared to other airlines in Germany. Ryanair states that distortions caused by past aid measures cannot be a pretext for causing fresh distortion.

144    Lastly, the fifth subsidiary limb is based on the claim that the COVID-19 pandemic was used as a pretext to accept measures which are not strict enough to prevent distortions of competition.

145    The Commission contends that the seventh limb of the ninth plea must be rejected as unfounded.

2.      Findings of the Court

146    It is apparent from points 70 to 93 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring that State aid must be granted to undertakings in difficulty in accordance with the ‘one time, last time’ principle and that appropriate measures must be taken to limit distortions of competition.

147    As regards the first subsidiary limb of the seventh limb of the ninth plea, as the General Court observed in paragraph 198 of the judgment under appeal, points 61 to 64 of those guidelines require in essence that the beneficiary, its shareholders or creditors, the business group to which it belongs or new investors should contribute to the restructuring costs from their own resources. That contribution must be significant, real, as high as possible, and free of aid. An own contribution will normally be considered to be adequate if it amounts to at least 50% of the restructuring costs.

148    In the present case, as found by the General Court in paragraph 201 of that judgment, it is apparent from recitals 127, 132(a) and 133 of the decision that the financing provided by Attestor in the purchase of Condor amounted to EUR 450 million and that the total amount of restructuring aid granted to Condor through the measure at issue was EUR 321.18 million. As the General Court pointed out, Ryanair did not dispute the Commission’s assertion, in recital 133, that Attestor’s own contribution already by itself amounted to 77% of the financing of the restructuring plan, that is to say, more than 50% of the restructuring costs, such that the requirement laid down in point 64 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring was satisfied.

149    In those circumstances, it must be found that Ryanair has not established that the Commission erred in its assessment of the level of own contribution. Consequently, the first subsidiary limb must be rejected.

150    As regards the second subsidiary limb, point 78 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring provides that undertakings benefiting from restructuring aid may be required to divest assets or reduce capacity or market presence, in particular in the market or markets where the undertaking will have a significant market position after restructuring, in particular those where there is significant excess capacity. That point also states that divestments, write-offs and closure of loss-making activities which would at any rate be necessary to restore long-term viability will generally not be considered sufficient to address distortions of competition.

151    In the present case, Ryanair merely asserts that the Commission was required to verify the level of fleet reduction that was necessary to restore Condor’s long-term viability and the level of fleet reduction proposed by Condor, without explaining why such a verification is required under point 78. Consequently, the second subsidiary limb must be rejected.

152    As regards the third subsidiary limb, it is necessary to observe that Ryanair relies on the fact that ‘Attestor appears to control a few undertakings’. However, that assertion is not substantiated in any way and, consequently, it must be considered as being purely speculative. The third subsidiary limb should therefore be rejected.

153    As regards the fourth subsidiary limb, it is based on an erroneous reading of the decision at issue. In contrast to what is claimed by Ryanair, the Commission does not assert in recital 148 of the decision at issue that ‘the negative effects of the aid are limited because the main competitors [of the beneficiary] have already received massive aid’.

154    It is true that the Commission states in that recital that ‘the measure effectively limits the distortion of competition caused by the restructuring aid on a market where competition is distorted by the State aid received by competing airlines, such as Lufthansa and TUI with, in those two cases, sizeable public recapitalisations’. That being said, as the Commission has observed, it is clear from recital 148 that the word ‘measure’ refers to the reduction in Condor’s fleet, which will make it possible to limit distortions of competition, and does not concern the aid measure at issue. It thus follows from that same recital that the Commission did not establish a connection between the limitation of distortions of competition and the State aid received by competing airlines.

155    Consequently, the fourth subsidiary limb must be rejected.

156    Lastly, as regards the fifth subsidiary limb, it is sufficient to find, first, that Ryanair merely makes a purely speculative assertion that is not substantiated, namely that ‘instead of justifying lax measures, the COVID-19 crisis should justify stricter measures’.

157    Second, Ryanair cannot validly refer to an alleged earlier decision-making practice of the Commission since, according to the case-law of the Court, the question of whether a measure constitutes State aid must be assessed solely in the context of Article 107(1) TFEU and not in the light of an alleged earlier decision-making practice of the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2020, Larko v Commission, C‑244/18 P, EU:C:2020:238, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).

158    In those circumstances, the fifth subsidiary limb must be rejected, and, consequently, the seventh limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, which corresponds to the elements referred to in the seventh plea of the action, must be rejected in its entirety.

B.      The eighth limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, alleging infringement of the principles of non-discrimination, free provision of services and free establishment

1.      Arguments of the parties

159    By the eighth limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, corresponding to the elements referred to in the eighth plea of that action, Ryanair argues that the decision at issue infringes specific provisions of the FEU Treaty and the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment.

160    First, it argues that those principles remain applicable when assessing aid granted under Article 107(2)(b) or Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.

161    Second, as regards the principle of non-discrimination, the decision at issue, first of all, treats Condor differently from the other airlines operating in Germany, even though those airlines also suffered losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and also contribute to Germany’s economy and connectivity.

162    Further, the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure contains no review of the necessity of allocating that measure to Condor only, even though its stated objective is to cover some of the liquidity needs caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

163    Lastly, Ryanair submits that the difference of treatment caused by the aid measure is not proportionate. If that aid measure were allocated to all the airlines that operate in Germany, based on their market share, the objective of the measure would be reached with no discrimination. However, granting 100% of the aid to Condor, an airline that ensures only a fraction (3%) of German connectivity goes beyond what is necessary for that purpose and is therefore disproportionate.

164    Third, Ryanair claims that the decision at issue infringes the principles of the free provision of services and of free establishment.

165    It asserts that the decision at issue authorises the grant of aid only to Condor, which is a large airline and which has its principal place of business in Germany. Accordingly, that decision grants an advantage to that airline over other airlines that operate in that Member State, which constitutes a restriction on the free provision of services, as implemented by Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3), and on free establishment. The Commission failed to examine the compatibility of the aid measure in the light of those fundamental freedoms.

166    Ryanair adds that the restriction on the free provision of services and free establishment is not justified where the real aim of the aid measure appears to be to support Condor exclusively.

167    The Commission argues that the eighth limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment must be rejected.

2.      Findings of the Court

168    By the three subsidiary limbs of the eighth limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, corresponding to the elements referred to in the eighth plea of the action, which should be examined together, Ryanair claims, in essence, that the decision at issue infringes the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment in that the aid measure was granted to Condor alone, in the light solely of the criteria laid down in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and without any application of the aforesaid principles.

169    As Ryanair observes, it should be borne in mind that the procedure provided for in Article 108 TFEU must never produce a result that is contrary to the specific provisions of the Treaty. Accordingly, State aid which, as such or by reason of some modalities thereof, contravenes provisions or general principles of EU law cannot be declared compatible with the internal market (judgments of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 96, and of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 109).

170    According to settled case-law, classification of a national measure as ‘State aid’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, requires all the following conditions to be fulfilled. First, there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, that intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

171    It is therefore with regard to measures with such characteristics, in so far as they are liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Member States, that Article 107(1) TFEU lays down the principle that such measures are with the internal market (judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 102).

172    Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU provides for derogations from the principle, referred to in paragraph 1 of that article, that State aid is incompatible with the internal market, and thus allows, in particular, differences in treatment between the undertakings, subject to fulfilment of the requirements laid down by those derogations (judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 111).

173    Accordingly, first, the restrictive effects which an aid measure has, in particular, on the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment still do not constitute a restriction prohibited by the Treaty, since it may be inherent in the very nature of State aid, such as its selective nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 132).

174    Second, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where the modalities of an aid measure are so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate them separately, their effect on the compatibility or incompatibility of the aid viewed as a whole with the internal market must therefore of necessity be determined by means of the procedure prescribed in Article 108 TFEU (see judgments of 22 March 1977, Iannelli & Volpi, 74/76, EU:C:1977:51, paragraph 14; of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 97; and of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 133).

175    In that regard, in the present case, the choice of Condor as beneficiary of the measure at issue is part of the object of that measure and, in any event, even if that choice were to be regarded as a modality of that measure, Ryanair does not dispute that such a modality is indissolubly linked to that object, which is to support the restructuring and the continuation of Condor’s operations. It follows that any possible discriminatory effect of the choice of Condor as beneficiary of the aid measure on the internal market cannot be examined separately from the compatibility of that aid measure as a whole with the internal market by means of the procedure prescribed in Article 108 TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 134).

176    It follows that Ryanair cannot assert that the Commission erred in law by failing to find in the decision at issue that the grant of the aid at issue infringes the principles of non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment.

177    Furthermore, the Court of Justice has previously found that the Commission’s obligation to state reasons does not in any event mean that it must in every case justify the absence of an explicit examination of the compatibility of an aid measure in the light of certain provisions or certain principles of EU law other than the State aid rules and, therefore, give its view on their relevance for the purpose of such an examination (judgment of 23 January 2025, Neos v Ryanair and Commission, C‑490/23 P, EU:C:2025:32, paragraph 58).

178    Indeed, given the extremely large number of provisions and principles of EU law that may be infringed by the grant of aid, the Commission cannot be required, without undermining the effectiveness of the procedure under Article 108 TFEU, or even the possibility of taking a decision in favour of aid after the preliminary examination phase referred to in Article 108(3) TFEU, and thus without initiation of the formal investigation procedure, to provide specific reasoning concerning each one of them (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2025, Neos v Ryanair and Commission, C‑490/23 P, EU:C:2025:32, paragraph 59).

179    It follows from the foregoing considerations that the eighth limb of the ninth plea in the action for annulment, corresponding to the elements referred to in the eighth plea of that action, must be rejected.

180    It follows that the ninth plea in the action for annulment must be rejected in its entirety.

C.      The tenth plea in the action for annulment, alleging a failure to state reasons

1.      Arguments of the parties

181    Ryanair argues that the Commission has failed in its duty to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

182    First, some parts of the decision are unintelligible owing to the removal of too much information. Second, the decision contains an assessment of the balance between the positive and negative effects of the measure at issue that is purely formal. A proper balancing exercise would require all the positive and negative effects of that measure to be identified and weighed against each other.

183    The Commission contends that the tenth plea should be rejected.

2.      Findings of the Court

184    It should be observed that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measures in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular, the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 23 April 2026, Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst, C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331, paragraph 151 and the case-law cited).

185    Specifically, as regards a decision under Article 108(3) TFEU not to raise objections in respect of an aid measure, as in the present case, the Court has held previously that such a decision, which is taken within a short period of time, must simply set out the reasons why the Commission takes the view that it is not faced with serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the aid at issue with the internal market, and that even a succinct statement of reasons for that decision must be regarded as being sufficient for the purpose of satisfying the requirement to state adequate reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, provided that it discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasons why the Commission considered that it was not faced with serious difficulties, the question whether the reasoning is well founded being a separate matter (judgment of 23 April 2026, Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst, C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited).

186    In that regard, first, as far as concerns the alleged absence of sufficient information on the reduction of Condor’s fleet, which refers to recital 65 of the decision at issue, it need only be found that that recital has enough elements to show that the Commission considered that the fleet reduction, among other aspects also set out in that recital, was a sufficient measure to limit distortions of competition.

187    Second, as regards the lack of information on the impact of other restructuring measures, the assessment of Condor’s return to viability and the fact that Condor faced a solvency crisis, it should be found that Ryanair has failed to demonstrate any failure to state reasons but refers, in essence, to arguments that it raised in other pleas of its application for annulment.

188    However, those pleas, which refer respectively to the fact that the Commission did not determine whether the aid measure was limited to the minimum necessary, that the Commission failed to demonstrate that Condor’s restructuring plan enabled it to return to viability, and that the Commission did not establish the appropriateness of the aid measure, were rejected by the General Court in paragraphs 151 to 161, 176 to 183 and 185 to 195 of the judgment under appeal as part of its review of whether the fourth and fifth limbs (described by the General Court as ‘items of evidence’) of the ninth plea in the action for annulment were well-founded.

189    Lastly, as regards the argument that the Commission’s assessment in the decision at issue of the balance between the positive and negative effects of the aid was purely formal, it should be stated that that argument is intended to contest the reasoning of the decision at issue on the substance, which is a separate matter from whether that reasoning is sufficient (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 67, and of 23 January 2025, Neos v Ryanair and Commission, C‑490/23 P, EU:C:2025:32, paragraph 53).

190    It follows from the foregoing considerations that the decision at issue satisfies the obligation to state reasons provided for in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and, consequently, that the tenth plea in the action for annulment must be rejected.

191    Since all the pleas in law raised by Ryanair have been rejected, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

VIII. Costs

192    Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.

193    Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

194    Since Ryanair has been unsuccessful and Condor, the Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany have applied for costs, it is necessary to order Ryanair to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Condor, the Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany related to the appeal proceedings.

195    Furthermore, since Ryanair has been unsuccessful in the first-instance proceedings and the Commission has applied for costs, it is necessary to order Ryanair to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission related to those proceedings.

196    In addition, under Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, read together with Article 184(1) thereof, Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs.

197    The Federal Republic of Germany, as an intervener in the first-instance proceedings, is to bear its own costs relating to those proceedings.

198    Lastly, under Article 140(3) of the Rules of Procedure, read together with Article 184(1) thereof, the Court of Justice may decide that an intervener other than those referred to in Article 140(1) and (2) is to bear its own costs.

199    Consequently, Condor, as an intervener in the first-instance proceedings, is to bear its own costs related to those proceedings.

On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby:

1.      Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 8 May 2024, Ryanair v Commission (Condor; restructuring aid) (T‑28/22, EU:T:2024:301);

2.      Dismisses the action brought by Ryanair DAC in Case T‑28/22;

3.      Orders Ryanair DAC to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Condor Flugdienst GmbH, the European Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany related to the appeal proceedings, and to bear its own costs and to pay those of the Commission related to the first-instance proceedings;

4.      Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs related to the first-instance proceedings;

5.      Orders Condor Flugdienst GmbH to bear its own costs related to the first-instance proceedings.

Lycourgos Fenger Rodin

Spineanu-Matei Piçarra

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 5 November 2026.

V. Di Bucci C. Lycourgos

Registrar President of the Chamber

*      Language of the case: English.