Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)
23 April 2026 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Urgent preliminary ruling procedure – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Directive 2012/29/EU – Minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime – Articles 6, 10 and 18 – Right to receive information about the case and right to be heard – National legislation providing for an extraordinary remedy, whereby a person convicted in absentia may have a conviction which has become final quashed – No recognition of the right of the victim to be informed of the application for that extraordinary remedy and of the right to participate in the related proceedings – Directive (EU) 2016/343 – Presumption of innocence and right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings – Articles 8 and 9 – Right to a new trial or to another legal remedy which allows a fresh determination of the merits of the case – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to a fair trial – Article 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Prohibition of abuse of rights )
In Case C‑24/26 PPU [Casotta], (i)
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Corte d’appello di Roma (Court of Appeal, Rome, Italy), made by decision of 7 January 2026, received at the Court on 22 January 2026, in the criminal proceedings against
CV,
other party to the proceedings:
Procuratore generale presso la Corte d’appello di Roma,
THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),
composed of I. Jarukaitis, President of the Chamber, M. Condinanzi, N. Jääskinen (Rapporteur), R. Frendo and A. Kornezov, Judges,
Advocate General: J. Kokott,
Registrar: E. Sartori, Administrator,
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 18 March 2026,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
– the Italian Government, by S. Fiorentino, acting as Agent, and by M. Greco, vice avvocato generale, E. Feola and A. Trimboli, avvocati dello Stato,
– the European Commission, by F. Tomat, J. Vondung and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 16 April 2026,
gives the following
Judgment
1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 6, 10 and 18 of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ 2012 L 315, p. 57), of Articles 8 and 9 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1), and of Articles 47 and 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 17 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).
2 The request has been made in proceedings relating to an extraordinary remedy, for which CV has applied following his sentence in absentia to a term of imprisonment of five years and three months and to a fine of EUR 1 500 for aggravated bodily harm and aggravated robbery with violence, and seeking to have the conviction, which had become final, quashed and new proceedings on the merits instituted.
Legal context
International law
3 Article 6 ECHR, entitled ‘Right to a fair trial’, provides:
‘1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. …
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.’
4 Article 17 ECHR, entitled ‘Prohibition of abuse of rights’, provides:
‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.’
European Union law
The Charter
5 Article 47 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’, provides:
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.’
6 Article 54 of the Charter, entitled ‘Prohibition of abuse of rights’, provides:
‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for herein.’
Directive 2012/29
7 Recitals 11, 20, 26 and 58 of Directive 2012/29 are worded as follows:
‘(11) This Directive lays down minimum rules. Member States may extend the rights set out in this Directive in order to provide a higher level of protection.
…
(20) The role of victims in the criminal justice system and whether they can participate actively in criminal proceedings vary across Member States, depending on the national system, and is determined by one or more of the following criteria: whether the national system provides for a legal status as a party to criminal proceedings; whether the victim is under a legal requirement or is requested to participate actively in criminal proceedings, for example as a witness; and/or whether the victim has a legal entitlement under national law to participate actively in criminal proceedings and is seeking to do so, where the national system does not provide that victims have the legal status of a party to the criminal proceedings. Member States should determine which of those criteria apply to determine the scope of rights set out in this Directive where there are references to the role of the victim in the relevant criminal justice system.
…
(26) When providing information, sufficient detail should be given to ensure that victims are treated in a respectful manner and to enable them to make informed decisions about their participation in proceedings. In this respect, information allowing the victim to know about the current status of any proceedings is particularly important. This is equally relevant for information to enable a victim to decide whether to request a review of a decision not to prosecute. …
…
(58) Victims who have been identified as vulnerable to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation should be offered appropriate measures to protect them during criminal proceedings. The exact nature of such measures should be determined through the individual assessment, taking into account the wish of the victim. The extent of any such measure should be determined without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion. The victims’ concerns and fears in relation to proceedings should be a key factor in determining whether they need any particular measure.’
8 According to Article 1(1) of that directive, entitled ‘Objectives’:
‘The purpose of this Directive is to ensure that victims of crime receive appropriate information, support and protection and are able to participate in criminal proceedings.
…’
9 Article 6 of Directive 2012/29, entitled ‘Right to receive information about their case’, provides:
‘1. Member States shall ensure that victims are notified without unnecessary delay of their right to receive the following information about the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of the complaint with regard to a criminal offence suffered by the victim and that, upon request, they receive such information:
(a) any decision not to proceed with or to end an investigation or not to prosecute the offender;
(b) the time and place of the trial, and the nature of the charges against the offender.
2. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with their role in the relevant criminal justice system, victims are notified without unnecessary delay of their right to receive the following information about the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of the complaint with regard to a criminal offence suffered by them and that, upon request, they receive such information:
(a) any final judgment in a trial;
(b) information enabling the victim to know about the state of the criminal proceedings, unless in exceptional cases the proper handling of the case may be adversely affected by such notification.
3. Information provided for under paragraph 1(a) and paragraph 2(a) shall include reasons or a brief summary of reasons for the decision concerned, except in the case of a jury decision or a decision where the reasons are confidential in which cases the reasons are not provided as a matter of national law.
4. The wish of victims as to whether or not to receive information shall bind the competent authority, unless that information must be provided due to the entitlement of the victim to active participation in the criminal proceedings. Member States shall allow victims to modify their wish at any moment, and shall take such modification into account.
5. Member States shall ensure that victims are offered the opportunity to be notified, without unnecessary delay, when the person remanded in custody, prosecuted or sentenced for criminal offences concerning them is released from or has escaped detention. Furthermore, Member States shall ensure that victims are informed of any relevant measures issued for their protection in case of release or escape of the offender.
6. Victims shall, upon request, receive the information provided for in paragraph 5 at least in cases where there is a danger or an identified risk of harm to them, unless there is an identified risk of harm to the offender which would result from the notification.’
10 Article 10 of that directive, entitled ‘Right to be heard’, provides:
‘1. Member States shall ensure that victims may be heard during criminal proceedings and may provide evidence. Where a child victim is to be heard, due account shall be taken of the child’s age and maturity.
2. The procedural rules under which victims may be heard during criminal proceedings and may provide evidence shall be determined by national law.’
11 Article 18 of Directive 2012/29, entitled ‘Right to protection’, is worded as follows:
‘Without prejudice to the rights of the defence, Member States shall ensure that measures are available to protect victims and their family members from secondary and repeat victimisation, from intimidation and from retaliation, including against the risk of emotional or psychological harm, and to protect the dignity of victims during questioning and when testifying. When necessary, such measures shall also include procedures established under national law for the physical protection of victims and their family members.’
Directive 2016/343
12 Recitals 9, 33, 38 and 48 of Directive 2016/343 state:
‘(9) The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings by laying down common minimum rules concerning certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at the trial.
…
(33) The right to a fair trial is one of the basic principles in a democratic society. The right of suspects and accused persons to be present at the trial is based on that right and should be ensured throughout the [European] Union.
…
(38) When considering whether the way in which the information is provided is sufficient to ensure the person’s awareness of the trial, particular attention should, where appropriate, also be paid to the diligence exercised by public authorities in order to inform the person concerned and to the diligence exercised by the person concerned in order to receive information addressed to him or her.
…
(48) As this Directive establishes minimum rules, Member States should be able to extend the rights laid down in this Directive in order to provide a higher level of protection. The level of protection provided for by Member States should never fall below the standards provided for by the Charter or by the ECHR, as interpreted by the Court of Justice and by the European Court of Human Rights.’
13 Article 1 of that directive, entitled ‘Subject matter’, provides:
‘This Directive lays down common minimum rules concerning:
(a) certain aspects of the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings;
(b) the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings.’
14 Article 8 of Directive 2016/343, entitled ‘Right to be present at the trial’, provides:
‘1. Member States shall ensure that suspects and accused persons have the right to be present at their trial.
2. Member States may provide that a trial which can result in a decision on the guilt or innocence of a suspect or accused person can be held in his or her absence, provided that:
(a) the suspect or accused person has been informed, in due time, of the trial and of the consequences of non-appearance; or
(b) the suspect or accused person, having been informed of the trial, is represented by a mandated lawyer, who was appointed either by the suspect or accused person or by the State.
3. A decision which has been taken in accordance with paragraph 2 may be enforced against the person concerned.
4. Where Member States provide for the possibility of holding trials in the absence of suspects or accused persons but it is not possible to comply with the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article because a suspect or accused person cannot be located despite reasonable efforts having been made, Member States may provide that a decision can nevertheless be taken and enforced. In that case, Member States shall ensure that when suspects or accused persons are informed of the decision, in particular when they are apprehended, they are also informed of the possibility to challenge the decision and of the right to a new trial or to another legal remedy, in accordance with Article 9.
5. This Article shall be without prejudice to national rules that provide that the judge or the competent court can exclude a suspect or accused person temporarily from the trial where necessary in the interests of securing the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings, provided that the rights of the defence are complied with.
6. This Article shall be without prejudice to national rules that provide for proceedings or certain stages thereof to be conducted in writing, provided that this complies with the right to a fair trial.’
15 Article 9 of that directive, entitled ‘Right to a new trial’, states:
‘Member States shall ensure that, where suspects or accused persons were not present at their trial and the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) were not met, they have the right to a new trial, or to another legal remedy, which allows a fresh determination of the merits of the case, including examination of new evidence, and which may lead to the original decision being reversed. In that regard, Member States shall ensure that those suspects and accused persons have the right to be present, to participate effectively, in accordance with procedures under national law, and to exercise the rights of the defence.’
Italian law
16 Article 420-bis of decreto del Presidente della Repubblica n. 447 – Approvazione del codice di procedura penale (Decree of the President of the Republic No 447 approving the Code of Criminal Procedure) of 22 September 1988 (GURI No 250 of 24 October 1988, Ordinary Supplement No 92) (‘the Code of Criminal Procedure’), as amended by decreto legislativo n. 150, Attuazione della legge 27 settembre 2021, n. 134, recante delega al Governo per l’efficienza del processo penale, nonchè in materia di giustizia riparativa e disposizioni per la celere definizione dei procedimenti giudiziari (Legislative Decree No 150 implementing the Law of 27 September 2021, No 134, delegating to the Government for the effectiveness of criminal proceedings and in matters of restorative justice and of provisions permitting the rapid resolution of judicial proceedings) of 10 October 2022 (GURI No 243 of 17 October 2022, Ordinary Supplement No 38), entitled ‘Absence of the accused person’, provides:
‘1. Where the accused person, whether at liberty or in custody, is not present at the hearing, the court shall proceed in his or her absence:
(a) when the accused person has been summoned to appear by means of service of the document in person or on a person expressly authorised by him or her to receive that document;
(b) when the accused person has expressly waived his or her right to appear or, if there is an impediment within the meaning of Article 420-ter, has expressly waived his or her right to rely on that impediment.
2. The court shall also proceed in the absence of the accused person when it considers it otherwise proven that the accused person is effectively aware of the pending proceedings and that his or her absence from the hearing is due to a voluntary and conscious choice. For this purpose, the court shall take into account the manner of service, the actions taken by the accused person prior to the hearing, the appointment of defence counsel and any other relevant circumstances.
3. The court shall also proceed in absentia in the cases other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, where the accused person has been declared a fugitive or has otherwise voluntarily avoided knowledge of the pending proceedings.
4. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the court shall declare the accused person absent. Unless otherwise provided for by law, an accused person who is declared absent shall be represented by his or her defence counsel.
5. In cases other than those provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, before proceeding in accordance with Article 420-quater, the court shall adjourn the hearing and order that the notice referred to in Article 419, the indictment and the record of the hearing be served on the accused person, in person, by the police authorities.
6. The order declaring the accused person absent shall also be revoked ex officio if the accused person appears in court prior to the judgment. The time limit permitted for the accused person to exercise the rights that he or she forfeited shall be reinstated:
(a) where the accused person provides evidence that, due to unforeseeable circumstances, force majeure or another legitimate impediment, it was impossible for him or her to appear in due time to exercise the rights forfeited and that he or she was unable to provide proof of the impediment in due time through no fault of his or her own;
(b) where, in the cases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, the accused person provides evidence that he or she had no actual knowledge of the pending proceedings and that, through no fault of his or her own, he or she was unable to take action in due time to exercise the rights forfeited;
(c) where it transpires, in any event, that the conditions required for the case to proceed in his or her absence were not met.
7. Other than in the case provided for in paragraph 6, if it appears that the conditions required for the case to proceed in absentia were not met, the court shall, of its own motion, withdraw the order declaring the accused person absent and shall proceed in accordance with paragraph 5.’
17 Article 629-bis of that code provides:
‘1. In cases other than those governed by Article 628-bis, a convicted person or a person subject to a preventive measure pursuant to a judgment having the status of res judicata who has been tried in absentia may have the judgment set aside if that person proves that he or she was declared absent and the conditions laid down in Article 420-bis were not met, and that he or she was unable to appeal the judgment within the [prescribed] time limit through no fault of his or her own, unless it appears that he or she had actual knowledge of the pending proceedings before the judgment was handed down.
2. The application shall be submitted to the court of appeal in the district where the court that handed down the judgment is based, either personally by the party concerned or by defence counsel with a special power of attorney within 30 days of the person concerned becoming aware of the judgment, failing which it will be rejected as inadmissible.
3. The court of appeal shall proceed in accordance with Article 127 and, if it upholds the application, shall set aside the judgment and order that the relevant documents be sent to the court at the stage or level at which the judgment set aside was delivered.
…’
The main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
18 On 2 April 2022, CV was apprehended by police officers in Rome (Italy) in the act of committing the offences of aggravated bodily harm and aggravated robbery. On being arrested, CV appointed and mandated a lawyer to defend him.
19 On 4 April 2022, at the hearing before the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome, Italy) for the validation of his arrest, CV stated that, although he was entered on the register of natural persons as resident at his mother’s home in Sicily, he had been permanently resident in Rome for five years. He stated that his place of residence was at the premises of a soup kitchen run by a charitable association and that the procedural documents should be served on him at that address.
20 Following that hearing, as CV’s arrest had not been validated, the Giudice per le indagini preliminari presso il Tribunale ordinario di Roma (Preliminary Investigations Judge attached to the District Court, Rome, Italy), on application by the Pubblico ministero (Attorney General’s Office, Italy), committed CV for trial before the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome), sitting as a full court, for the purposes of immediate judgment set for the hearing on 4 October 2022.
21 On 9 May 2022, officers of the Municipal Police, Rome, went to the address designated by CV as his place of residence in Rome, in order to serve the order for immediate judgment on him. As they did not find CV at that address, they left the notification with one of the individuals responsible for the operation of the charitable association concerned, who declared that CV had visited that address two days earlier and undertook to place the summary judgment order in CV’s personal mailbox.
22 On 4 October 2022, the order for immediate judgment was notified by certified email to the lawyer appointed by CV, on the ground that the place of residence indicated by CV was not appropriate for that purpose.
23 At the hearing on 4 October 2022, since CV’s lawyer had withdrawn from the case as he was unable to locate his client, the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome) appointed another lawyer to act as a court-appointed defence counsel.
24 Following that hearing, the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome) found that the order for immediate judgment had not been served on CV and therefore referred the file to the registry so that that order could be served again.
25 It is apparent from the information available to the Court that, on 30 December 2022, Legislative Decree No 150 of 10 October 2022 entered into force, replacing in full the former Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a new provision under which the proceedings can no longer be continued in the absence of the person concerned, except where the conditions laid down in that provision are satisfied, inter alia where the document containing the summons to appear has been served on the person concerned in person or on a person whom he or she has expressly authorised to receive that document, or where he or she has expressly waived the right to appear. According to Article 420-bis(3), moreover, the criminal proceedings may also be continued in absentia where the person concerned has been declared a fugitive or has otherwise voluntarily avoided knowledge of the pending proceedings.
26 At the hearing on 17 January 2023, the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome) found that it was necessary to search for the person concerned, since it had not been established that CV had had actual knowledge of the criminal proceedings brought against him.
27 Following that hearing, officers of the Municipal Police, Rome, attempted in vain to contact CV both at the address designated by him as his place of residence in Rome and by telephone.
28 At the hearing on 13 June 2023, the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome) noted that it was apparent from the notice of service drawn up by the Municipal Police, Rome that it had not been possible to locate CV. That court therefore ordered that a search for CV be carried out at the address of his residence, namely his mother’s residence in Sicily, so that he could be served with a copy of the order for immediate judgment and a copy of the transcript of the hearing of 13 June 2023, stating that the hearing was adjourned until 23 October 2023.
29 On 19 June 2023, those two documents were served on CV’s mother, with the indication ‘cohabiting mother’, even though, on 3 February 2023, she had already submitted a declaration stating that her son had left the parental home and had requested that he be removed from the composition of her household as entered on the civil register.
30 At the hearing on 23 October 2023, the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome) found that the order for immediate judgment had been served on CV’s cohabiting mother and ordered that the proceedings be continued in CV’s absence, taking the view that it had been clearly established that CV had had actual knowledge of the proceedings brought against him and that his absence from the hearing should be considered to constitute a voluntary and deliberate choice, in accordance with Article 420-bis(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
31 By judgment of 23 October 2023, CV was given a custodial sentence of five years and three months and a fine of EUR 1 500, as jointly guilty of the offences of aggravated bodily harm and aggravated robbery with violence committed in Rome.
32 Since CV did not appeal that judgment, it became final on 14 April 2024.
33 Following the order enforcing the sentence, issued by the Pubblico ministero (Attorney General’s Office) on 11 October 2024, CV was arrested by police officers on 19 November 2024.
34 On 19 December 2024, CV applied for an extraordinary remedy, on the basis of Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before the referring court, the Corte d’appello di Roma (Court of Appeal, Rome, Italy), seeking to have the conviction of 23 October 2023 – which, as stated in paragraph 32 of the present judgment, had become final – quashed and, where appropriate, to have new proceedings on the merits instituted. In support of his application, he alleged that he had been declared absent in breach of the conditions laid down in Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he had been unable to lodge an appeal through no fault of his own, since he had never had actual knowledge of the proceedings brought against him.
35 The referring court has doubts as to the compatibility with EU law of Articles 420-bis and 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which govern the conditions to be satisfied in order to be able to try an accused person in absentia and the extraordinary remedy available to a convicted person in respect of whom a decision has been handed down in absentia, respectively.
36 In particular, the referring court observes, in the first place, that those national provisions may conflict with the rights of victims of crime guaranteed by Directive 2012/29.
37 In that regard, it emphasises that Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants a person who has been convicted in absentia a right to apply for an extraordinary remedy, referred to in paragraph 34 of the present judgment, but without affording the victim of the offence in question who did not join as a civil party in the criminal proceedings that led to the conviction the right to be informed that such a remedy has been applied for by the person convicted in absentia or the right to participate in that procedure or to submit observations, even though that procedure may result in the conviction handed down in absentia being quashed.
38 According to the referring court, such an extraordinary remedy has a direct and significant impact on the rights and interests of the victim, in so far as it might entail the institution of new proceedings on the merits and thereby expose that victim to the risk of secondary and repeat victimisation by causing him or her to participate again in the entire proceedings, but without being able to contest the remedy thus applied for by the convicted person.
39 Furthermore, the referring court emphasises that, in so far as Articles 6, 10 and 18 of Directive 2012/29, which enshrine the victim’s right to be informed and to be heard, refer to criminal proceedings as a whole, that directive does not permit the Member States to exclude the victim from proceedings which, like that provided for in Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may lead to a conviction handed down in absentia being quashed in its entirety and require the institution of new proceedings on the merits. It therefore considers that the absence of any form of information or communication in favour of the victim of the offence and, accordingly, of any possibility of hearing that victim in the context of such an extraordinary remedy, resulting from that national provision, would constitute a breach of the rights set out in Articles 6, 10 and 18 of that directive.
40 In the second place, the referring court also has doubts regarding the compatibility of Articles 420-bis and 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy), with Directive 2016/343.
41 In that regard, the referring court observes that it follows, inter alia, from a reading of Article 420-bis(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with Article 629-bis of that code that a conviction handed down in absentia which has become final cannot be quashed, in the situation envisaged in Article 420-bis(3) of that code and referred to in paragraph 25 of the present judgment, where it is established that the accused person ‘has otherwise voluntarily avoided knowledge’ of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her.
42 The referring court states that those provisions are interpreted in the national case-law as meaning that the voluntary nature of steps taken by the accused person to avoid knowledge of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her cannot be presumed on the basis of indirect proof or of objective behaviour on the part of that person showing conscious acceptance by him or her of the risk of not having knowledge of those proceedings. Such behaviour can be demonstrated only by adducing direct proof, which amounts de facto to requiring an express declaration by the accused person to the effect that he or she voluntarily sought to avoid knowledge of the proceedings.
43 It observes that, as such direct proof is particularly difficult to obtain, the court, when hearing an application for an extraordinary remedy under Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is required, in practice, to quash, almost systematically, the conviction handed down in absentia, even where it is established that the accused person engaged in behaviour showing, indirectly but beyond doubt, his or her intention to avoid knowledge of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her or where serious negligence with regard to information or acceptance of the risk of not having knowledge of the proceedings has been demonstrated.
44 According to the referring court, that is precisely the case in the main proceedings, in so far as CV was arrested by police officers while committing several offences and was brought before a court, but then engaged in a course of conduct making it highly foreseeable that he would be unable to have knowledge of the subsequent steps relating to the criminal proceedings brought against him, thus demonstrating his intention to avoid knowledge of those proceedings.
45 However, it states that, in the absence of any direct proof of such an intention on CV’s part, Articles 420-bis and 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted in the national case-law, require that the conviction handed down in absentia in respect of him be quashed.
46 On that basis, the referring court suggests, first, that that interpretation of the national provisions is capable, inter alia, of breaching the principles deriving from the judgment of 13 February 2020, Spetsializirana prokuratura (Hearing in the absence of the accused person) (C‑688/18, EU:C:2020:94), in which the Court of Justice held that, under Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 2016/343, the right to a new trial is not automatically acquired when the absence of the accused person is the consequence of a conscious choice, which may also be inferred from the objective circumstances of the case in question.
47 Second, the referring court observes that it follows from the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of 1 March 2006, Sejdovic v. Italy (CE:ECHR:2006:0301JUD005658100), concerning Article 6 ECHR, that it is necessary to ensure the protection of a person who was not aware of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her for reasons not attributable to him or her and who, for that reason, was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the proceedings and to exercise his or her rights of defence.
48 However, according to the referring court, that judgment cannot be interpreted or used as a basis for a general and unconditional right to have new proceedings on the merits instituted in every case in which a conviction has been handed down in absentia. In such circumstances, the right to have new proceedings instituted is conceived not as an absolute right but as an instrument intended to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. Nor, therefore, can that judgment legitimise behaviour allowing the accused person to avoid knowledge of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her or to transform the right to have new proceedings instituted into a mechanism capable of rewarding the evasive strategies of the accused person, his or her wrongful inertia or the conscious acceptance of the risk of not receiving the documents concerning him or her, lest this give rise to a structural risk of abuse of the rights of the defence, as is prohibited under Article 17 ECHR. In that regard, the referring court observes that the rights recognised by that convention, in this instance the right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 6 thereof, cannot be used in such a way as to distort their function and to undermine the rights of others and the general interest in the proper administration of justice.
49 It states that, in the present case, the national provisions at issue, as interpreted in the national case-law, have the effect of encouraging an accused person to engage in opportunistic behaviour which is capable of constituting serious negligence or an evasive strategy, and, accordingly, of leading to misuse of the extraordinary remedy aimed at having a conviction handed down in absentia, which has become final, quashed.
50 In addition, the referring court observes that such a system would have systemic effects as it would undermine the public interest in the establishment of offences, especially since that extraordinary remedy does not interrupt the maximum limitation period, such that the convicted person would benefit from a mechanism capable, over time, of resulting in the extinction of the offence in question. The rights of the victim would also be directly affected and the victim unnecessarily subjected to secondary and repeat victimisation.
51 In those circumstances, the Corte d’appello di Roma (Court of Appeal, Rome) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Must Articles 6, 10 and 18 of Directive [2012/29], read in the light of Articles 47 and 54 of the [Charter] and Articles 6 and 17 [ECHR], be interpreted, taken together, as precluding national legislation such as that contained in Article 629-bis of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure which, in [the context of an extraordinary remedy capable of calling into question the res judicata status of a conviction handed down in absentia, such] as to quash [that] conviction and to require a new trial [on the merits], does not provide for any form of notification to, communication with, or participation by a victim of the crime who did not join [the criminal proceedings as a civil party]?
(2) Must Articles 8 and 9 of Directive [2016/343], read in the light of Articles 47 and 54 of the [Charter] and Articles 6 and 17 [ECHR], be interpreted, taken together, as precluding national legislation such as that provided for in Articles 420-bis and 629-bis of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for a conviction to be quashed where the accused person claims that he or she had no actual knowledge of the proceedings, in so far as that legislation excludes the possibility of inferring that the accused person deliberately avoided knowledge of the proceedings through gross negligence on his or her part or through the conscious acceptance of the risk of not receiving the relevant documents, as demonstrated by objective conduct and circumstantial evidence?’
The request for the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure
52 The referring court has requested that the present reference be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
53 It follows from those provisions that the application of that procedure is subject to two cumulative conditions. First, the reference for a preliminary ruling must raise questions of interpretation relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, which is the subject of Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty. Second, the circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings, as described by the referring court, must be characterised by the existence of a situation of urgency.
54 As regards the first condition, it must be pointed out that the present request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Directives 2012/29 and 2016/343, which fall within the areas referred to in Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, relating to the area of freedom, security and justice. Under the first paragraph of Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107(1) of the Rules of Procedure, that request may therefore be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.
55 As regards the second condition, it is satisfied, in particular, where the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of liberty and where his or her continued detention turns on the decision of the Court, in so far as the answer by the Court to the questions referred might result in his or her immediate release, it being specified that the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when consideration was given to whether the reference for a preliminary ruling should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 29; of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraphs 35 and 36; and of 4 September 2025, Adrar, C‑313/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:647, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
56 In the present case, in the first place, it is apparent from the order for reference that CV is being detained and is currently serving a custodial sentence imposed on him in absentia by judgment of 23 October 2023, which became final on 14 April 2024.
57 In the second place, in reply to a request for clarification from the Court of Justice, addressed to the referring court under Article 101 of the Rules of Procedure, the referring court stated, in essence, that, if, in the light of the answer by the Court of Justice to its questions, it were required to apply the procedure provided for in Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the quashing of convictions which have become final and grant the extraordinary remedy thus applied for by CV, the latter would be released pending any new trial.
58 In those circumstances, on 9 February 2026, the Fourth Chamber of the Court of Justice decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to grant the referring court’s request that the present reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.
Consideration of the questions referred
The first question
59 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice established in Article 267 TFEU, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgments of 29 November 1978, Redmond, 83/78, EU:C:1978:214, paragraph 26; of 28 November 2000, Roquette Frères, C‑88/99, EU:C:2000:652, paragraph 18; and of 29 January 2026, Keladis I and Keladis II, C‑72/24 and C‑73/24, EU:C:2026:51, paragraph 154).
60 In addition, it must be borne in mind that Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) and Article 13 ECHR; it is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47 of that charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 May 2017, Berlioz Investment Fund, C‑682/15, EU:C:2017:373, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). Similarly, as Article 54 of the Charter, like Article 17 ECHR, prohibits the abuse of rights, it is necessary to refer only to Article 54 of that charter.
61 In the present case, as regards the question of the circumstances in which the behaviour of an accused person who is subsequently convicted in absentia may be regarded as abusive, for the purposes of Article 54 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 47 thereof, it must be stated that that question is not connected with the rights of the victim in the context of criminal proceedings and must therefore be dealt with in the context of the second question referred.
62 In those circumstances, it must be held that, by its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 6, 10 and 18 of Directive 2012/29, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, where the victim of an offence did not join as a civil party, under national law, in the criminal proceedings that led to a conviction which was handed down in absentia and which has become final, does not provide, in the context of an extraordinary remedy applied for by the convicted person in order to have that conviction quashed on the ground that it could not be handed down in his or her absence and, where appropriate, to have new proceedings on the merits instituted, for either an obligation to inform the victim that that extraordinary remedy has been applied for or the possibility for that victim to participate in the proceedings relating to that remedy.
63 It follows from settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider both its wording and the objectives which it pursues and also the context to which it belongs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 August 2025, Galerie Karsten Greve, C‑433/24, EU:C:2025:600, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 18 December 2025, E. (Set-off of claims), C‑481/24, EU:C:2025:996, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
64 In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that, according to the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Directive 2012/29, the purpose of that directive is to ensure that victims of crime receive appropriate information, support and protection and are able to participate in criminal proceedings.
65 As regards, in the first place, the victim’s right to receive information, Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/29 lists the information about the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of the complaint with regard to a criminal offence suffered by the victim which the latter is entitled to receive, provided that he or she so requests. Article 6(1) provides that Member States are to ensure that victims are notified without unnecessary delay of their right to be informed of any decision not to proceed with or to end an investigation or not to prosecute the offender, and of the time and place of the trial and the nature of the charges against the offender.
66 In the present case, it must be stated that the information referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/29 has no connection with the object of an extraordinary remedy such as that at issue in the main proceedings. It follows that Article 6(1) of that directive is not intended to afford the victim the right to be informed that such an extraordinary remedy has been applied for.
67 Article 6(2) of Directive 2012/29 provides that Member States are to ensure that, ‘in accordance with their role in the relevant criminal justice system’, victims are notified without unnecessary delay of their right to receive the information referred to in Article 6(2) about the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of their complaint with regard to a criminal offence suffered by them and that, upon request, they receive such information. In that regard, Article 6(2) refers, in point (a) thereof, to any final judgment in a trial and, in point (b) thereof, to information enabling the victim to know about ‘the state of the criminal proceedings’, unless in exceptional cases the proper handling of the case may be adversely affected by such notification.
68 It follows from the wording of Article 6 of Directive 2012/29, therefore, that the victim’s right to receive the information referred to in Article 6(2) of that directive depends on the legal status conferred on him or her, in national law, in the context of those proceedings, such that the Member States are not required to notify the victim of his or her right to receive that information or to provide him or her with that information, where such notification or information is not consistent with that status.
69 That interpretation is borne out by the appraisal of the context to which Article 6 of Directive 2012/29 belongs.
70 In particular, recital 20 of that directive states that the role of victims in the criminal justice system and whether they can participate actively in criminal proceedings vary across Member States, depending on the national system, and is determined by taking into account various criteria, set out in that recital, and that, where there are references to the role of the victim in the relevant criminal justice system, Member States should determine which of those criteria apply to determine the scope of rights set out in that directive. Those criteria include, inter alia, the question whether the national system provides for a legal status as a party to criminal proceedings.
71 In addition, that interpretation also appears to be consistent with the objective pursued by Article 6 of Directive 2012/29, as recital 26 of that directive specifies that the right to receive information about the state of the proceedings aims to enable victims to make informed decisions about their ‘participation’ in those proceedings.
72 In that regard, it should be noted that the Proposal of the European Commission for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime (COM(2011) 275 final) states, to the same effect, that ‘the purpose’ of the articles in Chapter II of Directive 2012/29, of which Article 6 of that directive forms part, ‘is to ensure that victims receive sufficient information in a form they can understand to enable them to fully access their rights and to ensure [that] they feel treated in a respectful manner’ and that ‘sufficient detail should be provided to enable victims to make informed decisions about their participation in proceedings and how to access their rights, in particular when deciding whether to request a review of the decision not to prosecute’.
73 In the present case, the referring court has doubts regarding the failure to inform the victim, who did not join as a civil party in the criminal proceedings that led to a person being convicted in absentia, that that convicted person has applied for an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings. As is apparent from the order for reference, the purpose of such an application is to have such a conviction, which has become final, quashed, on the ground that it could not be handed down in absentia, and, where appropriate, to secure a retrial of the case on the merits.
74 In that regard, it must be held that information about an application for an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, may come under Article 6(2)(b) of Directive 2012/29, which refers to ‘the state of the criminal proceedings’, provided, first, that the criminal proceedings in question were instituted as a result of the complaint with regard to a criminal offence suffered by the victim, within the meaning of that provision, and, second, that the victim’s right to receive such information, upon request, is in accordance with his or her role in the national criminal justice system.
75 It follows that Article 6(2)(b) of Directive 2012/29 does not require that, in a national system which affords the victim the possibility of joining criminal proceedings as a civil party, that victim be informed of an application such as that at issue in the main proceedings when he or she is not a party to the proceedings in national law on the ground that he or she did not join those proceedings as a civil party.
76 Nonetheless, it must be further emphasised that that assessment is without prejudice to the victim’s rights to receive information about the possible release of the person originally convicted in absentia, in accordance with Article 6(5) and (6) of Directive 2012/29.
77 In addition, it must also be borne in mind that, as stated in recital 11 of Directive 2012/29, that directive lays down minimum rules and Member States may, in order to provide a higher level of protection, extend the rights which it sets out.
78 As regards, in the second place, the victim’s right to be heard in the context of an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, Article 10 of Directive 2012/29 provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, that Member States are to ensure that victims may be heard during criminal proceedings and may provide evidence. That provision thus establishes, as a general proposition, the victim’s right to be heard ‘during criminal proceedings’, but does not require that they be heard at every stage of the proceedings.
79 Article 10(2) of that directive specifies that the procedural rules under which victims may be heard during criminal proceedings and may provide evidence are to be determined by national law.
80 It thus follows from a combined reading of Article 10(1) and (2) of Directive 2012/29 that it is for the Member States to specify, in their national law, at which stage of the proceedings the victim is heard.
81 As regards the objective pursued by Article 10 of Directive 2012/29, it follows from the Commission’s proposal for a directive, referred to in paragraph 72 of the present judgment, that the purpose of the right to be heard is to enable the victim to provide initial and further information, views or evidence during criminal proceedings. That proposal states, furthermore, that ‘the exact extent of [that] right is left to national law and may range from basic rights to communicate with and supply evidence to a competent authority through to more extensive rights such as a right to have evidence taken into account, the right to ensure that certain evidence is taken or the right to make interventions during the trial’.
82 It follows from the foregoing that the purpose of the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 10 of Directive 2012/29, is to provide the victim with the opportunity to participate in the proceedings relating to the criminal offence committed against him or her and, in particular, to allow the victim to contribute to the establishment of the relevant facts and to the gathering of evidence connected with the alleged offence and the harm suffered by him or her.
83 It follows from the request for a preliminary ruling that, in the context of an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, only procedural questions of a factual nature relating to the circumstances in which the absence of the accused person has been declared may be raised. Those questions therefore appear to be unconnected with the substance of the case, which concerns the alleged offence and any harm suffered by the victim. Accordingly, it must be stated that, in the context of that remedy, only the procedural rights of the convicted person, inter alia his or her right to a fair trial and rights of defence, are at issue, with the result that the rights of the victim, who did not join the criminal proceedings as a civil party, are not directly concerned by the proceedings relating to such a remedy.
84 It follows that Article 10 of Directive 2012/29 does not require that the victim be heard in the context of an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
85 As stated in paragraph 77 of the present judgment, such an interpretation is, however, without prejudice to the right of the Member States to extend the rights set out in that directive in order to provide a higher level of protection.
86 In the third place, as regards the question whether, on the basis of Article 18 of Directive 2012/29, the victim might benefit from the right to receive information about an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, and also to be heard in the context of that remedy, it must be observed that it follows from the wording of that article that the purpose of the protective measures which it lays down is to ‘protect victims and their family members from secondary and repeat victimisation, from intimidation and from retaliation, including against the risk of emotional or psychological harm, and to protect the dignity of victims during questioning and when testifying’.
87 Measures intended to prevent secondary victimisation cannot in themselves be understood as affording victims the right to participate in proceedings such as those at issue in the main case with the sole aim of preventing a new trial, or the right to be heard in the context of such proceedings.
88 The Court has previously held, moreover, that it does not follow from the wording of Article 18 of Directive 2012/29 that the EU legislature included, among the measures designed to protect the victim of a criminal offence, provision for limiting examination of the victim to a single occasion during the judicial proceedings (judgment of 29 July 2019, Gambino and Hyka, C‑38/18, EU:C:2019:628, paragraph 51).
89 Furthermore, Article 18 of Directive 2012/29 affords the victim the right to protection, ‘without prejudice to the rights of the defence’. To the same effect, recital 58 of that directive states that the extent of appropriate measures to protect victims who have been identified as vulnerable to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation during criminal proceedings should be determined ‘without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion’ (judgment of 29 July 2019, Gambino and Hyka, C‑38/18, EU:C:2019:628, paragraph 52).
90 It follows that Article 18 of Directive 2012/29 does not in principle preclude the victim of a criminal offence from being heard again in the context of new proceedings, as might be the case if the conviction were to be quashed following the procedure provided for in Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
91 Consequently, Article 18 of that directive cannot form the basis of an interpretation of Articles 6 and 10 of Directive 2012/29 that differs from the interpretation set out, respectively, in paragraphs 75 and 84 of the present judgment.
92 Next, as regards Article 47 of the Charter, it guarantees, in the first paragraph of that article, that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article. However, it is not apparent from the file before the Court that the victim would be deprived of effective judicial protection in the absence of information or of the opportunity to be heard in the proceedings relating to the extraordinary remedy at issue in the main proceedings in the circumstances provided for by Directive 2012/29. Nor does the file indicate that the victim would be deprived of such judicial protection of the rights which he or she derives from that directive. Furthermore, it must be observed that, in the event that a remedy such as that at issue in the main proceedings resulted in the contested conviction being quashed, it is apparent from the file submitted to the Court that a new trial on the merits would be initiated.
93 It follows from all of the foregoing that the answer to the first question is that Articles 6, 10 and 18 of Directive 2012/29, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, where the victim of an offence did not join as a civil party, under national law, in the criminal proceedings that led to a conviction which was handed down in absentia and which has become final, does not provide, in the context of an extraordinary remedy applied for by the convicted person in order to have that conviction quashed on the ground that it could not be handed down in his or her absence and, where appropriate, to have new proceedings on the merits instituted, for either an obligation to inform the victim that that extraordinary remedy has been applied for or the possibility for that victim to participate in the proceedings relating to that remedy.
The second question
94 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 2016/343, read in the light of Articles 47 and 54 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, as interpreted in national case-law, requires the national court, in the absence of direct proof that a person convicted in absentia voluntarily avoided knowledge of the criminal proceedings that led to a conviction being handed down in respect of him or her, to grant a remedy applied for by that person in order to have that conviction, which has become final, quashed, on the ground that it could not be handed down in his or her absence, and, where appropriate, that the institution of new proceedings on the merits be ordered.
95 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, Directive 2016/343 has as its subject matter the laying down of common minimum rules concerning certain aspects of criminal proceedings, including the ‘right to be present at the trial’. As recital 33 of that directive expressly confirms, that right forms an integral part of the fundamental right to a fair trial (judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
96 In that regard, Article 8(1) of that directive requires that Member States are to ensure that suspects and accused persons have the right to be present at their trial.
97 However, under Article 8(2) of Directive 2016/343, Member States may provide that a trial which can result in a decision on the guilt or innocence of a suspect or accused person can be held in his or her absence, where certain conditions are satisfied. Under Article 8(2), that possibility is subject to the condition that, in accordance with point (a) of that paragraph, the suspect or accused person has been informed, in due time, of the trial and of the consequences of non-appearance or, in accordance with point (b) of that paragraph, the suspect or accused person, having been informed of the trial, is represented by a mandated lawyer, who was appointed either by the suspect or accused person, or by the State.
98 Furthermore, Article 8(3) of Directive 2016/343 provides that a decision which has been taken in accordance with Article 8(2) may be enforced against the person concerned.
99 As for Article 8(4) of Directive 2016/343, it provides that, where Member States provide for the possibility of holding trials in the absence of suspects or accused persons but it is not possible to comply with the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) of that directive because a suspect or accused person cannot be located despite reasonable efforts having been made, Member States may provide that a decision can nevertheless be taken and enforced. In that case, Member States are to ensure that when suspects or accused persons are informed of the decision, in particular when they are apprehended, they are also informed of the possibility to challenge the decision and of the right to a new trial or to another legal remedy, in accordance with Article 9 of that directive.
100 Furthermore, under Article 9 of Directive 2016/343, where criminal proceedings are conducted in absentia even though the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) of that directive are not met, the person concerned has the right ‘to a new trial, or to another legal remedy, which allows a fresh determination of the merits of the case … and which may lead to the original decision being reversed’.
101 In that regard, as stated in paragraph 95 of the present judgment, since the ‘right to be present at the trial’, enshrined in Directive 2016/343, forms an integral part of the fundamental right to a fair trial, the right to a new trial, as provided for in Article 9 of that directive, must also be considered to form part of the right to a fair trial, in that, as emphasised in recital 9 of that directive, it contributes to enhancing that right.
102 Nonetheless, it follows from Articles 8 and 9 of that directive that a person convicted in absentia may be deprived of the right to a new trial if the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) of that directive are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
103 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that points (a) and (b) of Article 8(2) of Directive 2016/343 are applicable alternatively and that they each set out two cumulative conditions, the first of which, being common to both points, requires that the suspect or accused person has been informed, in due time, of the trial (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraph 34).
104 According to the Court’s case-law, for the purpose of determining whether that first condition is met, it is apparent from recital 38 of that directive that particular attention must be paid, first, to the diligence exercised by public authorities in order to inform the person convicted in absentia of the trial and, second, to the diligence exercised by that person in order to receive the information relating thereto. Consequently, the question whether there are any precise and objective indicia that that person, while having been officially informed that he or she was accused of having committed a criminal offence, and therefore aware that he or she was going to be brought to trial, took deliberate steps to avoid officially receiving the information regarding the date and place of the trial, for example by deliberately communicating an incorrect address, or where that person is no longer at the address which he or she communicated, is relevant for the purpose of making that assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraph 35).
105 The Court has made clear, in that regard, that a person convicted in absentia may, inter alia, be regarded as having sufficient information to know that he or she was going to be brought to trial if he or she received a preliminary indictment, the content of which corresponds, as regards the alleged acts and their legal classification, to the content of the final indictment ultimately drawn up in his or her regard. Thus, where the person concerned absconded after receiving such a preliminary indictment, Member States are entitled to take the view that the dispatch in due time, by the competent authorities, of an official document indicating the date and place of the trial to the address which that person communicated during the pre-trial investigation of the case, and the proof that that document was actually delivered to that address, are tantamount to informing the person of the date and place of the trial, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Directive 2016/343, provided, moreover, that the competent authorities have made reasonable efforts to locate that person (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraphs 36 and 37).
106 The second condition required in order for a person convicted in absentia to be denied the right to a new trial may be satisfied either, in accordance with Article 8(2)(a) and (4) of Directive 2016/343, if that person had also been informed, in due time, of the consequences of not appearing at the trial or, pursuant to Article 8(2)(b) and (4) of that directive, if the person could be regarded as having been represented at the trial by a mandated lawyer, who was appointed either by that person or by the State (judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraph 38). In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, the mere fact that a person convicted in absentia was defended by a court-appointed lawyer throughout the judicial proceedings conducted in his or her absence is not sufficient to satisfy that condition, since it is necessary that that person specifically designated a lawyer to represent him or her, in his or her absence, during the trial (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2025, Kachev, C‑135/25 PPU, EU:C:2025:366, paragraphs 41, 59, 61 and 62).
107 If those conditions are satisfied in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, Directive 2016/343 would not preclude the Member State concerned from refusing to afford the convicted person the right to a new trial.
108 In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that, following, inter alia, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 March 2006, Sejdovic v. Italy (ECHR:2006:0301JUD005658100), the national legislative framework governing trials in absentia and the extraordinary remedy at issue in the main proceedings, in particular Articles 420-bis and 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), require, in essence, that, in the situation provided for in Article 420-bis(3) of that code, the right to a new trial is always afforded to a convicted person who was tried in absentia unless ‘direct’ proof that he or she ‘voluntarily avoided’ knowledge of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her is established.
109 According to the referring court, such requirements would have the consequence that a person who was convicted in absentia and who voluntarily evaded the criminal proceedings brought against him or her could subsequently have the conviction quashed and new proceedings on the merits instituted almost automatically, since direct proof of such ‘voluntary evasion’ would be practically impossible to adduce.
110 As follows from the case-law referred to in paragraph 104 of the present judgment, Directive 2016/343 does not require such direct proof for the purposes of the assessment of the first condition laid down in Article 8(2) of that directive, concerning knowledge of the trial on the part of the accused person, since account may also be taken of any precise and objective indicia that that person, while having been officially informed that he or she is accused of having committed a criminal offence, and therefore aware that he or she is going to be brought to trial, has taken deliberate steps to avoid officially receiving the information regarding the date and place of that trial.
111 Similarly, according to paragraph 99 of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 March 2006, Sejdovic v. Italy (ECHR:2006:0301JUD005658100), it cannot be ruled out that certain established facts might provide an unequivocal indication that the accused is aware of the existence of the criminal proceedings against him or her and of the nature and the cause of the accusation and does not intend to take part in the trial or wishes to escape prosecution.
112 That being so, it should be recalled that it follows from Article 1 of Directive 2016/343, read in the light of recital 9 of that directive, that the purpose of that directive is to lay down common minimum rules concerning certain aspects of the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings and the right to be present at the trial in those proceedings, and not to carry out exhaustive harmonisation of criminal proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 September 2022, HN (Trial of an accused person removed from the territory), C‑420/20, EU:C:2022:679, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
113 In that respect, as stated in recital 48 thereof, Directive 2016/343 allows Member States to extend the rights laid down therein in order to provide a higher level of protection.
114 Accordingly, Directive 2016/343 does not prevent Member States from extending the right to a new trial to include situations in which the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) of that directive are satisfied, nor does it preclude the assessment of the diligence exercised by the accused person in order to receive information relating to the criminal proceedings brought against him or her from being based on standards of proof according to which only direct proof can show that that person voluntarily evaded those proceedings.
115 As regards Articles 47 and 54 of the Charter, relating, respectively, to the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and to the prohibition of abuse of rights, which correspond to Articles 6 and 17 ECHR, as referred to by the referring court in its second question, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court considers, in essence, that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, as interpreted in the national case-law, would allow a person convicted in absentia to abuse, to the detriment of the victim of the criminal offence, his or her right to a fair trial, as guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter, in breach of Article 54 thereof. It therefore asks whether Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 2016/343, read in the light of Articles 47 and 54 of the Charter, should be read as precluding such national legislation.
116 In that regard, in the first place, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, where, as in the present case, a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by EU law, implements EU law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised (judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 29, and of 24 July 2023, Lin, C‑107/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:606, paragraph 110 and the case-law cited).
117 In this instance, as is apparent from paragraphs 112 to 116 of the present judgment, the Member States remain free to apply a higher level of protection of the right of accused persons to be present at the trial than that required by EU law, which is not such as to compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court. Nor is there anything in the file before the Court to suggest that that higher level of protection provided for by national law is capable of compromising the primacy, unity or effectiveness of EU law.
118 In the second place, according to Article 54 of the Charter, nothing in that charter is to be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for therein.
119 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of Article 17 ECHR, in so far as it refers to individuals, is to prevent them from relying on the provisions of the Convention in order to perform any act aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in that convention. The European Court of Human Rights has made clear that that provision, which is therefore negative in scope, cannot, on the other hand, be construed a contrario as depriving a physical person of the fundamental individual rights guaranteed, inter alia, by Articles 5 and 6 ECHR, which correspond to Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter (ECtHR, 17 March 2009, Ould Dah v. France, ECHR:2009:0317DEC001311303).
120 Where a person convicted in absentia, relying on the procedure provided for in Article 629-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applies for an extraordinary remedy in order to have a conviction, which was handed down in absentia and which has become final, quashed, and where the national court, finding that the conditions laid down in Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not satisfied during the trial, grants such a remedy, that person relies on his or her right to a fair trial, which includes the right to be present at the trial; therefore, it is not apparent that recourse to such an extraordinary remedy by that person is aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognised in the Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Charter, within the meaning of Article 54 thereof.
121 Furthermore, in so far as the conditions for having recourse to an extraordinary remedy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, provided for under national law, as interpreted in national case-law, are intended to ensure a higher level of protection of the right of the accused person to be present at his or her trial than is required by EU law, that person, in benefiting from that higher national level of protection, does not exercise a right which he or she derives from EU law.
122 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 2016/343, read in the light of Articles 47 and 54 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, as interpreted in national case-law, requires the national court, in the absence of direct proof that a person convicted in absentia voluntarily avoided knowledge of the criminal proceedings that led to a conviction being handed down in respect of him or her, to grant a remedy applied for by that person in order to have that conviction, which has become final, quashed, on the ground that it could not be handed down in his or her absence, and, where appropriate, that the institution of new proceedings on the merits be ordered.
Costs
123 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
1. Articles 6, 10 and 18 of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, where the victim of an offence did not join as a civil party, under national law, in the criminal proceedings that led to a conviction which was handed down in absentia and which has become final, does not provide, in the context of an extraordinary remedy applied for by the convicted person in order to have that conviction quashed on the ground that it could not be handed down in his or her absence and, where appropriate, to have new proceedings on the merits instituted, for either an obligation to inform the victim that that extraordinary remedy has been applied for or the possibility for that victim to participate in the proceedings relating to that remedy.
2. Articles 8 and 9 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, read in the light of Articles 47 and 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, as interpreted in national case-law, requires the national court, in the absence of direct proof that a person convicted in absentia voluntarily avoided knowledge of the criminal proceedings that led to a conviction being handed down in respect of him or her, to grant a remedy applied for by that person in order to have that conviction, which has become final, quashed, on the ground that it could not be handed down in his or her absence, and, where appropriate, that the institution of new proceedings on the merits be ordered.
[Signatures]