CURIA - Documents

Provisional text

ENJUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

16 July 2026 (*)

Table of contents

I. Legal framework

A. European Law

1. The FEU Treaty

2. The GDPR

B. FIFA rules

1. FIFA Football Agent Regulations

2. The RSTP

3. The FIFA Statutes

4. The FIFA Disciplinary Code

5. The FIFA Code of Ethics

II. The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

III. The admissibility of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

IV. Substance

A. The application of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on competition law and the freedom to provide services

1. Preliminary observations

2. The application of the FEU Treaty provisions on competition law

(a) The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU

(1) The existence of an agreement, decision or concerted practice

(2) The effect on trade between Member States

(3) The fact that the conduct at issue must have as its ‘object’ or ‘effect’ the restriction of competition

(i) The concept of ‘restriction of competition by object’

(ii) The possibility of categorising rules such as those mentioned by the referring court in its question as a restriction of competition by ‘object’

– The rules restricting multiple representation

– The rules on the remuneration which an agent may claim in respect of the recruitment of a player or a coach

– The rules on agent licences

– The rules on making an approach

– The rules organising the collection of certain information on a digital platform operated by FIFA and the communication of part of that information

– Interim conclusion

(iii) Categorisation of the existence of conduct having as its effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition

(iv) Whether a possible restriction of competition by ‘object’ or ‘effect’ may be justified

– Whether particular conduct may be regarded as falling outside the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU because it pursues an objective in the public interest

– Whether certain conduct may fall within the scope of Article 101(3) TFEU

(b) The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU

(1) Whether the conduct in question originates from one or more undertakings

(2) Holding a dominant position on the internal market or on a substantial part of it

(3) The concept of ‘effect on trade between Member States’

(4) Whether there is an abuse

(5) Whether conduct falling within the scope of Article 102(3) TFEU may be justified

3. The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 56 TFEU

(a) Whether there is an obstacle

(b) Whether there are justifications

B. The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 6 of the GDPR

1. The processing of personal data provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR

(a) Compliance with the first requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

(b) Compliance with the second requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

2. The processing of personal data provided for in Article 19 of the FFAR

(a) Compliance with the first requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

(b) Compliance with the second requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

Costs

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Internal market – Competition – Professional football – Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Football Agent Regulations – Rules on agents’ remuneration, agent licences, multiple representation, making an approach and the communication of certain information to FIFA, other agents, clubs and players – Article 101(1) TFEU – Prohibition of agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices – Restrictions on competition – Concepts of anticompetitive ‘object’ and ‘effect’ – Exception to the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU – Conditions – Exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU – Conditions – Concept of ‘efficiency gains’ – Article 102 TFEU – Abuse of dominant position – Justification – Conditions – Article 56 TFEU – Obstacle to the freedom to provide services – Objectives – Proportionality – Protection of personal data – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 – Point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) – Lawfulness of processing – Conditions )

In Case C‑209/23,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Landgericht Mainz (Regional Court, Mainz, Germany), made by decision of 30 March 2023, received at the Court on 31 March 2023, in the proceedings

FT,

RRC Sports GmbH

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer, E. Regan (Rapporteur), D. Gratsias and B. Smulders, Judges,

Advocate General: N. Emiliou,

Registrar: R. Șereș, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 12 February 2025,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– FT and RRC Sports GmbH, by T. Bernhard, A. Fritzsche, S. Kirchgeßner and C. von Köckritz, Rechtsanwälte,

– Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), by M.B. Keane, D. Slater and D. Waelbroeck, avocats, and by S. Milde and N. Nohlen, Rechtsanwälte,

– the German Government, by J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents,

– the Greek Government, by K. Boskovits, acting as Agent,

– the French Government, by R. Bénard and T. Lechevallier, acting as Agents,

– the Hungarian Government, by M.Z. Fehér and K. Szíjjártó, acting as Agents,

– the European Commission, by S. Baches Opi, A. Bouchagiar, M. Mataija and G. Meeßen, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 15 May 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and of Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1; ‘the GDPR’).

2 The request was made in the course of proceedings between FT, a football players’ agent, together with RRC Sports GmbH, a limited liability company governed by German law, which itself operates as a players’ agent, and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), concerning the lawfulness of FIFA’s regulations relating to services provided under the international transfer system for players and coaches.

I. Legal framework

A. European Union Law

1. The FEU Treaty

3 Article 56 TFEU provides:

‘Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the [European] Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.

The European Parliament and the Council [of the European Union], acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services and who are established within the Union.’

4 Article 101 TFEU provides:

‘1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which:

(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;

(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;

(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;

(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’

2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:

– any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,

– any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,

– any concerted practice or category of concerted practices

which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:

(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;

(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.’

5 Article 102 TFEU is worded as follows:

‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.

Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:

(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;

(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;

(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;

(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’

2. The GDPR

6 Recital 47 of the GDPR states:

‘The legitimate interests of a controller, including those of a controller to which the personal data may be disclosed, or of a third party, may provide a legal basis for processing, provided that the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, taking into consideration the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller. Such legitimate interest could exist for example where there is a relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller in situations such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller. At any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. The interests and fundamental rights of the data subject could in particular override the interest of the data controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect further processing. Given that it is for the legislator to provide by law for the legal basis for public authorities to process personal data, that legal basis should not apply to the processing by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. The processing of personal data strictly necessary for the purposes of preventing fraud also constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. The processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes may be regarded as carried out for a legitimate interest.’

7 Article 1 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Subject matter and objectives’, provides, in paragraph 1:

‘This Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data.’

8 Article 2 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Material scope’, provides, in paragraph 1:

‘This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.’

9 Article 3 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Territorial scope’, states, in paragraph 2:

‘This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to:

(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or

(b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union.’

10 Article 4(2) and (6) of the GDPR, entitled ‘Definitions’, is worded as follows:

‘For the purposes of this Regulation:

(2) “processing” means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;

…

(6) “filing system” means any structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis’.

11 Article 5 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Principles relating to processing of personal data’, provides, in paragraph 1:

‘Personal data shall be:

(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (“lawfulness, fairness and transparency”);

…

(c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (“data minimisation”);

…’

12 Article 6 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Lawfulness of processing’, provides, in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1:

‘Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies:

…

(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.’

13 Article 10 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences’, provides:

‘Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures based on Article 6(1) shall be carried out only under the control of official authority or when the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Any comprehensive register of criminal convictions shall be kept only under the control of official authority.’

14 Article 23 of the GDPR, entitled ‘Restrictions’, states:

‘1. Union or Member State law to which the data controller or processor is subject may restrict by way of a legislative measure the scope of the obligations and rights provided for in Articles 12 to 22 and Article 34, as well as Article 5 in so far as its provisions correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in Articles 12 to 22, when such a restriction respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard:

(a) national security;

(b) defence;

(d) the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security;

(e) other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of the Union or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters, public health and social security;

(f) the protection of judicial independence and judicial proceedings;

(g) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of breaches of ethics for regulated professions;

(h) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the cases referred to in points (a) to (e) and (g);

(i) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others;

(j) the enforcement of civil law claims.

2. In particular, any legislative measure referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain specific provisions at least, where relevant, as to:

(a) the purposes of the processing or categories of processing;

(b) the categories of personal data;

(d) the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer;

(e) the specification of the controller or categories of controllers;

(f) the storage periods and the applicable safeguards taking into account the nature, scope and purposes of the processing or categories of processing;

(g) the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects; and

(h) the right of data subjects to be informed about the restriction, unless that may be prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction.’

B. FIFA rules

1. FIFA Football Agent Regulations

15 The FIFA Football Agent Regulations (‘the FFAR’) were adopted by FIFA’s Council at its meeting on 16 December 2022 and were published on 6 January 2023. Articles 1 to 10 and 22 to 27 of the FFAR entered into force on 9 January 2023. The other provisions of those regulations entered into force on 1 October 2023.

16 The FFAR contain the following definitions:

‘Approach: (i) any physical, in-person contact or contact via any means of electronic communication with a Client; (ii) any direct or indirect contact with another person or organisation linked to a Client, such as a family member or friend; or (iii) any action when a Football Agent uses or directs another person or organisation to contact a Client on their behalf in the manner described in (i) or (ii) above.

Client: a member association, club, player, coach, or Single-Entity League that may engage a Football Agent to provide Football Agent Services.

Connected Football Agent: a Football Agent is connected to another Football Agent as a result of their: (i) being employed or contractually retained by the same Agency through which Football Agent Services are conducted; (ii) both being directors, shareholders in, or co-owners of the same Agency through which Football Agent Services are conducted; (iii) being married to one another, domestic partners, siblings of one another, or parent and child or stepchild; or (iv) them having made any contractual or other arrangements, whether formal or informal, to cooperate, on more than one occasion, in the provision of any services or to share the revenue or profits of any part of their Football Agent Services.

Engaging Entity: a club, member association or Single-Entity League that may engage a player or coach.

…

Football Agent Services: football-related services performed for or on behalf of a Client, including any negotiation, communication relating or preparatory to the same, or other related activity, with the purpose, objective and/or intention of concluding a Transaction.

Individual: player or coach.

…

Platform: the digital platform operated by FIFA through which the licensing process, dispute resolution process, continuing professional development (CPD) and reporting shall occur.

…

Releasing Entity: a club, member association or Single-Entity League that a player or coach is leaving to be employed and/or registered by an Engaging Entity.

…

Single-Entity League: an entity affiliated to a member association that organises a league (or leagues) and represents the common interests of its clubs, for example, by acting as the employer of all club players.’

17 Title I of the FFAR, ‘General rules’, contains Articles 1 to 3.

18 Article 1 of the FFAR, entitled ‘Objectives’, states:

‘1. FIFA has a statutory obligation to regulate all matters relating to the football transfer system. The core objectives of the football transfer system are to:

(a) protect the contractual stability between professional players and clubs;

(b) encourage the training of young players;

(d) protect minors;

(e) maintain competitive balance; and

(f) ensure the regularity of sporting competitions.

2. Regulation of the occupation of Football Agent ensures that the conduct of a Football Agent is consistent with both the core objectives of the football transfer system and the following objectives:

(a) Raising and setting minimum professional and ethical standards for the occupation of Football Agent;

(b) Ensuring the quality of the service provided by Football Agents to Clients at fair and reasonable service fees that are uniformly applicable;

(d) Improving financial and administrative transparency;

(e) Protecting players who lack experience or information relating to the football transfer system;

(f) Enhancing contractual stability between players, coaches and clubs; and

(g) Preventing abusive, excessive and speculative practices.’

19 Article 2 of the FFAR, entitled ‘Scope’, states, in paragraphs 1 and 2:

‘1. These Regulations govern the occupation of Football Agents within the international transfer system and apply:

(a) to all Representation Agreements with an international dimension; or

(b) any conduct connected to an international transfer or international Transaction.

2. A Representation Agreement will have an international dimension whenever:

(a) it governs Football Agent Services related to a Specified Transaction in connection with an international transfer (or a move of a coach to a club affiliated to a different member association from that of their previous employer or to another member association than that of their previous employer); or

(b) it governs Football Agent Services related to more than one Specified Transaction, one of which is connected to an international transfer (or a move of a coach to a club affiliated to a different member association from that of their previous employer or to another member association than that of their previous employer).’

20 Article 3(1) and (2) of the FFAR, entitled ‘National football agent regulations’, provides:

‘1. Member associations shall implement and enforce national football agent regulations by 30 September 2023.

2. The national football agent regulations govern the occupation of Football Agents within the territory under the jurisdiction of the relevant member associations and apply to all Representation Agreements that do not have an international dimension. The national football agent regulations must be consistent with these Regulations. In particular, they shall:

(a) incorporate articles 11 to 21 of these Regulations by reference;

(b) incorporate references to any mandatory element of national law;

(c) provide jurisdiction to a national-level body for the determination of any disputes, as established in these Regulations; and

(d) provide jurisdiction to a national-level body to take disciplinary measures, as established in these Regulations.’

21 Title II of the FFAR, ‘Becoming a football agent’, contains Articles 4 to 10.

22 Article 4 of the FFAR, entitled ‘General provisions’, provides:

‘1. A natural person may become a Football Agent by:

(a) submitting a complete licence application via the Platform;

(b) complying with the eligibility requirements;

(d) paying an annual fee to FIFA.

2. By applying for a licence, an applicant agrees to abide by these Regulations and the FIFA Statutes, FIFA Code of Ethics, FIFA Disciplinary Code and [FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”)], all of which are available on www.fifa.com.’

23 Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, entitled ‘Eligibility requirements’, provides:

‘1. An applicant must:

(a) upon submitting their licence application (and subsequently thereafter, including after being granted a licence):

…

ii. never have been convicted of a criminal charge, including any related settlements, regarding matters related to: organised crime, drug trafficking, corruption, bribery, money laundering, tax evasion, fraud, match manipulation, misappropriation of funds, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, forgery, legal malpractice, sexual abuse, violent crimes, harassment, exploitation or child or vulnerable young adult trafficking;

iii. never have been the subject of a suspension of two years or more, disqualification or striking off by any regulatory authority or sports governing body for failure to comply with rules relating to ethics and professional conduct’.

24 Title III of the FFAR, ‘Acting as a football agent’, contains Articles 11 to 17.

25 Article 11 of the FFAR, entitled ‘General provisions’, states, in paragraphs 1 to 3:

‘1. Only a Football Agent may perform Football Agent Services.

2. A Football Agent must always satisfy the eligibility requirements in article 5 of these Regulations.

3. A Football Agent may conduct their business affairs through an Agency. Any employees or contractors hired by the Agency that are not Football Agents may not perform Football Agent Services or make any Approach to a potential Client to enter into a Representation Agreement. A Football Agent remains fully responsible for any conduct by their Agency, its employees, contractors or other representatives should they violate these Regulations.’

26 Article 12 of the FFAR, entitled ‘Representation’, states:

‘…

3. A Representation Agreement concluded between an Individual and a Football Agent may not exceed two years. This term may be extended by a new Representation Agreement only. Any automatic renewal provision, or any other provision that purports to extend any term of the Representation Agreement beyond the maximum period, shall be null and void.

…

5. A Representation Agreement concluded between an Engaging Entity or Releasing Entity and a Football Agent is not subject to a maximum duration.

…

7. A Representation Agreement is valid only if it contains the following minimum requirements:

(a) The names of the parties

(b) The duration (if applicable)

(d) The nature of the Football Agent Services to be provided

(e) The parties’ signatures.

8. A Football Agent may only perform Football Agent Services and Other Services for one party in a Transaction, subject to the sole exception in this article.

(a) Permitted dual representation: a Football Agent may perform Football Agent Services and Other Services for an Individual and an Engaging Entity in the same Transaction, provided that prior explicit written consent is given by both Clients.

9. A Football Agent may, in particular, not perform Football Agent Services or Other Services in the same Transaction for:

(a) a Releasing Entity and Individual; or

(b) a Releasing Entity and Engaging Entity; or

10. A Football Agent and a Connected Football Agent may not perform Football Agent Services or Other Services for different Clients in the same Transaction, except in accordance with paragraph 8 of this article.

…

13. Any clause in a Representation Agreement that:

(a) limits an Individual’s ability to autonomously negotiate and conclude an employment contract without the involvement of a Football Agent; and/or

(b) penalises an Individual if they autonomously negotiate and/or conclude an employment contract without the involvement of a Football Agent,

will be null and void.

…’

27 Article 14 of the FFAR, entitled ‘Service fee – general principles’, provides:

‘1. A Football Agent may charge a service fee to a Client as agreed in a Representation Agreement.

2. Payment of the service fee due under a Representation Agreement shall be made exclusively by the Client of the Football Agent. A Client may not contract with or authorise any third party to make such payment.

3. The only exception to the principle in paragraph 2 of this article is when a Football Agent is representing an Individual and their negotiated annual Remuneration is less than [200 000 United States dollars (USD)] (or equivalent), not counting any conditional payments. In such cases, an Engaging Entity may agree with an Individual to pay the service fee for that Transaction to their Football Agent in accordance with the Representation Agreement. All of the following conditions must apply:

(a) The service fee payment made by the Engaging Entity on behalf of the Individual shall not affect the fiduciary duty of the Football Agent to the Individual. It must also not create any dependency or subordination of the Football Agent towards the Engaging Entity.

(b) The service fee payment made by the Engaging Entity on behalf of the Individual must be no higher than the agreed service fee in the Representation Agreement between the Individual and Football Agent.

(c) The Engaging Entity may not deduct any service fee payment made pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article from the Individual’s Remuneration.

…

6. Payment of any service fee shall be made after the closure of the relevant registration period and in instalments every three months for the duration of the negotiated employment contract.

7. Only the Remuneration actually received by an Individual shall be subject to the payment of a service fee, calculated on a pro-rata basis.

…

10. Where a Football Agent acts on behalf of an Engaging Entity and an Individual in the same Transaction under article 12 paragraph 8 a) of these Regulations (permitted dual representation), the Engaging Entity may pay up to 50% of the total service fee due.

…

12. A Football Agent is not entitled to receive any service fee not yet due deriving from a negotiated employment contract where:

(a) the Individual transfers to another Engaging Entity before the negotiated employment contract expires; or

(b) the negotiated employment contract is prematurely terminated by the Individual without just cause and the Football Agent still represents the Individual at the time of that termination.

…’

28 Article 15 of the FFAR, entitled ‘Service fee cap’, provides:

‘1. The service fee payable to a Football Agent for the performance of Football Agent Services shall be calculated as follows:

(a) When representing an Individual or Engaging Entity: based on the Individual’s Remuneration

(b) When representing a Releasing Entity: based on the transfer compensation for the relevant Transaction.

2. The maximum service fee payable for the provision of Football Agent Services in a Transaction, regardless of the number of Football Agents providing Football Agent Services to a particular Client, is:

	Service fee cap
Client	Individual’s annual Remuneration less than or equal to USD 200 000 (or equivalent)	Individual’s annual Remuneration above USD 200 000 (or equivalent)
Individual	5% of the Individual’s Remuneration	3% of the Individual’s Remuneration
Engaging Entity	5% of the Individual’s Remuneration	3% of the Individual’s Remuneration
Engaging Entity and Individual (permitted dual representation)	10% of the Individual’s Remuneration	6% of the Individual’s Remuneration
Releasing Entity (transfer compensation)	10% of the transfer compensation

For the avoidance of doubt, the following shall apply:

a) The calculation to determine the relevant service fee cap of the Individual’s Remuneration may not take into account any conditional payments.

b) If an Individual’s Remuneration is above USD 200 000 (or equivalent), the annual excess above that amount shall be subject to a service fee cap of 3% if the Football Agent is representing an Individual or an Engaging Entity or 6% if they are representing both an Engaging Entity and an Individual (permitted dual representation).

c) The calculation of the transfer compensation may not include:

i. any amount paid as compensation for breach of contract pursuant to article 17 or Annexe 2 of the RSTP; and/or

ii. any sell-on fee.

3. Where a Football Agent or a Connected Football Agent, in the 24 months prior to or following a Transaction, performs Other Services for a Client involved in that Transaction, it shall be presumed that the Other Services formed part of the Football Agent Services performed in that Transaction, unless proven to the contrary.

4. Where a Football Agent and/or Client fails to rebut the presumption in paragraph 3 of this article, the fees paid for the Other Services shall be deemed to be part of the service fee paid for the Football Agent Services performed in that Transaction.’

29 Article 16 of the FFAR, entitled ‘Rights and obligations’, provides:

‘1. A Football Agent may:

…

(b) not Approach a Client that is bound by an exclusive Representation Agreement with another Football Agent, except in the final two months of that exclusive Representation Agreement;

(c) not enter into a Representation Agreement with a Client that is bound by an exclusive Representation Agreement with another Football Agent, except in the final two months of that exclusive Representation Agreement.

2. A Football Agent shall:

…

(b) respect and adhere to the Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of the competent bodies of FIFA, the confederations and member associations;

…

(f) pay an annual licence fee to FIFA within the deadline stipulated on the Platform, as described in articles 7 and 17 of these Regulations;

…

(j) upload to the Platform:

i. within 14 days of execution, amendment or termination of a Representation Agreement: the relevant Representation Agreement and the information requested on the Platform;

ii. within 14 days of execution: any agreement with a Client other than a Representation Agreement, including but not limited to agreements relating to Other Services and the information requested on the Platform;

iii. within 14 days of payment of a service fee: the information requested on the Platform;

iv. within 14 days of payment of a fee related to any agreement entered into with a Client other than a Representation Agreement: the information requested on the Platform;

v. within 14 days of occurrence: any contractual or other arrangement between Football Agents to cooperate in the provision of any services or to share the revenue or profits of any part of their Football Agent Services;

vi. within 14 days of occurrence: any information that may impact the obligation to meet the eligibility requirements; and

vii. within 14 days of occurrence: any settlement agreement entered into with a Client or another Football Agent;

k) if they conduct their business affairs through an Agency, upload to the Platform:

i. within 14 days of the first Transaction involving the Agency: its ownership structure, the identity of the shareholders, the percentage owned in its share capital and/or identity of its beneficial owners;

ii. within 14 days of the first Transaction involving the Agency: the number of Football Agents that use the same Agency to conduct their business affairs and the name of all its employees; and

iii. within 30 days of occurrence: any changes to any of the information previously provided in relation to the Agency.

3. A Football Agent may not engage, or attempt to engage, in the following conduct:

…

(e) Accept payment of any transfer compensation or training reward that is payable in connection with a player’s transfer between clubs. This includes, without limitation, any rights as described in article 18ter of the RSTP.

…

4. With regard to disclosure and reporting, a Football Agent shall:

(a) immediately inform a Client of any written offer (by any means of communication) they have received in relation to their Client;

(b) provide to a Client, on request, a copy of the relevant Representation Agreement or any other written agreements in relation to Other Services, a copy of the employment contract or any other written documents obtained in relation to the Football Agent Services, a schedule detailing payments of any kind whatsoever made to the Football Agent in relation to a Transaction in which they were involved; and

(c) upon request, cooperate with the relevant body of each member association, confederation and/or FIFA with respect to any request for any type of information in any form.’

30 Title IV of the FFAR, ‘Rights and obligations of clients’, comprises only Article 18. That article, entitled ‘Engagement of Football Agents’, states:

‘1. Clients:

…

(c) shall satisfy themselves that a Football Agent is appropriately licensed by FIFA prior to signing the relevant Representation Agreement;

…

(f) (for clubs) shall upload to the FIFA Transfer Matching System (TMS) within 14 days of occurrence:

i. the information requested in TMS on completion of each Transaction that is an international transfer in which the club is involved;

ii. any amendment to, or termination of, a relevant Representation Agreement;

iii. any agreement with a Football Agent other than a Representation Agreement, including but not limited to Other Services, and the information requested in TMS;

iv. the information requested in TMS following the payment of a fee related to any agreement entered into with a Football Agent other than a Representation Agreement; and

(g) shall immediately report any breaches of these Regulations to FIFA, the confederations or member associations.

2. Clients (and their officials, when applicable) may not engage, or attempt to engage, in the following conduct:

…

(e) Participate, or assist, directly or indirectly, in any circumvention of the service fee cap established by these Regulations.

…’

31 Title V of the FFAR, ‘Disclosure and publication’, comprises only Article 19, which, bearing the same title as Title V, provides:

‘1. FIFA shall make available:

(a) the names and details of all Football Agents;

(b) the Clients that Football Agents represent, the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of their representation and the expiry date of the Representation Agreement;

(d) any sanctions imposed on Football Agents and Clients; and

(e) details of all Transactions involving Football Agents, including the service fee amounts paid to Football Agents.’

32 Title VI of the FFAR, ‘Disputes’, comprises only Article 20. That article, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, is worded as follows:

‘1. Without prejudice to the right of a Football Agent or a Client to seek redress before an ordinary court of law, the Agents Chamber of the Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine disputes:

(a) arising out of, or in connection with, a Representation Agreement with an international dimension (see art. 2 par. 2 of these Regulations);

(b) where a claim is lodged in accordance with the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal; and

(c) where no more than two years have elapsed from the event giving rise to the dispute; the application of this time limit shall be examined ex officio in each case.

2. The detailed procedures for the resolution of disputes are set out in the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal.

3. Without prejudice to the right of a Football Agent or a Client to seek redress before an ordinary court of law, for disputes arising out of, or in connection with, a Representation Agreement without an international dimension, the decision-making body identified in the national football agent regulations of the relevant member association has jurisdiction to determine such disputes (cf. art. 2 par. 3).’

2. The RSTP

33 Article 18bis of the RSTP, entitled ‘Third-party influence on clubs’, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides:

‘1. No club shall enter into a contract which enables the counter club/counter clubs and vice versa, or any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.

2. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs that do not observe the obligations set out in this article.’

34 Article 18ter of the RSTP, entitled ‘Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights’, provides, in paragraph 1:

‘No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation.’

3. The FIFA Statutes

35 Article 8(3) of the FIFA Statutes, entitled ‘Conduct of bodies, officials and others’, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, states:

‘Every person and organisation involved in the game of football is obliged to observe the Statutes and regulations of FIFA as well as the principles of fair play.’

36 Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes, entitled ‘Member associations’ obligations’, provides:

‘1. Member associations have the following obligations:

(a) to comply fully with the Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA bodies at any time as well as the decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) passed on appeal on the basis of art. 56 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes;

(b) to take part in competitions organised by FIFA;

(d) to cause their own members to comply with the Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA bodies;

(e) to convene its supreme and legislative body at regular intervals, at least every two years;

(f) to ratify statutes that are in accordance with the requirements of the FIFA Standard Statutes;

(g) to create a referees’ committee that is directly subordinate to the member association;

(h) to respect the Laws of the Game;

(i) to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties in accordance with art. 19 of these Statutes;

(j) to comply fully with all other duties arising from these Statutes and other regulations.

2. Violation of the abovementioned obligations by any member association may lead to sanctions provided for in these Statutes.

3. Violations of par. 1 i) may also lead to sanctions, even if the third-party influence was not the fault of the member association concerned. Each member association is responsible towards FIFA for any and all acts of the members of their bodies caused by the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of such members.’

37 Article 57(1) of the FIFA Statutes, entitled ‘Jurisdiction of CAS’, states:

‘Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies and against decisions passed by confederations, member associations or leagues shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of receipt of the decision in question.’

38 In accordance with Article 58(1) and (2) of the FIFA Statutes, entitled ‘Obligations relating to dispute resolution’:

‘1. The confederations, member associations and leagues shall agree to recognise CAS as an independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members, affiliated players and officials comply with the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to football agents and match agents that are licensed by FIFA.

2. Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional measures is also prohibited.’

4. The FIFA Disciplinary Code

39 The 2019 version of the FIFA Disciplinary Code was adopted by FIFA’s Council at its meeting on 3 June 2019 in Paris and entered into force on 15 July 2019 (‘the FIFA Disciplinary Code’). It was replaced by the 2023 version of that code on 1 February 2023.

40 Article 53(1) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, states:

‘1. The Disciplinary Committee is competent to sanction any breach of FIFA regulations which does not come under the jurisdiction of another body.

2. The Disciplinary Committee is, in particular, responsible for:

(a) sanctioning serious infringements which have escaped the match officials’ attention;

(b) rectifying obvious errors in the referee’s disciplinary decisions;

(d) pronouncing additional sanctions.’

5. The FIFA Code of Ethics

41 Article 4 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, entitled ‘Scope of the Code, omissions, custom, doctrine and jurisprudence’, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides:

‘1. This Code governs every subject to which the text or the meaning of its provisions refers.

2. If there are any omissions in this Code with respect to procedural rules, and in case of doubts regarding the interpretation of the Code, the Ethics Committee shall decide in accordance with FIFA custom.

3. During all its operations, the Ethics Committee may draw on precedents and principles already established by sports doctrine and jurisprudence.’

42 Article 84 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, entitled ‘Court of Arbitration for Sport’, provides:

‘1. Decisions taken by the adjudicatory chamber are final, subject to appeals lodged with the [CAS] in accordance with the relevant provisions of the FIFA Statutes.

2. The aforementioned decisions may also be appealed at CAS by the chief of the investigation.’

II. The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

43 The applicants in the main proceedings are FT, a football players’ agent and the Vice-President of the players’ agents’ association ‘The Football Forum’, and RRC Sports, a company established in Germany, which also acts as a players’ agent and of which FT is the managing director.

44 FIFA, the defendant in the main proceedings, is an umbrella organisation which brings together many international and national federations and associations. It has 211 national associations among its members, including the Deutscher Fußball-Bund (German Football Association; ‘the DFB’). In accordance with Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes, member associations are required to undertake, in their own statutes, to comply with the rules laid down by FIFA and to recognise the decisions adopted by it.

45 FIFA has several bodies and committees. Among them, the Council is the body responsible for strategy and supervision and is competent to adopt general regulations.

46 Thus, the FIFA Council adopted the FFAR on 16 December 2022, which were published on 6 January 2023 and which lay down the framework conditions applicable to persons providing agent services under the international transfer system for players and coaches established by that federation. In particular, those regulations lay down rules governing the offering and provision of intermediary services to players, coaches, clubs and single-entity leagues, and the arrangements for remuneration in respect of those services.

47 The applicants in the main proceedings brought before the Landgericht Mainz (Regional Court, Mainz, Germany), which is the referring court, an action for an injunction seeking an order prohibiting FIFA from implementing several provisions of inter alia the RSTP and the FFAR on the ground that they infringed Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and the GDPR.

48 In that regard, the referring court has doubts as to, in particular, whether the exception identified, in the context of Article 101 TFEU, in the judgments of 19 February 2002, Wouters and Others (C‑309/99, EU:C:2002:98), and of 18 July 2006, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission (C‑519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492), is applicable to rules which, like those at issue in the main proceedings, are not of a purely sporting nature or whether it also applies to rules which, although of an economic nature, have an influence, at least indirectly, on the composition of club teams.

49 In particular, it notes that it is not clear, first, whether the objectives put forward by FIFA to justify the rules at issue may be regarded as being legitimate, since they do not directly concern the functioning of sporting competitions as such and, second, whether those rules are necessary to achieve such objectives.

50 More generally, the referring court questions the compatibility with Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU of 13 of the rules contained in the FFAR.

51 Lastly, the referring court asks whether, among those rules, those which provide for the processing of personal data may pursue legitimate interests within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the GDPR and whether they meet the requirements deriving from the principle of proportionality, a necessary condition for such processing to be lawful.

52 In those circumstances, the Landgericht Mainz (Regional Court, Mainz) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘Must Article 101 TFEU (prohibition on cartels), Article 102 TFEU (prohibition on abuse of a dominant position) and Article 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services) and also Article 6 of the [GDPR] be interpreted as precluding [certain provisions of a set of] rules adopted by [an international sports federation] (in this case: FIFA), to which 211 national sports federations of the relevant sport (in this case: football) belong, and whose rules are therefore binding in any event on the majority of the actors active in the respective national professional leagues of the relevant sport (in this case: clubs (which also means football clubs organised as capital companies), players (who are club members) and players’ agents), [and which are intended to govern the activities of football players’ and coaches’ agents]?’

III. The admissibility of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

53 As a preliminary point, it is important to bear in mind that the Court itself must examine the circumstances in which cases are referred to it by the national court in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction or whether the request submitted to it is admissible (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

54 According to settled case-law, which is now reflected in Article 94(a) and (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary for the national court to define the factual and regulatory context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, to explain the factual hypotheses on which those questions are based (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

55 In the present case, the request for a preliminary ruling satisfies all those requirements since it is apparent from the information in the documents before the Court that the interpretation sought relates to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, that the problem raised is not hypothetical and that the case file contains the factual and legal material necessary to enable the Court to give a useful answer to the question referred.

56 Admittedly, as the Greek Government observes, that material does not contain a precise definition of the relevant market or, a fortiori, an analysis of its functioning.

57 However, the fact that the Court does not have an exhaustive account of the economic and legal context of the dispute in the main proceedings does not preclude it, nevertheless, on the basis of the information sent to it by the referring court, from being able to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to that court.

58 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the FFAR are capable of influencing the functioning of the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches and the employment market for players or coaches, the latter being characterised as a multi-party market in that it involves the interaction of several parties pursuing different interests, such as the entities employing the individuals concerned, those wishing to recruit them, the individuals concerned themselves and, lastly, as the case may be, their agents.

59 In those circumstances, the Court considers that it is not necessary, for the purposes of answering the question referred by the national court, to further define the material or geographical boundaries of the markets likely to be affected by the FFAR.

60 As regards the fact, mentioned by the Greek Government, that the information contained in the order for reference does not, in the absence of a detailed analysis, make it possible to establish the existence of an infringement of EU competition law, it should be noted that it is exclusively for the referring court to rule on the merits of the pleas raised by one of the parties to the main proceedings.

61 However, it should be noted that the referring court refers, in its question, to Article 53(3) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code. Where it reproduces that provision in its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court refers to the 2019 version of that code, in which that provision contains only two paragraphs. Moreover, where it reproduces that same provision in its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court itself refers only to those two paragraphs.

62 Consequently, the question referred by that court must be regarded as admissible, except in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and of Article 6 of the GDPR in the light of a rule such as that set out in Article 53(3) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code.

IV. Substance

63 By its question, the referring court asks the Court to interpret Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and Article 6 of the GDPR in order to rule on the compatibility with those four articles of a set of rules adopted by FIFA governing the pursuit of the activities of football players’ and coaches’ agents.

64 In particular, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and Article 6 of the GDPR preclude rules adopted by an international sports federation, such as those set out in the FFAR, which may be grouped, on the basis of their subject matter and objective, into five categories, namely:

– those aimed at restricting multiple representation, that is to say representation, by the same agent, of both the player or coach and the engaging and releasing clubs or single-entity leagues;

– those aimed at regulating the remuneration of agents;

– those relating to the conditions for obtaining or the withdrawal of a FIFA licence;

– those aimed at regulating the opportunities for agents to approach new players or coaches to represent, and

– those organising the communication of certain information to FIFA, other agents, clubs, single-entity leagues, players and coaches.

65 In those circumstances, the Court considers that it is necessary, for each of those categories of rules, to interpret, in the first place, the provisions of the FEU Treaty on competition law and the freedom to provide services and, in the second place, Article 6 of the GDPR.

A. The application of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on competition law and the freedom to provide services

1. Preliminary observations

66 The second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU states that the European Union is to contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function. Moreover, the last indent of Article 165(2) TFEU specifies that EU action is to be aimed at developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen. It follows that the competent EU institutions are required to take those objectives into consideration when they adopt, on the basis of that provision and in accordance with the conditions laid down therein, incentive measures or recommendations in the area of sport.

67 By contrast, Article 165 TFEU cannot be regarded as being a special rule exempting sport from all or some of the other provisions of primary EU law liable to be applied to it or requiring special treatment for sport in the context of that application (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 101, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 75).

68 Consequently, when applying the provisions of the FEU Treaty on competition law or the freedom to provide services, the specific characteristics of sport must be taken into account, but only and in so far as such specific characteristics are relevant, in the context of and in compliance with the conditions and criteria of application provided for in each of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).

69 Thus, where conduct or rules pursue economic aims or concern the economic dimension of a sport, they may fall within the scope of the provisions of EU law applicable to an economic activity, including Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU, even if that conduct or those rules have been adopted by a sports federation (judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

70 Only certain specific rules which were adopted solely on non-economic grounds and which relate to questions of interest solely to sport per se must be regarded as being extraneous to any economic activity. That is the case, in particular, of those on the exclusion of foreign players from the composition of teams participating in competitions between teams representing their country or the determination of ranking criteria used to select the athletes participating individually in competitions (judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 76, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

71 With the exception of those very specific situations, the rules adopted by sports associations in order to govern the services provided by operators engaged in an economic activity linked to the professional or semi-professional practice of a sport or which have a direct impact on such provision of services may fall within the scope of the provisions of EU law that are applicable to that activity, such as Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

72 In the present case, the purpose of the FFAR is to regulate certain activities of agents, consisting, in essence, of connecting, in return for remuneration, a player or coach and an entity established in another State with a view to the permanent or temporary move of that player or coach from one club to another, which the FIFA regulations call a ‘transfer’. In so far as those activities constitute a supply of services, for consideration, and relating to the placement of football players or coaches, they must be regarded as economic in nature.

73 Moreover, the referring court observes that the activity of agents is capable of having a decisive impact on the composition of teams, their continuity and their sporting strength. Since the composition of the teams constitutes one of the essential parameters of the competitions in which professional football clubs compete and those competitions give rise to an economic activity, the regulations at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as having an impact on the conditions for engaging in that economic activity and on competition between the professional football clubs engaged in that activity (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 81).

74 Therefore, the rules laid down by the FFAR do not fall under the rules to which the exception referred to in paragraph 68 of the present judgment might be applied, which exception the Court has stated repeatedly must be limited to its proper objective and may not be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the scope of the FEU Treaty provisions on EU economic law (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 79, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

75 Accordingly, those rules may fall within the scope of Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU.

76 First, as regards Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, even though they each pursue different objectives and have a specific scope, those articles may apply simultaneously where their respective conditions of application are met (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 119).

77 Second, in so far as the rules in the FFAR to which the referring court refers in its question are, as regards their application, independent of each other, the potential incompatibility of one of them with EU law, as determined, if applicable, by that court, cannot, in itself, necessarily result in others being incompatible.

78 It is therefore appropriate to examine the question referred for a preliminary ruling in the light of, first, Article 101 TFEU, second, Article 102 TFEU and, third, Article 56 TFEU.

2. The application of the FEU Treaty provisions on competition law

79 At the outset, it should be noted that football’s specific characteristics include the fact that it gives rise to the organisation of numerous competitions at both European and national levels, which involve the participation of very many clubs and also that of large numbers of players. In common with other sports, it also limits participation in those competitions to teams which have achieved certain sporting results, with the conduct of those competitions being based on matches between and gradual elimination of those participating teams. Consequently, it is, essentially, based on sporting merit, which can be guaranteed only if all the participating teams face each other in homogeneous regulatory and technical conditions, thereby ensuring a certain level of equal opportunity (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 143).

80 Those various specific characteristics support a finding that it is legitimate to subject the organisation and conduct of such competitions, at international, European and national levels, to common rules intended to guarantee their homogeneity and coordination within an overall match calendar as well as, more broadly, to promote, in a suitable and effective manner, the holding of sporting competitions based on equal opportunities and merit (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 144, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraphs 62 to 64).

81 Since the organisation and conduct of such competitions may give rise to the pursuit of ancillary economic activities, which may themselves influence those competitions, it cannot be regarded as necessarily unlawful for an association such as FIFA to adopt rules intended to regulate relations between, on the one hand, its members and their affiliates and, on the other, undertakings liable to have an economic interest in the organisation of those competitions.

82 That said, the fact that it may be legitimate for a sports confederation or federation to adopt such rules does not mean that each of the rules thus adopted may be considered to be compatible with EU competition law. The choices made when adopting each of those rules must also comply with the requirements arising from that law.

(a) The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU

83 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the application of Article 101(1) TFEU presupposes the existence of conduct by several ‘undertakings’ or, failing that, an ‘association of undertakings’.

84 According to settled case-law, any entity engaged in an economic activity consisting in the offering of products or services on a given market, irrespective of its legal form and the way in which it is financed, must be regarded as an ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU in particular (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, Royal Antwerp Football Club, C‑680/21, EU:C:2023:1010, paragraph 76), whereas the concept of an ‘association of undertakings’ covers a grouping together of several entities engaged in such an activity.

85 In the present case, although the FFAR were adopted only by FIFA, it should be noted that FIFA has national football associations among its members, which themselves are formed of clubs or single-entity leagues engaged in economic activities, consisting of offering products or services on various markets, such as sports ticketing, sponsorship or merchandising markets.

86 Therefore, FIFA may be regarded as having the status of an association of undertakings on those markets and on the markets upstream of them, such as the markets for the recruitment of players or coaches, or the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches from one entity to another.

87 Consequently, in a situation such as that referred to by the national court in its question, Article 101(1) TFEU must be regarded as applicable to FIFA since FIFA may be classified as an ‘association of undertakings’ within the meaning of that provision.

88 That said, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 101(1) TFEU, all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market are to be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market.

89 As is apparent from the wording of that provision, its application in a given case is subject to the fulfilment of a number of cumulative conditions: first, there must be an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice; second, that agreement, decision or concerted practice must be liable to affect trade between Member States; and, third, that conduct must have as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.

(1) The existence of an agreement, decision or concerted practice

90 In accordance with Article 101(1) TFEU, the conduct in question must consist of an ‘agreement’, a ‘concerted practice’ or a ‘decision by an association of undertakings’, concepts which cover conduct that may be of various kinds and take different forms.

91 In particular, the Court has already had occasion to hold that a decision by an association of undertakings consisting in adopting or implementing rules having a direct impact on the conditions in which the economic activity is exercised by undertakings which are directly or indirectly members of that association may constitute such a ‘[decision by an association] of undertakings’ within the meaning of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 118).

92 As is apparent from the very wording of the question referred by the national court, it is precisely in the light of such a decision that that court is asking the Court of Justice for an interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU in a situation where an international sports confederation or federation has adopted and implemented a set of rules intended to establish a legal framework applicable to all players’ and coaches’ agents wishing to represent clubs, single-entity leagues, coaches or players falling within the ecosystem established by that federation.

93 It follows that, in such a situation, the FFAR, and, consequently, each of the rules contained therein, may be regarded as constituting a ‘decision by an association of undertakings’, within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.

(2) The effect on trade between Member States

94 The application of Article 101(1) TFEU requires, among other conditions, that it be established, with a sufficient degree of probability, that an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice is capable of having an appreciable effect on trade between Member States by having an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade, at the risk of hindering the attainment or the functioning of the internal market, it being noted that such a condition may be considered fulfilled in the case of conduct that covers the entire territory of a Member State (judgment of 21 December 2023, Royal Antwerp Football Club, C‑680/21, EU:C:2023:1010, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

95 In the case at issue in the main proceedings, that condition must be regarded as being fulfilled, since the rules referred to in the question referred for a preliminary ruling are binding, at least for the most part, on clubs, single-entity leagues, players, coaches and players’ agents operating in the Member States in all cases where there is a representation agreement with an international dimension or conduct connected to an international transfer or international transaction, in accordance with Article 2 of the FFAR.

(3) The fact that the conduct at issue must have as its ‘object’ or ‘effect’ the restriction of competition

96 In order to find, in a given case, that an agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice is caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, it is necessary to demonstrate, in accordance with the very wording of that provision, either that that conduct has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or that that conduct has such an effect (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 158 and the case-law cited, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 47).

97 To that end, it is appropriate to begin by examining the object of the conduct in question. If, at the end of that examination, that conduct proves to have an anticompetitive object, it is not necessary to examine its effect on competition. Thus, it is only if that conduct is found not to have an anticompetitive object that it will be necessary, in a second stage, to examine its effect (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 159 and the case-law cited, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 37).

98 In that regard, the analysis to be made differs depending on whether those rules have as their ‘object’ or ‘effect’ the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, with each of those concepts being subject to different legal and evidentiary rules (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 160).

99 In so far as conduct may have as its object or effect only in part the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, that analysis does not necessarily have to be carried out in the light of the agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice in its entirety. That analysis may, in so far as one or more provisions, measures or aspects of that agreement, decision or concerted practice are severable from it in that they are, in themselves, liable to give rise to a restriction of competition on the relevant market, be carried out in the light of that provision, measure or aspect.

(i) The concept of ‘restriction of competition by object’

100 The concept of anticompetitive ‘object’, whilst not an exception in relation to the concept of anticompetitive ‘effect’, must nevertheless be interpreted strictly (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 161 and the case-law cited, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 38).

101 Thus, that concept must be interpreted as referring solely to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition for the view to be taken that it is not necessary to assess their effects. Indeed, certain types of coordination between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 162 and the case-law cited, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 39).

102 In order to determine, in a given case, whether certain rules established by an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice fall within a form of coordination which, by their very nature, must be regarded as harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition, it is necessary to examine, first, the content of those rules; second, the economic and legal context of which they form part; and, third, their objectives (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 165, and of 26 February 2026, Cargolux Airlines v Commission, C‑401/22 P, EU:C:2026:132, paragraph 172).

103 In that regard, first of all, in order to examine the content of the rules established by the agreement, decision or practice at issue, it is necessary to examine their various aspects in order to identify the type of coordination which those rules establish and, accordingly, to determine whether those rules have characteristics enabling them to be linked to a form of coordination between undertakings which must be regarded, by its very nature, as sufficiently harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition, which is in particular the case if any coordination exhibiting such characteristics is, precisely because of those characteristics, capable of creating conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Banco BPN v BIC Português and Others, C‑298/22, EU:C:2024:638, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

104 As regards, next, the economic and legal context of which the rules in question form part, given that the concept of restriction of competition by ‘object’ refers solely to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices falling within a form of coordination which, by its very nature, must be regarded as harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition, it is not necessary to examine nor, a fortiori, to prove the effects of those rules on competition, be they actual or potential, or negative or positive (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 166 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 131).

105 By contrast, it is necessary to take into consideration the nature of the products or services concerned, as well as the real conditions of the structure and functioning of the sectors or markets in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 166 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 131).

106 It may be that it is only where certain specific conditions are satisfied that it may be held that certain forms of coordination and, therefore, the agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices forming part of them, are harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition. Therefore, the examination of the economic and legal context of those forms of coordination must make it possible to ascertain whether, where a form of agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice is, by its very nature, harmful to competition only in certain circumstances relating, in particular, to the nature of the goods or services at issue, to the real conditions of the functioning of the market and to its structure, those circumstances exist (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 July 2024, Banco BPN v BIC Português and Others, C‑298/22, EU:C:2024:638, paragraph 48, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 52).

107 Lastly, as regards the objectives pursued by the coordination in question, the analysis of which is limited to what is necessary in order to establish the existence of a restriction of competition by ‘object’, it is necessary, in accordance with settled case-law, to determine the ‘objective’ aims which that coordination seeks to achieve from a competition standpoint (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 167 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 132).

108 Such ‘objective’ aims correspond, from a competitive point of view, to the intrinsic purpose of the practice in question.

109 Nevertheless, the fact that the undertakings involved acted without having a subjective intention to prevent, restrict or distort competition and the fact that they pursued certain legitimate objectives are not decisive for the purposes of the application of Article 101(1) TFEU (see judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 167 and the case-law cited, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 50).

110 In any event, the assessment carried out to that effect must show the precise reasons such as to justify a finding that all or part of the agreement between undertakings, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission, C‑124/21 P, EU:C:2023:1012, paragraph 108; of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 168; and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 51).

111 As regards the dispute in the main proceedings, it should be borne in mind that, in the framework of the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, the Court is empowered not to apply the rules of EU law to a particular case, of which, moreover, it has only knowledge limited to the information contained in the file submitted to it, but only to rule on the interpretation of those rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 201 and the case-law cited).

112 Therefore, it is exclusively for the referring court to assess, in the light of all the elements of fact and of law available to it, whether certain provisions of the FFAR may result, on the relevant market, in a restriction of competition by ‘object’.

113 However, in order to provide an answer of use to that court, the Court of Justice may take into consideration certain information from the file in the main proceedings submitted to it and the written observations submitted to it, in order to provide clarification as to the interpretation to be given to Article 101(1) TFEU in the light of that information and those observations (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 124).

(ii) The possibility of categorising rules such as those mentioned by the referring court in its question as a restriction of competition by ‘object’

– The rules restricting multiple representation

114 In its question, the referring court refers to rules such as those set out in Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR, which provide that the same agent or several ‘connected’ agents, namely directors, co-owners, shareholders or employees of the same agency, or persons with a family relationship or who have entered into an agreement to cooperate, may not represent simultaneously two or three of the parties involved in the transfer of a player or coach from one entity to another, namely the player or coach, the engaging entity and the releasing entity. However, Article 12(8) of the FFAR provides for an exception, allowing the dual representation of the player or coach and the engaging entity, provided that both parties have given their express consent to such dual representation.

115 In that regard, first, it should be noted that rules such as those set out in Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR are certainly capable of reducing the intensity of competition in the various sectors of the market for the services of agents involved in the international transfers of professional players or coaches from one entity to another, in that they prohibit agents already engaged by one party from providing their services for the benefit of one of the other parties to the same transaction, subject to the exception provided for in Article 12(8) of the FFAR. However, that aspect alone cannot lead to the conclusion that conduct constituting such a form of coordination reveals, by its very nature, a sufficient degree of harm to competition unless, having regard to the context surrounding such a form of coordination, the market concerned is characterised by a high degree of concentration, which it is for the referring court to verify.

116 Second, although rules such as those laid down in Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR, by stipulating that agents represent only one of the parties concerned and, in exceptional cases, players or coaches and the engaging entity, are capable of restricting agents’ freedom of economic action, that does not necessarily mean that those rules constitute a form of coordination which, by its very nature, must be regarded as harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition.

117 It must be borne in mind that the EU antitrust rules are not directly intended to ensure that economic operators are free to pursue their commercial activities. By contrast, they are intended to ensure, above all, that, on a given market, undertakings do not distort competition to the detriment of both undertakings and consumers and, more broadly, the well-being of people living in the European Union, in accordance with the objectives pursued by the European Union, as set out in Article 3(1) and (3) TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraph 41).

118 In so far as, consequently, it does not appear – although it is for the referring court to verify this – that the rules adopted by an association of undertakings, such as those set out in Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR, reveal in themselves a sufficient degree of harm to competition, it must be held that those rules do not appear to constitute a restriction of competition by ‘object’.

– The rules on the remuneration which an agent may claim in respect of the recruitment of a player or a coach

119 In its question, the national court refers to seven separate rules laid down by the FFAR relating to the remuneration of agents which must, therefore, be examined in turn.

120 As regards, first, a rule such as that laid down in Article 15(2) of the FFAR, which sets a remuneration cap for agents calculated as a percentage of the transfer fee or the annual remuneration of the player or coach, it follows, admittedly, from the Court’s case-law that certain collusive conduct, such as that leading to horizontal price-fixing, is, by its very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition on the market concerned, and more specifically to the free determination of the price, quantity or quality of products and services (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 18 January 2024, Lietuvos notarų rūmai and Others, C‑128/21, EU:C:2024:49, paragraphs 93 and 94).

121 That said, as the Advocate General essentially pointed out in points 56 and 57 of his Opinion, it does not follow from the Court’s case-law that the fixing of a maximum price such as that at issue in the main proceedings must, by its very nature, be regarded as necessarily capable of distorting competition.

122 Moreover, in the light of the documents before the Court and without prejudice to the in-depth examination which it is for the referring court to carry out, a rule, such as that laid down in Article 15(2) of the FFAR, which establishes a remuneration cap, does not appear, in view of its impact on the willingness of the undertakings concerned to provide their services in question, or on the quality of those services, to be sufficiently harmful to dispense with an examination of its effects. Since such a rule does not establish a fixed remuneration cap, but provides for a relative limit, being proportional, depending on the case, either to the remuneration which the player or coach will receive when the agent represents that individual or the engaging entity, or to the compensation paid by the engaging entity to the releasing entity where the agent represents the latter, it does not appear that that rule is likely to prevent agents from offsetting the efforts they make in order, in particular, to improve the quality of their service by securing higher remuneration, or that it is capable of dissuading them from offering their services on the market concerned.

123 Furthermore, it should be noted that a rule, such as that set out in Article 15(2) of the FFAR, cannot be categorised as a restriction on competition by ‘object’ within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, in relation to agents representing engaging or releasing entities, solely because the remuneration cap provided for in Article 15(2) of the FFAR is calculated, for those agents, as a percentage of the ‘transfer’ compensation.

124 In so far as concerns, second, a rule prohibiting third parties from paying remuneration due under the representation agreement on behalf of the contractual partners of the players’ and coaches’ agent which does not apply to agents representing an individual whose negotiated annual remuneration is less than or equal to USD 200 000 (EUR 188 341.65 on the date of adoption of the FFAR) or equivalent, as provided for in Article 14(2) and (3) of the FFAR, it appears that that rule merely limits the use of certain financial arrangements to remunerate an agent, without preventing agents or their clients from competing on the basis of one of the decisive parameters on which competition is established, such as the price or quality of the services offered. Such a rule does not therefore appear to reveal, with regard to competition, a sufficient degree of harm to be categorised as a restriction of competition by ‘object’, which it is nevertheless for the referring court to verify.

125 The same applies as regards, third, a rule, such as that set out in Article 15(3) and (4) of the FFAR, which establishes a presumption that other services which an agent, or another agent who is connected to the former, performs in the 24 months prior to or following the provision of his or her services as an agent must be regarded as forming part of those agent services and that, accordingly, where an agent and/or a client is unable to rebut that presumption, the remuneration paid for those other services is deemed to be part of the remuneration relating to the agent services. Such a rule cannot, any more than the rule referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, be regarded as having as its object the restriction of competition on the market at issue.

126 As regards, fourth, a rule, such as that laid down in Article 15(1) of the FFAR, which prohibits agents from agreeing on their remuneration otherwise than on the exclusive basis of the remuneration of the transferred individual or the amount of the transfer, and, fifth, a rule, such as that laid down in Article 16(3)(e) of the FFAR, read in conjunction with Article 18ter of the RSTP, which prohibits agents from receiving, for the transfer of an individual, remuneration or components of remuneration, or from paying agents remuneration or components of remuneration whose basis for calculation depends on the future transfer compensation which the engaging entity will receive in respect of a subsequent transfer of a player or coach, it should be noted that such rules do not affect the amount of that remuneration, but only its method of calculation or payment.

127 Whilst such rules may limit the ability, for the agents concerned, to compete by offering their clients alternative methods of calculating or paying their remuneration, those rules do not appear to prevent price competition. Moreover, since they are a priori applicable without distinction, those rules also do not appear, prima facie, to be liable to favour certain agents or their clients.

128 Consequently, it cannot be regarded as justified to classify rules exhibiting such characteristics as forms of coordination between undertakings which must be regarded, by their very nature, as revealing a sufficient degree of harm to competition, which it is, however, for the referring court to ascertain.

129 As regards, sixth, a rule, such as that laid down in Article 14(10) of the FFAR, which prohibits clubs or single-entity leagues, where a players’ and coaches’ agent acts both on behalf of the engaging entity and an individual, from paying more than 50% of the total remuneration payable by that individual and by that entity for the agent’s services, it should be borne in mind that that rule, which does not concern the calculation of the fee to be paid to an agent, but determines the person liable to pay such a fee, applies only in the exceptional situation, referred to in Article 12(8) of the FFAR, in which the engaging entity and the individual have given their express consent to that dual representation, which limits its potential harm to competition.

130 Moreover, such a rule may prevent the occurrence of collusive conduct liable to distort supply and demand and, on that basis, produce pro-competitive effects, with the result that it cannot be regarded as revealing, in itself, a sufficient degree of harm to competition for it to be considered that an examination of its effects is not required.

131 Similarly, as regards, seventh, a rule, such as that laid down in Article 14(7) of the FFAR, which provides that the amount of the service fee, calculated as a percentage, must be determined on the basis of the salary actually paid to the individual, calculated on a pro-rata basis, it should be noted that, aside from the fact that such a rule does not prevent competition on price or on the basis of any of the other decisive parameters on which competition is established, that rule does not appear to be sufficiently harmful to competition on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches from one entity to another. On the contrary, that rule appears to be such as to promote competition in the employment market for such individuals, in so far as it encourages agents to endeavour to ensure that their clients actually receive their remuneration.

132 That said, it should be noted that, with regard to the latter rule, the referring court also refers to Article 14(12) of the FFAR, which, in reality, lays down a separate rule, under which a football players’ or coaches’ agent is not entitled to receive a service fee which is not yet ‘due’ deriving from a negotiated employment contract where the individual is transferred to another engaging entity before that contract expires, or where the individual terminates his or her negotiated employment contract prematurely without just cause, whereas the agent still represents the individual at the time of that termination.

133 If the term ‘due’, referred to in Article 14(12) of the FFAR, were to be interpreted, in the light of the context in which it is used, as meaning ‘accrued’ or ‘payable’, which it is for the referring court to determine, it would follow that the expression ‘not yet due’ should be understood as relating to the fee to which the agent is entitled by reason of a previous transfer of the individual concerned to the entity with which he or she had concluded a contract before that contract was terminated.

134 Such an interpretation of the term ‘due’ would have the consequence that an agent who was involved in a first transfer would lose part of the remuneration due to him or her in respect of that transfer if, in accordance with Article 14(12)(a) of the FFAR, the individual thus transferred was transferred again before the expiry of his or her new employment contract or if, under Article 14(12)(b) of those regulations, that individual terminated his or her employment contract prematurely without just cause, whereas the agent still represents him or her at the time of that termination.

135 It is true that, in so doing, such a rule would be liable to neutralise the incentive that agents who represented an individual in an initial transaction might otherwise have to encourage their clients to terminate their contract as quickly as possible in order to receive a new fee, or even to encourage them to enter into contracts for a relatively short period in order to receive a payment as often as possible, which could contribute to strengthening competition in the employment market for such individuals.

136 However, in so far as Article 14(12)(a) of the FFAR provides, in respect of the situation to which it refers, as the sole condition for its application that the individual must have been transferred to another engaging entity before the expiry of the negotiated employment contract, such a rule would mean that agents who were involved in the individual’s first transfer but have since ceased to represent him or her would automatically be deprived of part of their remuneration if the individual were to be transferred to another entity, even if they had not played any role in that new transfer.

137 Given that such a loss of remuneration would thus be arbitrary, in accordance with the approach adopted by the Court in the judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA (C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824), such a rule must be regarded as constituting a form of coordination which, by its very nature, is injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.

138 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded, with regard to the rules on agents’ remuneration set out in the FFAR, to which the national court refers, that, with the exception of a rule which, such as that which could be inferred from Article 14(12)(a) of those regulations, in the event of the transfer of an individual to a new entity, would deprive agents who were involved in that individual’s previous transfer, but have since ceased to represent him or her, of the remuneration that would have been due to them in respect of that previous transfer, those rules do not fall within the scope of the forms of coordination between undertakings which, by their very nature, would be harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition, with the result that it is still necessary to examine their effects.

– The rules on agent licences

139 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the referring court’s questions do not concern the requirement, as such, to hold a licence issued by FIFA in order to pursue the activity of agent of players, coaches, clubs or single-entity leagues in connection with the recruitment of players or coaches, but concern certain conditions relating to obtaining and renewing such a licence.

140 In order to determine whether such rules constitute a restriction of competition by ‘object’, it is necessary to examine whether they are capable of being linked to a form of coordination which, by its very nature, reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition, with the result that it would not be necessary to examine their effects.

141 In the present case, of the various rules laid down by the FFAR or by other FIFA texts governing the conditions for obtaining and renewing a FIFA licence, the national court refers to only two groups of rules.

142 The first group comprises rules such as those set out in Article 4(2) to Article 16(2)(b) and Article 20 of the FFAR, read in conjunction with Article 8(3), Article 57(1) and Article 58(1) and (2) of the FIFA Statutes, as well as Article 4(2) and Article 84 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which make obtaining and renewing a FIFA licence subject to the condition that applicants and holders of such a licence comply, first, with FIFA’s rules and, by default, Swiss law and, second, submit to the jurisdiction of FIFA, its member associations and the CAS, whose headquarters is in Switzerland.

143 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the mere fact of requiring any economic operator wishing to be involved in transfers falling within FIFA’s ecosystem to comply with the rules of that international sports federation and, in the alternative, the law of the third country in which that federation has its headquarters, as well as submit to the jurisdiction of FIFA, of confederations and member associations or even a specific arbitration body cannot, as such, be regarded as capable of establishing the existence of a restriction of competition by ‘object’.

144 It is only if it were established that FIFA’s substantive rules or those laid down by Swiss law thus rendered applicable are, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition that rules, such as those set out in Article 4(2) to Article 16(2)(b) and Article 20 of the FFAR, read in conjunction with Article 8(3), Article 57(1) and Article 58(1) and (2) of the FIFA Statutes, as well as Article 4(2) and Article 84 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, could, as such, be categorised as restrictions of competition by ‘object’.

145 In the case at issue in the main proceedings, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether that is the case, in so far as the applicants in the main proceedings have raised such a complaint.

146 The second group of rules mentioned by the referring court in its question includes those laid down in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, which require that, in order to obtain a FIFA licence, applicants must never have been convicted, following criminal proceedings, of any of the offences listed therein, or have been the subject of a suspension of two years or more, disqualification or striking off by any regulatory authority or sports governing body on account of a breach of the rules on ethics or professional conduct.

147 In that regard, it is true that such a group of rules makes access to the activity concerned dependent on considerations unrelated to any effort that might be made or any resources that might be committed by the applicant concerned.

148 However, it cannot be held that the rules laid down in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR establish a restriction of competition by ‘object’. As observed in paragraph 101 of the present judgment, only agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices falling under a form of coordination which is sufficiently harmful to the proper functioning of the relevant market may be regarded as constituting such a restriction.

149 The requirement that all applicants must never have been convicted following criminal proceedings, nor, in essence, been the subject of a professional or sporting sanction does not appear to be such as to prevent a significant number of persons from accessing the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches from one entity to another.

150 That is all the more so given that, subject to the verifications to be carried out by the referring court, the requirements set out in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR are capable of being applied in a transparent, objective and non-discriminatory manner (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 177).

151 Consequently, a rule, such as that laid down in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, which makes the grant of a FIFA licence subject to the condition that the applicant has not been the subject of certain criminal convictions or certain sporting sanctions cannot be regarded as establishing a restriction of competition by ‘object’.

– The rules on making an approach

152 It should be noted at the outset that, whilst the referring court refers to rules such as those set out in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, inasmuch as they prohibit players’ agents from approaching or entering into a representation agreement with a client who is already bound by an exclusive representation agreement with another agent, it is clear from the wording of those provisions that they do not absolutely prohibit agents from approaching such a client or entering into such an agreement. First, they limit to a period of two months preceding the expiry of the exclusive representation agreement the period during which those agents may approach a client who is bound by such an agreement and, second, they prohibit agents from entering into an agreement with such a client outside that two-month period.

153 In that regard, it cannot be ruled out that the obligation imposed on all agents wishing to enter into an exclusive representation agreement with a club, single-entity league or a player to negotiate the conclusion of such an agreement during the same period may promote greater comparability of offers and, consequently, lead to the setting of a price that more accurately reflects the mechanisms of supply and demand on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches.

154 Admittedly, at the same time, rules, such as those referred to in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, are likely to enhance contractual stability, that is to say the effectiveness of the duration of exclusive representation agreements which have already been concluded. However, provided that the duration of an exclusive representation agreement is not manifestly excessive, such rules cannot, in themselves, be regarded as falling within the scope of a form of coordination between undertakings which, by its very nature, reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition.

155 Whilst any agreement of a certain duration is liable to prevent an optimal adjustment of supply and demand, that factor must be balanced with the need for every economic operator to have predictability so that it can organise its activity.

156 In the present case, it is clear from the wording of Article 12(3) of the FFAR that a representation agreement concluded between an individual and an agent may not exceed two years, whereas, in respect of a representation agreement concluded between an engaging entity or a releasing agency and an agent, Article 12(5) of those regulations does not provide for any maximum period of validity.

157 That said, in so far as those provisions do not, conversely, require such agreements to have a minimum duration, it must be noted that the impact on competition of rules which, such as those mentioned by the referring court in its question, limit the period during which agents may approach a client and enter into a new agreement with him or her depends on the prevailing practice in the relevant market as regards the duration of those agreements and the specific characteristics of that market. Therefore, assessing the impact of rules of that nature requires, in principle, an examination of the effects of those rules.

158 However, it should be noted that the rules set out in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR apply only to agents with whom the player, coach, single-entity league or club concerned is not already bound by a representation agreement. Agents who are already bound by an exclusive representation agreement are not required to wait for the two-month period preceding the end of that agreement to renegotiate its terms or enter into a new one. That said, it must be held that such rules confer an advantage on agents who are already bound by an exclusive representation agreement over those who are not, an advantage which is liable to distort supply and demand on the market concerned. Therefore, it appears justified to classify those rules, in so far as they exclude from their scope agents who are already bound by an exclusive representation agreement, as forms of coordination between undertakings which reveal, in themselves, a sufficient degree of harm to competition, such that an examination of their effects is not required.

– The rules organising the collection of certain information on a digital platform operated by FIFA and the communication of part of that information

159 In its question, the referring court mentions, first, the rule laid down in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, which requires agents to upload certain information to a digital platform operated by FIFA and, second, the rule laid down in Article 19 of the FFAR, under which the names and details of agents, the clients they represent, the football agent services provided to each client, any sanctions imposed on agents and clients and details of all transactions involving agents, including the amount of their remuneration, must be made available to clubs, single-entity leagues, players, coaches and agents.

160 With regard to a rule such as that set out in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, it should be noted that the mere fact that those provisions organise the collection of information for the benefit of FIFA, in order to enable FIFA to ensure that the substantive provisions set out in those regulations are duly complied with, cannot be regarded, prima facie, as being, in itself, capable of constituting a restriction of competition. Since FIFA is not active in any of the markets in question, such a mechanism for collecting information does not, in itself – subject to the possible dissemination or use of that information – have any impact on the operation of competition.

161 As regards a rule such as that laid down in Article 19 of the FFAR, it must be noted that that provision organises the disclosure and publication, among the information collected by FIFA, of data relating in particular to the services provided by each agent to each of his or her clients and details of all transactions involving those agents, including the amount of remuneration paid to them. Subject to verification by the referring court, that information is a priori accessible to persons with access rights to the platform operated by FIFA, including, in principle, clubs, single-entity leagues, players, coaches and agents holding a FIFA licence, who constitute the various natural and legal persons operating on the markets in question.

162 Although, in principle, transparency between economic operators is, at least on a non-oligopolistic market, likely to lead to intensification of competition between suppliers, for a market to operate effectively, operators must determine their conduct independently, which presupposes that they are uncertain at least as to the timing, extent and details of any future changes in the conduct of competitors on that market (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Banco BPN v BIC Português and Others, C‑298/22, EU:C:2024:638, paragraphs 53, 54 and 61).

163 Thus, according to the case-law of the Court, an exchange of information may be regarded as constituting, in itself, a form of coordination between undertakings which, by its very nature, is harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition, either where, in the context of that exchange, the information shared can only lead the participants, who are reasonably active and economically rational, tacitly to follow the same course of conduct with regard to one of the parameters on the basis of which competition on the market in question is established, or where that exchange makes it possible, in itself, to reduce such uncertainty in so far as it relates to information which is, first, confidential and, second, strategic (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Banco BPN v BIC Português and Others, C‑298/22, EU:C:2024:638, paragraph 62).

164 ‘Confidential information’ must be understood as information not already known to any economic operator active on the market concerned, while ‘strategic information’ must be understood as information that may reveal, in some circumstances, once combined with other information already known to the participants in an information exchange, the strategy which some of those participants intend to implement with regard to what constitutes one or more parameters in the light of which competition on the market in question is established (judgment of 29 July 2024, Banco BPN v BIC Português and Others, C‑298/22, EU:C:2024:638, paragraph 63).

165 In the present case, first, the information the disclosure and publication of which is organised by Article 19 of the FFAR is for the benefit of the various natural and legal persons operating on the markets in question, namely the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches, and on the employment market for players or coaches, with the result that it cannot be regarded, a priori, as being confidential on those markets. Second, given that such information relates to transactions that have already taken place, it cannot, in principle, reveal the strategy which those persons intend to implement with regard to what constitutes one or more parameters in the light of which competition on those markets is established, with the result that it also cannot, in principle, be regarded as strategic within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraphs 162 to 164 of the present judgment, unless, on account of certain specific features of those markets or of the sector of activity concerned, it appears possible to infer the future conduct of those persons on those same markets, which is for the referring court to ascertain.

166 As regards the possibility of considering that, in the context at issue in the main proceedings, the making available of such information is capable of leading all reasonably active and economically rational persons with access to it to adopt the same course of conduct with regard to one of the parameters on the basis of which competition on the market in question is established, it should be borne in mind that such a possibility depends not only on the nature of the information thus disseminated, but also on the specific characteristics of the market and, in particular, the number of undertakings active on it.

167 In particular, while it is true that, on a highly concentrated market, an exchange of information on prices charged may encourage collusive conduct, the fact remains that, on a market characterised by a spread of market participants, the disclosure and publication of such information may, conversely, help to stimulate competition.

168 In the present case, the referring court does not appear to consider that the markets in question are highly concentrated, which is a matter for it to verify.

169 Consequently, even if a rule, such as that laid down in Article 19(e) of the FFAR, provides that FIFA is to make available detailed information concerning all transactions involving football agents, including the service fee amounts paid to agents, the fact remains that, in so far as, first, that information concerns only past transactions and, second, the markets concerned do not appear to be highly concentrated – a point which it is, however, for the referring court to verify – such an obligation does not appear to be capable of being regarded as falling within the scope of a form of coordination between undertakings which, by its very nature, may be regarded as harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition.

– Interim conclusion

170 It follows from all the foregoing that, of the various categories of rules identified by the referring court in its question, only two of them are capable of being regarded, in the light of the information available to the Court and subject to verification by the referring court, as constituting restrictions of competition by ‘object’, namely:

– a rule such as that contained in Article 14(12)(a) of the FFAR, in so far as it must be understood as meaning that a football players’ or coaches’ agent cannot claim the portion of the service fee not yet due which would otherwise have been payable on account of the transfer of an individual, where that individual is subsequently transferred to another entity before the employment contract relating to the first transfer expires, even though the agent has since ceased to represent that individual and has played no role in that new transfer, and

– rules, such as those referred to in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, which, first, limit to a period of two months preceding the end of the exclusive representation agreement the period during which a players’ or coaches’ agent may approach a client who is already bound by such an agreement with another agent and, second, prohibit the agent from entering into an agreement with that client outside that period, in so far as they exclude from their application agents who are already bound by an exclusive representation agreement, since those agents are not required to wait for the two-month period preceding the end of that agreement to renegotiate its terms or enter into a new one.

(iii) Categorisation of the existence of conduct having as its effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition

171 The concept of conduct having an anticompetitive ‘effect’ comprises any collective conduct which cannot be regarded as having an anticompetitive ‘object’, provided that it is demonstrated that that conduct has as its actual or potential effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, which must be appreciable (judgment of 21 December 2023, Royal Antwerp Football Club, C‑680/21, EU:C:2023:1010, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

172 To that end, it is necessary to assess the way the competition would operate within the actual context in which it would take place in the absence of the agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice in question, by defining the market(s) in which that conduct is liable to produce its effects, then by identifying those effects whether they are actual or potential. That assessment itself entails that all relevant facts must be taken into account (judgment of 21 December 2023, Royal Antwerp Football Club, C‑680/21, EU:C:2023:1010, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

173 However, the Court cannot, in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, determine whether, in the absence of the rules at issue, competition on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches from one entity to another or on the employment market of players or coaches would be more intense, since such an assessment necessarily requires account to be taken of factual considerations, which are outside its jurisdiction.

174 Consequently, it is for the referring court to determine whether, in the context of the case in the main proceedings, the rules referred to in its question, which it found not to be capable of being classified as restrictions of competition by ‘object’, may nevertheless constitute a restriction of competition by ‘effect’.

(iv) Whether a possible restriction of competition by ‘object’ or ‘effect’ may be justified

175 Where it is found that a measure contained in an agreement between undertakings, in a decision by an association of undertakings or in a concerted practice has, in whole or in part, either the object or the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition, that measure may nevertheless escape the principle laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, under which restrictions of competition by object or effect are prohibited, if it falls within the exception laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU or, in the case of coordination having the effect of restricting competition, if it pursues an objective in the public interest and meets the requirements set out in the case-law of the Court.

– Whether particular conduct may be regarded as falling outside the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU because it pursues an objective in the public interest

176 According to the case-law of the Court, not every agreement between undertakings, decision of an association of undertakings or concerted practice which restricts the freedom of action of the undertakings party to that agreement or subject to compliance with that decision necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. Indeed, the examination of the economic and legal context of which certain of those agreements and certain of those decisions form a part may lead to a finding, first, that they are justified in whole or in part by the pursuit of one or more legitimate objectives in the public interest which are not per se anticompetitive in nature; second, that the specific means used to pursue those objectives are genuinely necessary for that purpose; and, third, that, even if those means prove to have an inherent effect of, at the very least potentially, restricting or distorting competition, that inherent effect does not go beyond what is necessary for achieving those objectives, in particular by eliminating all competition (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 183 and the case-law cited, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 36).

177 However, that case-law does not apply in situations involving conduct which, far from merely having the inherent ‘effect’ of restricting competition, at least potentially, by limiting the freedom of action of certain undertakings, reveals a degree of harm in relation to that competition that justifies a finding that it has as its very ‘object’ the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 186, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 37).

178 The degree of harm of that conduct in relation to competition, and therefore the direct or indirect harm to users and to intermediate or end consumers in the various sectors or markets concerned, is too great for it to be regarded as justified and proportionate (judgment of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 92).

179 Moreover, in the light of the requirement that that conduct must be necessary and proportionate, it is important to note that, as is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, the examination thereof involves, first of all, a determination of whether the specific means used in a given case to pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest are suitable for ensuring achievement of that objective; next, an assessment of whether the use of those means is necessary for achieving that objective, which requires that there are no other measures which would be equally effective for that purpose while being less restrictive of competition; and, lastly, making sure that the restrictive effects caused by the measures adopted are not disproportionate to such an objective, in particular by eliminating all competition on the market concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 98, and of 9 July 2026, ROGON and Others, C‑428/23, EU:C:2026:563, paragraph 38).

180 While it is for the referring court to determine whether the objectives put forward by FIFA to justify the rules at issue are capable of satisfying those conditions, the Court nevertheless considers it necessary, in order to provide that court with a useful answer, to set out the following considerations.

181 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraph 170 of the present judgment that, with the exception of the two rules specifically referred to in that paragraph, the other rules mentioned by the referring court in its question cannot be regarded as constituting a restriction of competition by ‘object’, with the result that the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 above is potentially applicable to them.

182 Moreover, in so far as, in its written pleadings, FIFA relies, principally, on the fact that some of the rules at issue seek to remedy certain market anomalies, relating to, inter alia, an asymmetry of information between players’ agents and their clients, the existence of a negotiating ‘window’ of limited duration, which creates an incentive for ‘hold-up’ strategies, the existence of exclusive relationships between agents and their clients giving rise to ‘gate-keeper’ situations and a lack of transparency concerning agents’ remuneration, it should be noted that such objectives cannot be classified as being in the public interest, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment.

183 In the same way that grounds of a purely economic nature cannot constitute overriding reasons in the public interest justifying a restriction on a freedom of movement guaranteed by the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 251 and the case-law cited), the objectives which may be relied on by an association of undertakings on the basis of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment must not be of a purely economic nature.

184 That said, although an objective of a purely economic nature can neither constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying an obstacle to a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the FEU Treaty nor be relied on the basis of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, the fact that legislation is dictated by one or more economic reasons does not preclude such legislation from being justified if it appears that, on those grounds, it ultimately pursues one or more legitimate non-economic objectives in the public interest (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 October 2013, Essent and Others (C‑105/12 to C‑107/12, EU:C:2013:677, paragraphs 51, 52 and 57), and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 123).

185 Where the existence of such a situation is alleged, it is for the competent national court to verify that, on the economic grounds which dictate it, the legislation at issue actually pursues the legitimate public interest objectives relied on to justify it (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 October 2013, Essent and Others, C‑105/12 to C‑107/12, EU:C:2013:677, paragraphs 57 and 66, and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 123). In that context, that court must also satisfy itself that those objectives are not diverted from their specific function to serve, in fact, purely economic ends (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2000, Église de scientologie, C‑54/99, EU:C:2000:124, paragraph 17, and of 13 July 2023, Xella Magyarország, C‑106/22, EU:C:2023:568, paragraph 66).

186 It should be borne in mind, moreover, that, in the same way as for all the conditions required in order to benefit from the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, it is for the party relying on the existence of such legitimate objectives in the public interest to prove that those objectives are genuine though convincing arguments and evidence (judgment of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

187 In the present case, FIFA also contends that the FFAR pursue, as is apparent, moreover, from Article 1(2) of those regulations, objectives which are not purely economic, such as, inter alia, setting minimum professional and ethical standards, protecting clients against conduct by agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity, protecting players who lack experience or information relating to the football transfer system, or enhancing contractual stability between clubs, players and coaches.

188 The first three objectives referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment constitute legitimate objectives in the public interest, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of this judgment, which, in the light of what has been stated in paragraph 81 of this judgment, may be pursued by a sports association (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 12 December 1996, Reisebüro Broede, C‑3/95, EU:C:1996:487, paragraph 31, and of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 183). The same is true of the last of those objectives, relating to enhancing contractual stability, in so far as it relates to the need to ensure the stability of teams during a single sporting season (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraphs 100 to 102, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 96).

189 It is true, as observed by the referring court, that such objectives are not directly linked to the organisation of sporting competitions. Nonetheless, that fact is not relevant for the purposes of applying the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, since that case-law is not, after all, specific to sport (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters and Others, C‑309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraphs 97 to 110).

190 However, it is for the referring court to determine whether the regulations at issue in the main proceedings actually pursue objectives such as those referred to in paragraph 187 of the present judgment and whether those objectives are not diverted from their specific function to serve, in fact, purely economic ends.

191 If that were to be the case, it would be for the referring court to assess, for each of the rules at issue in the main proceedings, whether that rule is appropriate for pursuing one of those objectives and is necessary for that purpose. The Court nevertheless considers it useful to provide that court with some guidance for the purposes of that assessment.

192 In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that the rules restricting multiple representation, such as those set out in Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR, appear appropriate for attaining the legitimate objective in the public interest relied on by FIFA, relating to the protection of agents’ clients against any conduct by those agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity. By limiting the situations in which an agent may find himself or herself faced with a conflict of interest, such rules reduce the risk of such conduct.

193 Next, while, in order to pursue that objective, FIFA could have adopted other measures which are less restrictive of competition, such as imposing obligations of transparency or information on agents or the requirement to obtain the written consent of the parties concerned, it should be noted that the documents before the Court do not make it possible to determine whether those measures would have been as effective in protecting the agents’ clients against the risk of a conflict of interest. It is therefore for the referring court to ascertain whether or not FIFA could have had recourse to other measures which made it possible to achieve that objective as effectively while being less restrictive of competition.

194 Lastly, the rules restricting multiple representation mentioned by the referring court in its question do not appear to be such as to give rise to restrictive effects on competition that are disproportionate to the objective pursued, as set out in paragraph 192 of the present judgment. Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR merely requires informed consent in situations where potential conflicts of interest are less serious, in particular between players or coaches, on the one hand, and engaging entities, on the other, and prohibits dual representation only in cases where the existence of a conflict of interest is manifest, such as in the case of dual representation of a player or coach and the releasing entity, the releasing entity and the engaging entity, or where the agent intends to represent all the parties to the same transaction.

195 Consequently, as long as the referring court finds that there were no other means less harmful to competition capable of achieving as effectively the objective of protecting agents’ clients against possible conflicts of interest on the part of the latter, rules, such as those set out in Article 12(8) to (10) of the FFAR, intended to restrict multiple representation, appear capable of falling within the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment.

196 As regards, in the second place, the rules on the remuneration which an agent may claim in respect of the recruitment of a player or coach and, in particular, the rule setting a dynamic remuneration cap laid down in Article 15(2) of the FFAR, FIFA submits, as its principal argument, that they pursue the objective of remedying certain market anomalies, including, in particular, those set out in paragraph 182 of the present judgment. Thus formulated, such an objective appears to be purely economic, with the result that it cannot in itself justify the application of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment.

197 That said, it is apparent from FIFA’s observations that FIFA also claims that those rules pursue some of the objectives referred to in Article 1(2) of the FFAR, which include, in particular, those relating to the protection of clients against conduct by agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity and the protection of players who lack experience or information relating to the football transfer system. As has been found in paragraph 188 of the present judgment, such objectives are legitimate objectives in the public interest within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, which may be pursued by a sports federation.

198 Subject to verifications, which it falls to the referring court to carry out, as to whether those rules do in fact ultimately pursue the objectives referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment and whether those objectives are not diverted from their specific function to serve, in fact, purely economic ends, the following observations must be made with regard to the various rules at issue.

199 As regards, first, the rule establishing a dynamic remuneration cap, referred to in Article 15(2) of the FFAR; second, the rule prohibiting agents representing an individual from agreeing on their fee otherwise than on the exclusive basis of the remuneration of the transferred individual and, for agents representing the releasing entity, on the exclusive basis of the transfer compensation, laid down in Article 15(1) of the FFAR; and, third, the rule that the amount of the service fee must be determined on the basis of the salary actually paid to the individual, provided for in Article 14(7) of the FFAR, they appear to be capable of achieving, at the very least, the legitimate objective in the public interest of protecting clients against conduct by agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity. Such rules are capable of preventing situations in which agents would be motivated to act in an interest separate from that of their clients and, therefore, reducing the risk that they are faced with a conflict of interest.

200 The same is true of the rule laid down in Article 14(10) of the FFAR prohibiting an engaging entity, where an agent acts both on behalf of that entity and for an individual, from paying more than 50% of the total remuneration due, the rule laid down in Article 14(2) and (3) of those regulations prohibiting third parties from paying the remuneration due, and the rule laid down in Article 16(3)(e) of those regulations, read in conjunction with Article 18ter of the RSTP, prohibiting agents from receiving, for the transfer of an individual, remuneration whose basis for calculation depends on the future transfer compensation which the engaging entity will receive in respect of a subsequent transfer of that individual.

201 As regards the rule laid down in Article 15(3) and (4) of the FFAR establishing a presumption that other services which an agent, or another agent who is connected to the former, performs in the 24 months prior to or following the provision of his or her services as an agent must be regarded as forming part of those agents’ services, that rule serves to ensure that the rule setting a dynamic remuneration cap is not circumvented. It follows that a rule establishing such a presumption must be regarded as pursuing the same objectives as the rule setting a dynamic remuneration cap, including, inter alia, that of protecting clients against conduct by agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity, and as being appropriate for pursuing, at the very least, the latter objective.

202 As long as the referring court finds that those various rules on the remuneration of agents do, in fact, pursue the objectives referred to in paragraph 197 of the present judgment and that they are not diverted from their specific function to serve, in fact, purely economic ends, it will then fall to that court to determine whether it was possible to have recourse to other measures less restrictive of competition which would have made it possible to contribute as effectively to the pursuit of those objectives.

203 Lastly, it will be for the referring court to determine whether or not such rules are liable to give rise to disproportionate restrictive effects on competition.

204 In particular, as regards the introduction of a dynamic cap, which, among the rules on the remuneration of agents mentioned by the referring court in its question, appears most likely to be harmful to competition, it should be noted that, first, that cap is determined in proportion either to the remuneration received by the player or coach where the agent represents an individual or the engaging entity or to the compensation paid by the engaging entity to the releasing entity, where the agent represents the latter and that, in so doing, the operators concerned retain the right to compete both on prices and on any other relevant parameter, such as the quality of the services provided or innovation. Second, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that a limit is provided for on the fees which agents may receive for services distinct from those relating to the transfer, subject to the application of the rebuttable presumption set out in Article 15(3) and (4) of the FFAR.

205 As regards the rule prohibiting third parties from paying the remuneration due under a contract as an agent for players or coaches provided for in Article 14(2) and (3) of the FFAR, the fact, put forward by the referring court in its request for a preliminary ruling, that that rule deprives the players and coaches concerned of the advantage of not having to pay that remuneration themselves does not appear to be such as to permit the inference that that rule would have a disproportionate effect on competition in the light of the objective pursued, which relates, according to FIFA, to protecting agents’ clients against any conduct by agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity, since that same rule is nonetheless such as to prevent players’ or coaches’ agents from being encouraged to act in the interest of the person paying the remuneration to the detriment of the interests of their clients. Such a risk of conflict of interest is likely to have consequences for the latter which are otherwise more significant than the obligation to pay that remuneration themselves.

206 It is nevertheless for the referring court to ascertain whether the rules referred to in paragraphs 204 and 205 of the present judgment, as well as the other rules on the remuneration which an agent may claim, satisfy all the conditions set out in paragraph 176 of the present judgment.

207 In the third place, as regards the rules on agent licences, referred to in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, in so far as they make obtaining that licence subject to the condition that agents have not been the subject of any criminal or disciplinary measures, it is apparent from the order for reference that the purpose of those rules is to define minimum ethical standards and to protect players and coaches, in particular those at the beginning of their career, against abusive practices by agents. Rules such as those appear to be appropriate for attaining those legitimate objectives in the public interest.

208 That said, it is for the referring court to assess, on the basis of all the relevant elements available to it, whether an equivalent level of protection of that objective could not have been achieved by means of measures less restrictive of competition which would have been equally effective and whether the restrictive effects caused by the measures adopted are not disproportionate to such an objective, in particular by eliminating all competition on the market concerned.

209 As regards the rules, mentioned by the referring court in its question, concerning agent licences, which make obtaining and renewing that licence subject to the condition that applicants and holders of an agent licence comply, first, with the FIFA rules and, by default, Swiss law and, second, submit to the jurisdiction of FIFA, its member associations and the CAS, such rules may be regarded as being justified by the objective, relied on by FIFA, of ensuring a better level of protection for agents’ clients and for the agents themselves, in particular by providing, throughout the world, a uniform legal framework, together with a mechanism of supervision by a single decision-making body.

210 Moreover, in so far as they require applicants for and holders of an agent licence to comply with the FIFA rules, those rules on agent licences may be regarded as seeking to guarantee the integrity of the transfer system and of sporting competitions more broadly. Such an objective may be regarded as a legitimate objective in the public interest within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment.

211 It is for the referring court to determine whether the application of the FIFA rules and Swiss law to agents and their being subject to the jurisdiction of the bodies provided for that purpose are such as to produce restrictive effects on competition which are disproportionate with regard to that objective.

212 In the fourth place, as regards the rules on making an approach, set out in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, these do not appear, by contrast, to be capable of being justified by the objective put forward by FIFA. In its written observations, the latter merely claims, on the subject of the objective not being purely economic in nature, that those rules make it possible to determine clearly the period during which agents may approach a player with a view to concluding a representation agreement and during which players may select their agents. However, even if such an objective were to be regarded as akin to a legitimate objective in the public interest, that objective cannot be regarded as being pursued coherently, since, as noted in paragraph 158 of the present judgment, such rules do not apply to agents already bound by an exclusive representation agreement.

213 In the fifth place, as regards the rules set out in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii), and those set out in Article 19(a) to (d) of the FFAR organising the communication of certain information to FIFA and other persons required to apply the FFAR, such rules may, in so far as those regulations themselves pursue certain legitimate objectives in the public interest, be regarded as participating in the implementation of means necessary to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 187 of the present judgment.

214 In so far as those rules require the communication of information in order, first, to enable FIFA to verify compliance with those regulations and, second, to enable the addressees of those regulations to comply with them, they appear to be appropriate for attaining such objectives.

215 In addition, as regards the information referred to in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii), and that referred to in Article 19(a) to (d) of the FFAR, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that there are other measures which would make it possible to achieve that objective as effectively. Moreover, the making available of that information does not appear to be capable of being regarded as liable to have a disproportionate effect on competition. However, it is for the referring court to examine those two aspects in the light of all the relevant elements submitted by the parties to the dispute in the main proceedings.

216 By contrast, as regards the information referred to in Article 19(e) of the FFAR, it should be noted that the particularly broad formulation of that provision, in so far as it refers to the ‘details of all Transactions involving Football Agents’, appears to leave open the possibility that the disclosure of the information thus made is not necessary for the purposes of achieving the objective of ensuring the correct application of the FFAR.

217 In particular, the implementation of such a provision appears to be such as to enable competitors to know the amount of fees paid to agents. While some price transparency is necessary in order to enable agents wishing to approach new clients to offer competitive prices, it should be noted that access to anonymised data, such as the spread of the prices charged by all agents in relation to average prices, might prove sufficient for the purposes of achieving that objective.

218 Consequently, the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment appears to be applicable only to rules such as those set out in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) and Article 19(a) to (d) of the FFAR, whereas it cannot extend to the one laid down in Article 19(e) of those regulations.

– Whether certain conduct may fall within the scope of Article 101(3) TFEU

219 In accordance with Article 101(3) TFEU, any agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice which proves to be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU, whether because of its anticompetitive object or effect, may be exempted where that agreement, decision or practice satisfies the four cumulative conditions laid down in that provision.

220 As is apparent from the very wording of that provision, the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU for an exemption are, first, that the agreement between undertakings, the decision by an association of undertakings or the concerted practice in question contributes to improving the production or distribution of the products or services concerned or to promoting technical or economic progress; second, that it must be demonstrated that an equitable part of the profit resulting from those efficiency gains is reserved for the users; third, that the agreement, decision or practice in question does not impose on the participating undertakings restrictions which are not indispensable for achieving such efficiency gains; and, fourth, that that agreement, decision or practice does not give the participating undertakings the opportunity to eliminate all effective competition for a substantial part of the products or services concerned.

221 The first of those four conditions requires it to be demonstrated with a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement between undertakings, the decision by an association of undertakings or the concerted practice in question makes it possible to achieve efficiency gains (judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 154).

222 In that regard, it follows from the settled case-law that the efficiency gains that the agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice at issue in a given case must make it possible to achieve correspond not to any advantage the participating undertakings may derive from that agreement, decision or practice in the context of their economic activity, but only to the appreciable objective advantages that that agreement, decision or practice makes it possible to attain in the different sector(s) or market(s) concerned. Moreover, in order for that first condition to be considered satisfied, not only must the actual existence and extent of those efficiency gains be established, it must also be demonstrated that they are such as to compensate for the disadvantages caused by the agreement, decision or practice at issue in the field of competition (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

223 Such gains must be quantifiable (see judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 196) in the sense that it must be possible, by means of an analytical framework, to weigh them against the harm revealed, in the context in question, by the form of coordination between undertakings to which the agreement, decision or concerted practice may be linked by reason of its characteristics, or against the actual or potential restrictive effects of that agreement, decision or practice on competition.

224 In the case in the main proceedings, the fact that the rules at issue restrict the right of agents to take advantage of certain market anomalies could imply the existence of efficiency gains on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches from one entity to another or on the employment market of players or coaches. The correction of a market failure is, in principle, capable of generating such economic efficiency gains, which it is nevertheless for the court to ascertain by taking into account all the requirements referred to in paragraphs 219 to 223 of the present judgment.

225 As regards the second condition referred to in paragraph 220 of the present judgment, that condition involves establishing that the efficiency gains made possible by the agreement, decision or practice in question have a positive impact on all users, be they traders, intermediate consumers or end consumers, in the different sectors or markets concerned (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 193).

226 In that regard, it should be noted that, in so far as the concept of ‘all users’ requires an assessment of the existence of such gains, that second condition must be understood as not necessarily requiring that each potential user of the goods or services concerned benefits in the same way from those gains, or even that he or she benefits individually from them, provided that a fair share of the benefit resulting from those gains goes to all those users, considered as a whole.

227 As regards the third condition, to the effect that the conduct at issue must be indispensable or necessary, that condition requires an assessment and comparison of the respective impact, on the one hand, of the agreement, decision or practice in question and, on the other, of the alternative measures which might genuinely be envisaged, with a view to determining whether the efficiency gains expected from that conduct may be attained by measures which are less restrictive of competition (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 197, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 156).

228 As regards the fourth condition, the ascertainment of its observance in a given case involves an examination of the quantitative and qualitative aspects that characterise the functioning of competition in the sectors or markets concerned, in order to determine whether the agreement, decision by an association of undertakings or concerted practice in question gives the participating undertakings the opportunity to eliminate all actual competition for a substantial part of the products or services concerned (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 198).

229 Non-observance of one of those four cumulative conditions suffices to rule out the possibility that the conduct at issue may come within the exemption provided for in Article 101(3) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 208, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 155).

230 It is for the undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of that provision to demonstrate, by means of convincing arguments and evidence, that all of the conditions required for the exemption are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2009, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, C‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 P, C‑515/06 P and C‑519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, paragraph 82).

231 If those arguments and that evidence are such as to oblige the other party to refute them convincingly, it is permissible, in the absence of such refutation, to conclude that the burden of proof borne by the party relying on Article 101(3) TFEU has been discharged (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 191).

232 It follows that, in the case in the main proceedings, in order to be able to benefit from Article 101(3) TFEU, it is for FIFA to demonstrate before the referring court, by means of convincing arguments and evidence, that the adoption of the FFAR generated efficiency gains, whether qualitative or quantitative, likely to arise on the markets concerned by agents’ services, and that those gains are such as to offset, for consumers, all the negative effects resulting from the rules at issue, even if those rules constitute restrictions of competition by ‘object’ or ‘effect’.

233 That said, as regards a rule such as that laid down in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, it should be borne in mind that it follows from paragraph 158 of the present judgment that the prohibition on agents approaching or concluding a representation agreement with a client already bound by an exclusive representation agreement is not applicable to agents who are already bound by an exclusive representation agreement, with the result that that rule confers an undue advantage on those agents. Consequently, it does not appear capable of satisfying the first of the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU, since it cannot be regarded as producing any efficiency gain.

234 Accordingly, it follows from all the foregoing considerations that Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, in so far as, first, the requirements contained in those regulations give rise to restrictions of competition, whether those restrictions are categorised as being by ‘object’ or by ‘effect’ and, second, those restrictions are not capable of satisfying the conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU for benefiting from an exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU or, as regards requirements having the effect of restricting competition, those restrictions do not pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest in the light of which they appear to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense.

(b) The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU

235 It should be recalled at the outset that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU must be interpreted and applied consistently, although in compliance with the specific characteristics of each of those articles (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 119).

236 Under Article 102 TFEU, any conduct attributable to one or more undertakings which occupies a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it which may affect trade between Member States and which consists of the abuse of such a position is incompatible with the internal market and is therefore prohibited.

(1) Whether the conduct in question originates from one or more undertakings

237 In the present case, it is common ground that the FFAR were adopted by FIFA alone. It is true that that entity was regarded, for the purposes of the application of Article 101(1) TFEU, as constituting an association of undertakings. However, that fact does not preclude FIFA from being classified, for the purposes of the application of Article 102 TFEU, as an ‘undertaking’.

238 Since FIFA also pursues its own objectives and, to that end, it is active on a number of markets, such as those for the organisation of sporting competitions, as well as those for sports ticketing, the transfer of television rights, the sale of media partnerships, sponsorship or the marketing of licences for the use of intellectual property rights, that association may be regarded as falling within the classification of an ‘undertaking’ for the purposes of the application of Article 102 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 115).

(2) Holding a dominant position on the internal market or on a substantial part of it

239 According to settled case-law, the concept of ‘dominant position’ refers to a position of economic strength held by an undertaking, or by several undertakings, which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained on one or more relevant markets, which may be distinct from the market on which it derives that power, by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers, its suppliers and, ultimately, consumers (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 December 2012, AstraZeneca v Commission, C‑457/10 P, EU:C:2012:770, paragraph 175).

240 Such economic power on a given market may arise in particular from the fact that an undertaking exercises regulatory and review powers and the power to impose sanctions in respect of a significant part of that market or those markets (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 137).

241 In the present case, it is common ground that FIFA, as the umbrella organisation grouping together the various international and national football confederations and associations, may, on account of the regulatory power conferred on it by that organisation, exercise, in practice, that power with regard to most of the economic activities linked to football and, therefore, on the markets in question, and, by virtue thereof, prevent effective competition from being maintained on those markets.

242 It is true that, unlike the facts which gave rise to the judgments of 1 July 2008, MOTOE (C‑49/07, EU:C:2008:376) and of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company (C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011), FIFA is not itself an operator active on those markets and, in particular, on those likely to be primarily affected by the FFAR, namely the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches and the employment market of professional players or coaches.

243 However, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 137 of his Opinion, that fact does not preclude FIFA from having the power to shape the conditions in which undertakings may access the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches and the employment market of professional players or coaches.

244 Consequently, it must be held that FIFA has a dominant position, within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, on the various markets on which it exercises regulatory and review powers and the power to impose sanctions, in particular those likely to be affected by the application of the FFAR.

(3) The concept of ‘effect on trade between Member States’

245 Since the concept of ‘effect on trade between Member States’ is common to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and in so far as it has been found, in paragraph 95 of the present judgment, that, in the present case, that condition is satisfied for the purposes of the application of Article 101 TFEU, it follows that the same applies with regard to the application of Article 102 TFEU.

(4) Whether there is an abuse

246 As follows from the consistent case-law, the purpose of Article 102 TFEU is to prevent competition from being restricted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, by sanctioning the conduct of undertakings in a dominant position that has the effect of hindering competition on the merits and is thus likely to cause direct harm to consumers, or which causes them harm indirectly by hindering or distorting that competition (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited).

247 Dominant undertakings have a special responsibility, irrespective of the reasons for which they have such position, not to allow their conduct to impair genuine, undistorted competition on the internal market (judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraph 74).

248 Such abuse covers any practice which, through recourse to means different from those governing normal competition between undertakings, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 125 and the case-law cited).

249 However, it is not the purpose of Article 102 TFEU to prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on its own merits, a dominant position on a market, or to ensure that competitors less efficient than an undertaking in such a position should remain on the market (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

250 On the contrary, competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors which are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 127 and the case-law cited).

251 A fortiori, while a dominant undertaking has a special responsibility not to allow its behaviour to impair genuine, undistorted competition on the internal market, Article 102 TFEU does not sanction the existence per se of a dominant position, but only the abusive exploitation thereof (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 128 and the case-law cited).

252 The demonstration that a practice must be classified as an ‘abuse of a dominant position’, which may entail the use of different analytical frameworks depending on the type of conduct at issue in a given case, must however be made in the light of all the relevant factual circumstances (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, paragraph 130 and the case-law cited).

253 The types of conduct capable of constituting an abuse of a dominant position include not only those classified as ‘exclusionary abuse’, that is to say, capable of excluding competitors from one or more of the markets concerned by recourse to means which do not come within the scope of competition on the merits (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 129), but also those classified as ‘exploitative abuse’, consisting, for such an undertaking, in unduly taking advantage of its dominant position on a market to the detriment of its customers or suppliers and, ultimately, consumers, by imposing on them commercial conditions, relating to pricing or otherwise, which would not have been applied if there had been normal and therefore sufficiently effective competition (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 February 1978, United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission, 27/76, EU:C:1978:22, paragraph 249, and of 14 September 2017, Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība, C‑177/16, EU:C:2017:689, paragraph 35).

254 In the present case, the applicants in the main proceedings submit that the rules of the FFAR mentioned by the referring court produce both exclusionary and exploitative effects on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches and on the employment market of players or coaches.

255 First, those rules have the effect of restricting, for agents, players, coaches, clubs and single-entity leagues, access to the first of those markets and, for agents who are already active on it, the possibility of competing effectively, as do they limit, for clubs, the means of competing with each other on the employment market of players or coaches. Second, those rules lead to the imposition on agents of trading conditions different from those which would have prevailed under normal conditions of competition.

256 As regards, in the first place, the existence of possible exclusionary abuses, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 253 of the present judgment, in order for the conduct adopted by a dominant undertaking to fall within that analytical framework, that undertaking must be in actual or potential competition with the undertakings affected by the conduct in question.

257 The analytical framework used for exclusionary abuse turns on an assessment of whether, first, the conduct in question departs from competition on the merits and, second, that conduct may produce actual or potential effects capable of restricting competition, by excluding equally efficient competing undertakings from the market(s) concerned or by hindering their growth on those markets, although the latter may be either the dominated markets or related or neighbouring markets, where that conduct is liable to produce its actual or potential effects (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 129, and of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping), C‑48/22 P, EU:C:2024:726, paragraph 165).

258 According to the Court’s case-law, the first condition to be assessed during that test may be satisfied, inter alia, by demonstrating that the conduct could not be replicated by a hypothetical equally efficient, but not dominant, competitor (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraph 82), while the second requires that the conduct concerned has the effect of excluding a hypothetical equally efficient competitor from the market or markets concerned or of hindering its growth on those markets (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 129 and the case-law cited).

259 That said, the finding of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU on account of exclusionary abuse is not subject to proof that the conduct concerned is capable of excluding such a competitor (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping), C‑48/22 P, EU:C:2024:726, paragraphs 263 and 264).

260 The reference to an equally efficient competitor, in cases where it is relevant, also serves to recall that, in order to satisfy the second condition referred to in paragraph 257 of the present judgment, the actual or potential exclusionary effects produced by the conduct in question must not have been produced solely with regard to less efficient undertakings, since it is common ground that it is not the purpose of Article 102 TFEU to prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on its own merits, a dominant position on one or more markets, or to ensure that competitors less efficient than an undertaking in such a position should remain on the market. On the contrary, competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors which are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation (judgment of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping), C‑48/22 P, EU:C:2024:726, paragraph 164 and the case-law cited).

261 In the case at issue in the main proceedings, it should be noted that FIFA may be regarded as having a dominant position on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches and on the employment market of players or coaches, that position resulting from its regulatory and review powers and the power to impose sanctions in respect of those markets, as mentioned in paragraph 244 of the present judgment.

262 Admittedly, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that FIFA is present, as an undertaking, on either of those markets, or that it intends to carry on an economic activity on those markets in the short or medium term.

263 Nevertheless, FIFA has members which are national football associations, which are themselves groupings of undertakings, such as single-entity leagues and clubs, which carry on different economic activities, among which are principally the organisation of football competitions and participation in them. The pursuit of the latter activity requires that those leagues and clubs operate on the market for recruitment of professional players and coaches and the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches.

264 While the single-entity leagues and football clubs, on the one hand, and the agents present on that market, on the other, may not be regarded as competitors, they nonetheless pursue conflicting economic, commercial and financial interests, in particular as regards the distribution of profits likely to be derived in the event of international transfers of professional players or coaches in which they may be led to participate.

265 Accordingly, in the event that FIFA were to use its regulatory powers and, therefore, the dominant position which it holds in order to limit, steer or regulate the growth of competition on the market for agents’ services in accordance with the economic or competitive interests of single-entity leagues and clubs that are members of the national associations affiliated to it, such conduct could be classified as abuse of a dominant position and, more specifically, exclusionary abuse, even if the effects of that conduct were to manifest themselves on related or neighbouring markets to those on which FIFA carries on its own economic activities. The same would be true if FIFA were to mobilise its powers so as to limit, steer or regulate the growth of competition on that market in accordance with its own economic or competitive interests, including those which can be seen on other markets, such as that of the organisation of certain interclub competitions on which it has a dominant position.

266 However, in order to determine whether that is the case in a case such as that in the main proceedings, it is necessary to carry out a detailed, comprehensive and overall analysis of the conduct in question, which presupposes an examination of the nature, content and actual or potential effects, on the markets concerned, of the rules adopted by such an association with a view to regulating, controlling or sanctioning the various aspects of the economic activities concerned.

267 In the present case, it is for the referring court to carry out such an analysis.

268 As regards, in the second place, the existence of any exploitative abuse, it is important to note that the application of the analytical framework associated with that classification presupposes that, by its conduct, an undertaking in a dominant position has unduly derived profit from that position on a given market, or seeks to do so, to the detriment of its customers, suppliers or other trading partners.

269 In particular, the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position consisting in imposing on its customers or suppliers trading conditions which are unreasonable in relation to the type of transaction or the value of the product or service placed on the market constitutes such abuse (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 September 2017, Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība, C‑177/16, EU:C:2017:689, paragraph 35, and of 18 December 2025, OSA, C‑161/24, EU:C:2025:985, paragraph 29).

270 In the present case, while it is common ground that the agents do not supply any goods or services to FIFA, the fact remains that, in accordance with Article 16(2)(f) of the FFAR, agents wishing to operate on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches are required to pay annual fees to FIFA in order to renew their licence, to which may be added, inter alia, fees to sit the examination required in order to obtain that licence.

271 In addition, more generally, that market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches is itself intrinsically linked to the employment market for players or coaches, two markets on which undertakings such as single-entity leagues and clubs operate and which are members of national football associations, which are themselves grouped together within FIFA and in respect of which FIFA’s regulatory and control powers and the power to impose sanctions are exercised. In those circumstances, agents are subject both to FIFA’s powers and dependent, for the pursuit of their activities, on commercial partners which are themselves indirectly members of FIFA. They may thus be exposed to potential exploitative abuse resulting from FIFA’s use of those powers which it holds.

272 That said, as the Advocate General notes, in essence, in points 127 and 128 of his Opinion, in order to establish, by means of that analytical framework, the existence of such abuse in the circumstances at issue in the main proceedings, it is necessary to demonstrate that the undertaking in a dominant position imposed, in its interest, on its customers or on other trading partners, conditions for the pursuit of their activity which have no objective economic, technical or legal justification.

273 In the case at issue in the main proceedings, the existence of exploitative abuse could thus be established by demonstrating that a reasonably efficient sports federation, in a comparable situation, would have been led to adopt rules different from those at issue, which, while suitable for attaining the objectives pursued, would have been significantly less harmful to the agents’ own interests.

274 It is, in any event, for the referring court to assess, for each of those rules, whether they may be examined by means of the analytical framework applicable to exploitative abuse and to determine whether the various rules referred to by the referring court are capable of constituting abuses of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.

(5) Whether conduct falling within the scope of Article 102 TFEU may be justified

275 Should the applicant succeed in establishing that some of the rules at issue may be classified as ‘abuse of a dominant position’, in so far as they reflect an exploitation by FIFA of its dominant position, for example, on the market for agents’ services with a view to the international transfer of professional players or coaches, or on the employment market for players or coaches, it would be possible for FIFA to seek to justify such conduct. To that end, FIFA could argue either that its conduct falls within the scope of the case-law cited in paragraph 176 of the present judgment or that that conduct is objectively necessary because of specific and legitimate constraints, in particular legal, industrial or commercial constraints (see, by analogy, judgments of 14 September 2017, Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība, C‑177/16, EU:C:2017:689, paragraph 60, and of 25 February 2025, Alphabet and Others, C‑233/23, EU:C:2025:110, paragraphs 71 and 74), or demonstrate that the negative effects likely to result from that conduct for consumers are counterbalanced or even outweighed by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 202).

276 As regards, first, the case-law cited in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, it should be noted that its application is subject, in the context of the application of Article 102 TFEU, to the same conditions as those recalled in paragraphs 176 to 179 of this judgment with regard to the implementation of Article 101 TFEU.

277 In particular, that case-law cannot apply to conduct which, irrespective of which legitimate objectives in the public interest could be relied on in support thereof, by its very nature infringes Article 102 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 185).

278 Second, as regards the possibility for an undertaking to rely on the fact that its conduct is objectively necessary because of specific and legitimate constraints, it should be borne in mind that the situations which the case-law has already recognised as capable of characterising the existence of such constraints include, inter alia, the existence of legitimate requirements, such as the need to face particular commercial or technical constraints (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 3 October 1985, CBEM, 311/84, EU:C:1985:394, paragraph 26, and of 25 February 2025, Alphabet and Others, C‑233/23, EU:C:2025:110, paragraph 73).

279 In the present case, it is for the referring court to determine whether the existence of such a situation has been demonstrated by the applicants in the main proceedings.

280 If that were the case, that court will still have to verify that the conduct of the undertaking in question, in the present case, FIFA, remained proportionate, which presupposes, in a similar manner as required by the application of the case-law referred to in paragraph 179 of the present judgment, that that conduct was, first, capable of responding to those constraints, second, necessary for that purpose and, third, that it did not lead to an interference with competition disproportionate to the consequences that would have resulted from the failure to respond to those constraints, in particular by eliminating all competition.

281 As regards, third, whether possible abuses of a dominant position may be justified by the fact that the negative effects on consumers resulting from the conduct at issue are counterbalanced or even outweighed by efficiency gains which also benefit them, it should be borne in mind that that is subject to the same conditions as those laid down for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, as set out in paragraphs 176 to 179 of the present judgment.

282 In the present case, if it were to be established that the applicants in the main proceedings discharged their burden of proof in demonstrating the existence of an abuse of a dominant position, it will then be for the referring court to assess whether the arguments put forward by FIFA to justify those rules, whether on the basis of the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of the present judgment, the existence of efficiency gains or their objective necessity in the light of specific constraints, are well founded.

283 It follows from all of the foregoing that Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, where, first, that federation has binding rule-making power over a significant part of the relevant market and the requirements set out in those regulations are capable of constituting an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and, second, such requirements do not pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest in relation to which they appear to be adequate, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense, are not objectively necessary on account of specific and legitimate constraints, in particular of a legal, industrial or commercial nature, and do not generate efficiency gains benefiting consumers such as to offset the negative effects they entail for those consumers.

3. The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 56 TFEU

284 Under Article 56 TFEU, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the European Union are prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.

285 Even though that provision is principally addressed to Member States, it may nevertheless apply where a group or organisation exercises a certain power over individuals and is in a position to impose on them conditions equivalent to those which a Member State would itself be in a position to impose on them (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 1974, Walrave and Koch, 36/74, EU:C:1974:140, paragraph 17; of 11 April 2000, Deliège, C‑51/96 and C‑191/97, EU:C:2000:199, paragraph 47; and of 13 June 2019, TopFit and Biffi, C‑22/18, EU:C:2019:497, paragraph 39).

286 Article 56 TFEU is therefore capable of precluding any regulations adopted by an international sports body which obstruct the exercise of that freedom by prohibiting, impeding or rendering less attractive, for any providers in one Member State, the pursuit of their activities in another Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais, C‑325/08, EU:C:2010:143, paragraph 33, and of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 247 and the case-law cited), unless such regulations are justified.

(a) Whether there is an obstacle

287 In the present case, it is common ground that the FFAR apply in all Member States.

288 However, the fact remains that, following the adoption of the rules at issue by FIFA, agents established in certain Member States may now be prevented from providing some of their services to certain current or potential clients established in the territory of other Member States where, in the past, that activity was not regulated or was subject to less stringent requirements. That is the case as regards the rules restricting multiple representation, the rules on agent licences in so far as they make granting of such a licence subject to the condition that agents have not been the subject of any of the criminal or disciplinary measures referred to in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, and the rules on making an approach laid down in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR.

289 By contrast, as regards rules on agents’ remuneration, mentioned by the referring court in its question, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, rules do not constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services, within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU, solely by virtue of the fact that less strict or more commercially favourable rules could have applied if those rules had not been adopted (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 March 2011, Commission v Italy, C‑565/08, EU:C:2011:188, paragraph 49, and of 8 June 2023, Fastweb and Others (Time frame for billing), C‑468/20, EU:C:2023:447, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).

290 Consequently, the rules on remuneration mentioned by the referring court in its question cannot be regarded as imposing a restriction on that freedom to provide services solely because they regulate the remuneration of agents and coaches or the methods for calculating or paying that remuneration. It is for the referring court to determine whether, in the light of the arguments put forward by the applicants, they may constitute such a restriction for another reason.

291 As regards the rules governing the collection of certain information on a digital platform operated by FIFA and the communication of some of that information to other agents, clubs, single-entity leagues, coaches and players, mentioned by the referring court in its question, those rules appear not to be capable of constituting an obstacle to the freedom to provide services in so far as the effect which such rules may produce on agents providing their services in another Member State is too uncertain and too indirect to be regarded as being capable of hindering that freedom.

292 In that regard, it is apparent from settled case-law that legislation which is applicable to all operators exercising their activity on national territory, the purpose of which is not to regulate the conditions concerning the provision of services by the undertakings concerned and any restrictive effects of which on the freedom to provide services are too uncertain and indirect for the obligation laid down to be regarded as being capable of hindering that freedom, does not contravene the prohibition laid down in Article 56 TFEU (judgment of 22 December 2022, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK, C‑83/21, EU:C:2022:1018, paragraph 45).

293 It should be observed, first of all, that the rules governing the collection of certain information on a digital platform, mentioned by the referring court in its question, do not seem to be intended either to regulate the conditions for exercising the right of undertakings established in another Member State to the freedom to provide services or to prohibit, impede, or render less attractive the exercise, by agents established in other Member States, of that freedom in a way that is sufficiently certain and direct because the information requested is difficult to provide or because the amount of information required is excessive (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 20 June 2024, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Posting of third-country workers), C‑540/22, EU:C:2024:530, paragraph 116), which it is nevertheless for the referring court to ascertain.

294 Next, the rules on agent licences, mentioned by the referring court in its question, which make obtaining and renewing that licence subject to the condition that agents comply with the FIFA rules and, by default, Swiss law, can constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services only if the rules which are thus applicable to agents are themselves such as to dissuade them from carrying out their activity in another Member State.

295 Lastly, as regards the rules on agent licences, which make obtaining and renewing that licence subject to the condition that agents submit to the jurisdiction of FIFA, its member associations and the CAS, it should be noted that the referring court does not sufficiently explain how such rules are, per se, liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise, by agents established in other Member States, of their right to freedom to provide services in the territory of a Member State, with the result that the Court is not in a position to adopt a position in that regard.

(b) Whether there are justifications

296 Given that, as stated in paragraph 288 of the present judgment, some of the rules mentioned by the referring court in its question constitute obstacles to the freedom to provide services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU, it should be borne in mind that measures of non-State origin may be permitted even though they impede a freedom of movement enshrined in the TFEU, if it is proven, first, that their adoption is justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest which is other than of a purely economic nature and, second, that they observe the principle of proportionality, which entails that they are suitable for ensuring the achievement of that objective and do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 251 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 95).

297 As regards the condition relating to the suitability of such measures, it should also be borne in mind that measures may be held to be suitable for ensuring achievement of the aim relied on only if they genuinely reflect a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 251 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 95). As regards the requirement for those measures to be necessary, it must be ascertained that there was no alternative measure which would have been less restrictive, while equally effective in achieving the objective pursued (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility Package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraph 824, and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 208).

298 Lastly, similarly to situations involving a measure of State origin, once the applicant or applicants have established that measures of non-State origin constitute an obstacle within the meaning of the FEU Treaty. it is for the party who introduced those measures to demonstrate that they satisfy the cumulative conditions referred to in paragraph 296 of this judgment (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 252 and the case-law cited).

299 In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the rules restricting multiple representation mentioned by the referring court in its question, it should be noted that those rules are intended to avoid conflicts of interest and, thus, to protect clients against conduct by agents which is contrary to the ethical requirements applicable to that activity. As stated in paragraph 188 of the present judgment, just as the case-law referred to in paragraph 176 of this judgment may apply in cases involving agreements or decisions taking the form of rules pursuing certain ethical or principled objectives (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 183), the objective of avoiding conflicts of interest must be regarded as constituting a legitimate objective in the public interest capable of justifying an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.

300 In addition, such rules appear appropriate for attaining that objective since they limit the possibility for an agent – or for several agents who are ‘connected’ as a result of being directors, co-owners, shareholders or employees of the same agency, or having a family relationship or having made an arrangement to cooperate – to represent simultaneously both the player and the engaging and releasing clubs involved in a transaction.

301 Moreover, while it would have been possible to implement other measures, such as imposing obligations of transparency and information on agents or the requirement to obtain the written consent of the parties concerned, such measures do not appear to be equally effective in achieving the objective pursued, which it is nevertheless for the referring court to ascertain.

302 As regards, in the second place, the rules on agent licences, in so far as they make granting that licence subject to the condition that agents have not been the subject of any of the criminal or disciplinary measures referred to in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, it is apparent from paragraph 207 of this judgment that they pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest relating to the setting of minimum ethical standards and the protection of players and coaches, in particular those at the beginning of their career, against abusive practices by agents.

303 As regards the rules on agent licences, in so far as they make obtaining and renewing that licence subject to the condition that applicants and holders of such a licence comply, first, with the FIFA rules and, by default, Swiss law, and, second, submit to the jurisdiction of FIFA, its member associations and the CAS, assuming that those rules constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services, it is apparent from paragraph 209 of this judgment that those rules may be regarded as seeking to ensure a better level of protection for agents’ clients and for agents themselves by establishing a uniform legal framework, together with a mechanism of supervision by a single decision-making body. As noted in paragraph 299 of this judgment, such an objective may be regarded as a legitimate objective in the public interest capable of justifying an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.

304 Moreover, in so far as they require applicants and holders of an agent licence to comply with the FIFA rules, the rules on agent licences may be regarded as seeking, ultimately, to guarantee the integrity of the transfer system and of sporting competitions more broadly, and to improve the professional standards applicable to that activity. Such objectives may also be regarded as legitimate objectives in the public interest capable of justifying an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.

305 It is nevertheless for the referring court to assess, in the light of all the relevant elements available to it, whether, by making obtaining and renewing a licence subject to certain conditions, such as those referred to in paragraphs 302 and 303 of the present judgment, the rules on agent licences are appropriate to pursue the objectives referred to in paragraphs 302 and 304 of this judgment, and whether those objectives could be attained by measures less restrictive of the freedom to provide services, for the purpose of Article 56 TFEU.

306 As regards, in the third place, the rules on making an approach, which prohibit agents from approaching a potential client or entering into an agreement with that client outside certain periods, it should be noted that, before the referring court, FIFA justified those rules on the basis of the need to ensure contractual stability between players’ agents and their clients. As the Advocate General stated in point 111 of his Opinion, the pursuit of such an objective, which is different from that of ensuring the continuity of contracts between players and clubs in the interest of the proper conduct of sporting competitions, appears to be of a purely economic nature and, therefore, not capable of justifying an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.

307 It is true that, in its observations before the Court, FIFA also argued that such rules ‘benefit players, who now have a clear period of time during which they may consider various options’. Such an argument may be linked with the legitimate objective in the public interest, referred to in Article 1(2)(e) of the FFAR, of protecting players who lack experience or information relating to the football transfer system.

308 However, the fact remains that, in the present case, the rules at issue protect players and clubs without distinction, even though such an objective concerns only players. Furthermore, as is apparent from paragraph 212 of the present judgment, those rules do not pursue that objective coherently, as they do not apply to agents who are already bound by a representation agreement.

309 Consequently, if, in the present case, the applicants in the main proceedings were to succeed in demonstrating that the rules on making an approach, although apparently neutral, nevertheless constitute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services, such an obstacle could not be justified by either of the two objectives set out in paragraphs 306 and 307 of the present judgment. It is therefore for the referring court to determine whether, having regard to any other objectives put forward by FIFA, such rules may nevertheless be justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest which is not of a purely economic nature and whether they pursue such an objective in compliance with the requirements resulting from the principle of proportionality.

310 It follows that Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents by means of rules which, first, restrict multiple representation by those agents; second, make obtaining the licence needed for the performance of certain transactions subject to the condition that those agents have not been the subject of certain criminal or disciplinary measures; third, make the grant of that licence subject to compliance with substantive provisions which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise, by agents established in other Member States, of their right of freedom to provide services in the territory of a Member State; or, fourth, govern the possibility for certain players’ agents to approach new players with a view to representing them, where those different categories of rules are neither justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest nor proportionate to such an objective.

B. The question referred for a preliminary ruling in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 6 of the GDPR

311 Under Article 2(1) of the GDPR, in terms of its material scope, that regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.

312 That being so, as is apparent from Article 1(1) of the GDPR, that regulation governs the processing of data concerning natural persons only.

313 Consequently, Article 6 of the GDPR can preclude the adoption of rules providing for the processing of personal data only in so far as the data in question concern natural persons, such as, inter alia, agents, players or coaches, and not entities such as clubs or single-entity leagues.

314 As regards the territorial scope of the GDPR, Article 3(2)(a) of that regulation provides that that regulation applies to the processing of personal data of persons who are in the European Union, where that processing is carried out by a controller or processor not established in the European Union, and the processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment is required, to those persons in the European Union.

315 In the present case, the FFAR seek to regulate the professional activities of agents. Consequently, in so far as the processing of personal data provided for by the FFAR concerns economic or sporting activities carried out by natural persons, such as agents, players or coaches, within the European Union, that processing falls within the scope of the GDPR.

316 Any processing of personal data must, subject to the derogations permitted in Article 23 thereof, observe the principles governing the processing of personal data and the rights of the data subject set out, respectively, in Chapters II and III of that regulation. In particular, any processing of personal data must, first, comply with the principles set out in Article 5 of that regulation and, second, satisfy at least one of the alternative lawfulness conditions listed in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2023, Norra Stockholm Bygg, C‑268/21, EU:C:2023:145, paragraph 43).

317 As the Advocate General observed in point 159 of his Opinion, although the referring court has not specified which of the alternative lawfulness conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR are applicable in the case in the main proceedings, it follows both from the information in the request for a preliminary ruling and from the nature of the rules at issue that the applicable condition is that set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of that regulation.

318 That article provides that the processing of personal data is lawful if it is ‘necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data’.

319 According to settled case-law, that provision thus lays down three cumulative requirements, namely, first, that the controller or a third party is pursuing a legitimate interest; second, that processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued; and, third, that the interests or fundamental freedoms and rights of the data subjects do not take precedence over the legitimate interest of the controller or of a third party in processing those data (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 July 2023, Meta Platforms and Others (General terms of use of a social network), C‑252/21, EU:C:2023:537, paragraph 106, and of 9 January 2025, Mousse, C‑394/23, EU:C:2025:2, paragraph 45).

320 As regards, in the first place, the condition relating to the pursuit, by the controller, of one or more ‘legitimate interests’ within the meaning of the GDPR, the Court has held that, in the absence of a definition of the concept of ‘legitimate interest’ in that regulation, it is common ground that a wide range of interests is capable of being regarded as legitimate. In particular, that concept is not limited to interests enshrined in and determined by law (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 January 2025, Mousse, C‑394/23, EU:C:2025:2, paragraph 46), but, as is apparent from recital 47 of the GDPR, such legitimate interest could exist for example where there is a relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller in situations such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller. In general, that concept is distinct from the concept of ‘legitimate objective in the public interest’ referred to in the case-law cited, inter alia, in paragraphs 176 and 296 of the present judgment, as follows from the wording of those paragraphs.

321 As regards, in the second place, the requirement relating to the need for processing personal data for the purpose of attaining the legitimate interest pursued, it is necessary to ascertain whether that legitimate interest could reasonably be achieved just as effectively by other means less restrictive of the fundamental rights of data subjects, in particular the rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), since derogations and limitations in relation to the principle of protection of such data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 January 2025, Mousse, C‑394/23, EU:C:2025:2, paragraphs 28 and 48).

322 In that context, it should also be recalled that the condition relating to the need for processing must be examined in conjunction with the ‘data minimisation’ principle enshrined in Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR, in accordance with which personal data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2024, HTB Neunte Immobilien Portfolio and Ökorenta Neue Energien Ökostabil IV, C‑17/22 and C‑18/22, EU:C:2024:738, paragraph 52, and of 9 January 2025, Mousse, C‑394/23, EU:C:2025:2, paragraph 49).

323 As regards, in the third place, the requirement that the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned by the data protection do not take precedence over the legitimate interests of the controller or of a third party, that condition entails a balancing of the opposing rights and interests at issue which depends in principle on the specific circumstances of the particular case (judgment of 12 September 2024, HTB Neunte Immobilien Portfolio and Ökorenta Neue Energien Ökostabil IV, C‑17/22 and C‑18/22, EU:C:2024:738, paragraph 53).

324 Furthermore, as can be seen from recital 47 of the GDPR, the interests and fundamental rights of the data subjects may in particular override the interest of the data controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect such processing.

325 Moreover, although the fact that the personal data concerned may relate to activities of a professional nature does not, in itself, exclude them either from the protection conferred by the fundamental right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter, or from the protection conferred by the right to the protection of personal data, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Charter and given concrete expression in the GDPR (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 November 2022, Luxembourg Business Registers, C‑37/20 and C‑601/20, EU:C:2022:912, paragraph 38), such a circumstance may nevertheless be taken into account in order to assess whether the interests or fundamental freedoms and rights of the data subject take precedence over the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by a third party, particularly where the legitimate interest relied on relates to the fact that the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller.

326 Although it is ultimately for the referring court to assess whether the rules laid down by the FFAR, as referred to in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) and Article 19 of those regulations, comply with the three requirements referred to in paragraph 319 of the present judgment, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, may provide clarifications to guide the referring court in that assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 January 2025, Mousse, C‑394/23, EU:C:2025:2, paragraph 51).

327 Accordingly, since the referring court’s question refers to the rules mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, it is necessary to provide that court with the necessary criteria for the interpretation of point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR so as to permit it to assess whether the processing of personal data provided for in the abovementioned provisions of the FFAR is compatible with that article.

1. The processing of personal data provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR

328 Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR provides that agents are required to communicate to FIFA various pieces of information that may contain personal data, namely, first, any agreement with a client other than a representation agreement, including but not limited to agreements relating to other services and the information requested on the digital platform operated by FIFA; second, the information requested on that platform concerning the payment of a service fee; third, the information requested on that platform concerning the payment of a fee related to any agreement entered into with a client other than a representation agreement; fourth, any contractual or other arrangement to cooperate in the provision of any services or to share the revenue or profits of any part of their agent services; and fifth, the number of agents that use the same agency and the identities of all its employees.

329 Given that the operation of a digital platform, such as that operated by FIFA, presupposes, subject to verification by the referring court, the use of ‘automated processing’ and ‘filing systems’, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the GDPR, read, as regards that second concept, in conjunction with Article 4(6) of that regulation, in so far as such acts of collection relate to personal data, those acts must be regarded as constituting the processing of personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, with the result that they are subject to the requirements set out in paragraph 319 of the present judgment.

(a) Compliance with the first requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

330 As regards the question whether the processing provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR complies with the first requirement recalled in paragraph 319 of the present judgment, namely that the controller or a third party is pursuing a legitimate interest, it should be noted that FIFA’s justification for such processing is, inter alia, that it is necessary in order to ensure that the data subjects, namely agents and their clients, whether they are clubs, players, coaches or single-entity leagues, comply with the regulatory framework established by FIFA.

331 It should be noted that, in so far as the natural persons whose data agents may provide to FIFA, on the basis of Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, are all involved in competitions organised by FIFA or by confederations or federations affiliated to it, and the data that may be so provided relate to the professional activities of those natural persons carried out in connection with those sporting competitions, it may be considered that there is a relevant and appropriate relationship, within the meaning of recital 47 of the GDPR, between, on the one hand, the parties involved in those competitions and, on the other, FIFA.

332 Consequently, the requirement which FIFA imposes on agents to communicate to it the information referred to in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR in order to ensure that those agents and their clients comply with their obligations under those regulations may be regarded as pursuing a legitimate objective, within the meaning of point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR, provided that the obligations justifying the communication of such information are themselves compatible with the applicable national law and with EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Koninklijke Nederlandse Lawn Tennisbond, C‑621/22, EU:C:2024:858, paragraph 49), which it is for the referring court to verify.

(b) Compliance with the second requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

333 As regards the second requirement referred to in paragraph 319 of the present judgment, relating to the need for processing and compliance with the minimisation principle applicable to the data concerned, it should be noted that, although the items of data referred to in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR are relatively numerous, they appear to be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary to achieve the legitimate interest pursued by the processing at issue, namely to ensure that not only agents, but also other relevant stakeholders, such as clubs, single-entity leagues, players and coaches, comply with the regulatory framework put in place by the FFAR.

334 First of all, it must be observed that the disclosure of every agreement entered into with a client other than a representation agreement, including, but not limited to agreements relating to other services provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) of the FFAR, makes it possible to ensure that the various requirements relating to the content of the representation agreement laid down by those regulations, such as those referred to in Article 12(8) and (9) or Article 15 thereof, are not circumvented by clauses included in agreements entered into by agents and their clients, other than those that are linked to agents’ services and are, in reality, intended to govern their legal relationship with a view to providing such services.

335 It is, however, for the referring court to determine whether other measures might allow an equally effective review of compliance while being less restrictive of the rights of data subjects.

336 Next, it is important to state that the personal data which may be concerned by the disclosure of the information referred to in Article 16(2)(j)(v) and Article 16(2)(k)(ii) of the FFAR appear to be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary to enable FIFA to ensure that agents comply with the obligations arising, on the one hand, from Article 15(3) and (4) and Article 12(10) of the FFAR, and, on the other hand, from Article 11(3) thereof. It is, nevertheless, for the referring court to determine whether other measures might allow an equally effective review of compliance while being less restrictive of the rights of data subjects.

337 Lastly, as regards the processing referred to in points (iii) and (iv) of Article 16(2)(j) of the FFAR, it should be noted that those two provisions do not specify which information must be communicated by agents, but merely refer in that regard to the information requested on the digital platform operated by FIFA. Accordingly, those provisions cannot be regarded as contrary to the GDPR, since they do not in themselves lay down any specific processing requirements, and they refer to FIFA’s adoption of other provisions. The same is true of Article 16(2)(j)(ii) of the FFAR, in so far as it refers to the ‘information requested on the platform’.

(c) Compliance with the third requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

338 As regards the third requirement referred to in paragraph 319 of the present judgment, that the various interests and fundamental rights and freedoms involved must be balanced, it must be held that, although some of the personal data of FIFA-licensed agents, the players and coaches they represent, representatives of the clubs and single-entity leagues concerned and employees of the agencies through which those agents provide their services may be subject to the processing provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, the number of persons concerned by that processing remains relatively limited.

339 In addition, the personal data in question do not relate to the family or personal life of the data subjects, but to the professional activities they carry out within the regulatory framework which is established by FIFA and of which they are presumed to be aware in their capacity as professionals. In those circumstances, those persons can legitimately expect that FIFA will need to process some of their personal data.

340 Moreover, Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR seeks to ensure the correct application of the FFAR.

341 Such an objective may be regarded as being of considerable importance to FIFA.

342 Consequently, subject to the assessment which, as is apparent from paragraph 326 of the present judgment, is to be carried out by the referring court, that court could consider that the processing of personal data provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR is based on a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests and fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects and, on the other, the legitimate interests pursued by the controller.

343 Hence, provided, furthermore, that the referring court has established that the rules at issue do not infringe any provision of EU law or of the applicable national law, that provision could therefore be regarded as compatible with point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR.

344 It is important, however, to point out that that consideration is without prejudice to the compliance with the GDPR of some personal data processing operations the precise content of which is not specified in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, such as those relating to information requested by the digital platform operated by FIFA other than those referred to in that provision, given that the assessment of GDPR compliance requires account to be taken of the nature and scope of those data processing operations.

2. The processing of personal data provided for in Article 19 of the FFAR

345 In accordance with Article 19 of the FFAR, FIFA is to make available information relating to all agents, including their names and contact details and those of the clients represented by those agents, specifying the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of their representation and the expiry date of the representation agreement concerned, the agent services provided to each client, any sanctions imposed on agents and their clients, as well as details of all transactions involving agents, including the service fee amounts paid to them.

346 The making available of such information may be classified as dissemination of personal data within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the GDPR, with the result that it is subject to the requirements referred to in paragraph 319 of the present judgment.

347 As regards Article 19(d) of the FFAR, which requires FIFA to make available any sanctions imposed on agents and their clients, it should be recalled that, under Article 10 of the GDPR, processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences may be carried out only under the control of official authority, unless it is ‘authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects’.

348 Article 10 of the GDPR thus aims to ensure enhanced protection as regards processing which, because of the particular sensitivity of the data at issue, is liable to constitute a particularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter (judgment of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points), C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504, paragraph 74).

349 Since the data to which Article 10 of the GDPR refers relate to behaviour that gives rise to social disapproval, the grant of access to such data is liable to stigmatise the data subject and thereby to constitute a serious interference with his or her private or professional life (judgment of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points), C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504, paragraph 75), even though such a consequence does not pertain to the penalty provided for in respect of that behaviour.

350 In order to ensure the enhanced protection provided for in Article 10 of the GDPR, which is, however, limited to the criminal field alone (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points), C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504, paragraph 78), where the processing of personal data relates to criminal convictions, offences or security measures adopted against the data subject and is not authorised by EU or Member State law, the official public authority under whose control that processing is carried out must itself be required to apply the GDPR and, where appropriate, must be able to incur liability under that regulation, which implies that it must be an official public authority of a Member State.

351 In the present case, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that the processing referred to in Article 19(d) of the FFAR is authorised by EU or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Therefore, if it were to transpire that, in the case at issue in the main proceedings, the sanctions referred to in Article 19(d) of the FFAR fall within the scope of Article 10 of the GDPR, FIFA could not in any event process the data concerned, since such processing would not be carried out under the control of an official public authority of a Member State.

352 It is therefore in the light of that situation, about which the Court has not been asked by the referring court, that it is necessary to examine whether the various processing operations referred to in Article 19 meet the requirements set out in paragraph 319 of the present judgment.

(a) Compliance with the first requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

353 As regards whether all the different personal data processing operations provided for in Article 19 of the FFAR comply with the first requirement referred to in paragraph 319 of this judgment, it should be noted that FIFA contends, inter alia, that those processing operations are intended to enable the various persons on whom the FFAR impose verification obligations to comply with those obligations.

354 Like the objective pursued by the personal data processing operations provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, as mentioned in paragraph 330 of the present judgment, the objective referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment may be regarded as relating to a legitimate interest, provided that the obligations at issue are themselves compatible with EU law and the law of the Member State concerned, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

(b) Compliance with the second requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

355 As regards the second requirement referred to in paragraph 319 of the present judgment, namely that the processing carried out is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued and that the data subject to processing are adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed, it must be held that, since the legitimate interest that FIFA claims to pursue is an interest in enabling the various persons on whom the FFAR impose verification obligations to comply with those obligations, the information referred to in Article 19 of the FFAR which has been disclosed or published should be accessible only to the natural or legal persons who are subject to such obligations, which may require different access arrangements to be put in place depending on the category of persons concerned.

356 In the present case, the FFAR do not specify which category of persons may gain access to the information mentioned in Article 19 of those regulations. However, that lack of precision cannot, in itself, render that article contrary to point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR, if and in so far as the referring court finds that such a lack of precision does not mean that all those categories of persons will have indiscriminate access to all of that information.

357 Furthermore, that lack of precision does not preclude the Court from making observations as to the categories of persons in respect of whom each personal data processing operation provided for in Article 19 of the FFAR could be justified, having regard to the obligations imposed by those regulations.

358 In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that, as regards agents’ names and contact details, referred to in Article 19(a) of the FFAR, the making available of such personal data to other agents may be regarded as adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary to enable them to comply with their obligations under the FFAR, since those data would, in any event, be required should they wish to engage with the agent representing a particular player or coach in order to discuss a possible recruitment.

359 The same is true of the disclosure and publication of those data for the benefit of clubs, single-entity leagues, players and coaches, in so far as it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that there are alternative means by which, in accordance with Article 18(1)(c) of the FFAR, natural and legal persons wishing to be represented by an agent could satisfy themselves that the professional with whom they intend to enter into a representation agreement is actually licensed by FIFA.

360 As regards the identity of the clients represented by each agent, as well as the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the representation agreement and the duration of that agreement, which constitute information that must be made available pursuant to Article 19(b) of the FFAR, it should be noted that making such information available to clubs and single-entity leagues could enable them to comply with Article 18bis of the RSTP.

361 Under Article 18bis of the RSTP, no club is to enter into a contract which enables, inter alia, a third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams. Subject to verification by the referring court, it appears that an agent must be regarded as a third party for the purposes of the application of that article.

362 As regards the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the representation agreement between each agent and his or her clients and the duration of that agreement, making that information available to other agents could satisfy that same requirement, since that information is necessary in order to enable the latter to comply with the rules laid down in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, which govern the possibility for an agent to approach clients who have entered into an exclusive representation agreement.

363 For all of that information, there do not appear to be alternative means which, while less restrictive of the right to respect for private life, guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, and of the right to data protection, guaranteed in Article 8 of the Charter, would be equally effective for the purpose of satisfying those requirements, which it is, however, for the referring court to verify.

364 In the second place, it should be pointed out, first, that the FFAR do not appear to lay down obligations compliance with which requires the disclosure and publication of the information referred to in Article 19 of those regulations for the benefit of natural or legal persons other than agents, players, coaches, clubs and single-entity leagues. Second, irrespective of the identity of the recipient of that information, the making available of data relating to agent services provided to each client, within the meaning of Article 19(c) of the FFAR, sanctions imposed on agents and clients, within the meaning of Article 19(d), and all details of the transactions carried out by each agent, within the meaning of Article 19(e), cannot be regarded as necessary for the purposes of fulfilling any obligation arising from the FFAR.

365 It is true that, under Article 18(2)(e) of the FFAR, agents may not participate or assist, directly or indirectly, in any circumvention of the service fee cap established by those regulations. However, in order to ensure compliance with such an obligation, it is not necessary for other agents to be aware of the services which their competitors provide to their clients nor, a fortiori, of the details of all the transactions in which their competitors have been involved.

366 Similarly, although, under Article 18(1)(g) of the FFAR, the clients that agents represent are required immediately to report any breaches of those regulations to FIFA, the confederations or member associations, such an obligation does not require that specific information must, to that end, be made available to them beforehand.

367 It follows that, subject to the existence of other applicable rules contained in instruments distinct from the FFAR, the objective which FIFA claims to be pursuing, and which is referred to in paragraph 353 of the present judgment cannot, in itself, justify all the personal data processing operations provided for in Article 19 of those regulations.

368 However, it is apparent from Article 1 of the FFAR that those regulations also pursue the interests of setting minimum professional and ethical standards, protecting clients from unethical conduct, and protecting players who lack experience or information relating to the football transfer system. First, the pursuit of those interests by a sports federation could be regarded as legitimate.

369 Second, the making available of information referred to in Article 19(a) to (c) of the FFAR and, therefore, the processing of the personal data gathered as a result of that information being made available, could be regarded as adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary to achieve such legitimate interests.

370 However, even if the FFAR seek to achieve those legitimate interests, the fact that they provide, in Article 19(e) thereof, for the disclosure and publication of all transactions involving agents remains contrary to the principle of data minimisation, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR, since the extent of such processing is not sufficiently circumscribed to ensure compliance with that principle.

371 Lastly, as regards the processing provided for in Article 19(d) of the FFAR, consisting of the disclosure and publication of any sanctions imposed on agents or clients, it should be noted that such processing may be necessary, in that it may constitute a more effective and dissuasive sanction than a fine, in so far as the consequences of disclosing such sanctions are difficult to predict, thus rendering unreliable any cost-benefit assessment of non-compliance with the rule in question. Furthermore, such processing may prove necessary to enable persons who may have been harmed by the breach of the FFAR that led to the sanction to become aware of the matter.

372 It does not appear that there are means less restrictive of the right to respect for private life, guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, and of the right to the protection of personal data, guaranteed in Article 8 of the Charter, which would be equally effective in achieving the legitimate interests pursued. It is, however, for the referring court to ascertain whether other such means may exist, in the form of, for example, limiting the content or the dissemination of the personal data published.

(c) Compliance with the third requirement set out in point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR

373 As regards whether the processing referred to in Article 19(a) to (c) of the FFAR complies with the third requirement referred to in paragraph 319 of the present judgment, that the various interests and fundamental rights and freedoms involved must be balanced, it should be noted that those processing operations concern a limited number of persons and relate exclusively to the professional activities that those persons carry out within the regulatory framework which is established by FIFA and of which they are presumed to be aware in their capacity as professionals.

374 In that context, as regards, in the first place, the processing of personal data provided for in Article 19(a) to (c) of the FFAR, consisting of making available, first, the names and details of all the agents, second, the identity of the clients represented by those agents, including the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of their representation and the expiry date of the representation agreement, and, third, the agent services provided to each client, that processing may be regarded as constituting a proper balance between the legitimate interest pursued and the rights of the persons whose personal data are processed.

375 As regards, in the second place, the disclosure and publication of sanctions imposed on agents and clients, provided for in Article 19(d) of the FFAR, it is true that such data may expose the data subject to a certain form of exclusion.

376 However, that fact cannot, in itself, prevent the legitimate interest of the controller and that of third parties from prevailing over the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms of the agents concerned and their clients.

377 It is true that, in paragraph 92 of the judgment of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points) (C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504), the Court emphasised that, in certain circumstances, drivers of vehicles who have committed a road traffic offence and upon whom a financial or other penalty has been imposed, may be exposed to the risk of stigmatisation if the penalty points imposed on them are publicly disclosed. However, the sanctions at issue in the case which gave rise to that judgment did not relate to the professional activity but to the daily lives of the persons concerned, with the result that their publication was not capable of helping to restore confidence in a particular market, or of enabling the persons who may have suffered harm to become aware of the facts alleged against the person concerned.

378 In the present case, it appears that the processing at issue may be regarded as constituting an element of the sanction itself and also seems to be such as to restore confidence in the markets concerned and facilitate the exercise, by persons who may have suffered harm, of their right to compensation. Such an objective may be regarded as serving interests that outweigh those of the agents who have breached the FFAR, provided that the rules the breach of which led to a sanction are not contrary to EU law.

379 Consequently, despite the risk of exclusion which it may entail, such processing may, in certain situations, constitute a proper balance between the legitimate interest pursued and the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects concerned.

380 However, while it cannot be ruled out that the disclosure of information relating to sanctions of a certain severity may, in the light of the circumstances specific to the acts sanctioned, constitute a proper balance between the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms involved, that is not the case, conversely, as regards the consequences, in that context, of the obligation laid down in Article 19(d) of the FFAR to disclose any sanction imposed on agents and clients.

381 The latter obligation appears to entail an obligation to disclose and publish all the sanctions imposed, irrespective of their severity, of the damage which the acts sanctioned may have caused to confidence in the markets concerned, of any harm suffered by third parties or of the time that has elapsed since the breach in question was committed.

382 In the case at issue in the main proceedings, it does not appear that Article 19 of the FFAR draws a distinction between the sanctions imposed on an agent or his or her clients based on their severity, or that those sanctions would no longer be imposed after a certain period of time has elapsed following the commission of the acts in question.

383 It follows from all of those considerations that [point (f) of] the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, in so far as those regulations provide for the disclosure and publication, by that federation, first, of any sanctions imposed on agents and their clients and, second, of the details of all transactions involving agents, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

384 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that:

– Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, in so far as, first, the requirements contained in those regulations give rise to restrictions of competition, whether those restrictions are categorised as being by ‘object’ or by ‘effect’ and, second, those restrictions are not capable of satisfying the conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU for benefiting from an exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU or, as regards requirements having the effect of restricting competition, those restrictions do not pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest in the light of which they appear to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense;

– Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, where, first, that federation has binding rule-making power over a significant part of the relevant market and the requirements set out in those regulations are capable of constituting an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and, second, such requirements do not pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest in relation to which they appear to be adequate, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense, are not objectively necessary on account of specific and legitimate constraints, in particular of a legal, industrial or commercial nature, and do not generate efficiency gains benefiting consumers such as to offset the negative effects they entail for those consumers;

– Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents by means of rules which, first, restrict multiple representation by those agents; second, make obtaining the licence needed for the performance of certain transactions subject to the condition that those agents have not been the subject of certain criminal or disciplinary measures; third, make the grant of that licence subject to compliance with substantive provisions which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise, by agents established in other Member States, of their right of freedom to provide services in the territory of a Member State; or, fourth, govern the possibility for certain players’ agents to approach new players with a view to representing them, where those different categories of rules are neither justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest nor proportionate to such an objective;

– Point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the GDPR must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, in so far as those regulations provide for the disclosure and publication, by that federation, first, of any sanctions imposed on agents and their clients and, second, of the details of all transactions involving those agents.

Costs

385 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, in so far as, first, the requirements contained in those regulations give rise to restrictions of competition, whether those restrictions are categorised as being by ‘object’ or by ‘effect’ and, second, those restrictions are not capable of satisfying the conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU for benefiting from an exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU or, as regards requirements having the effect of restricting competition, those restrictions do not pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest in the light of which they appear to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense.

Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, where, first, that federation has binding rule-making power over a significant part of the relevant market and the requirements set out in those regulations are capable of constituting an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and, second, such requirements do not pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest in relation to which they appear to be adequate, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense, are not objectively necessary on account of specific and legitimate constraints, in particular of a legal, industrial or commercial nature, and do not generate efficiency gains benefiting consumers such as to offset the negative effects they entail for those consumers.

Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents by means of rules which, first, restrict multiple representation by those agents; second, make obtaining the licence needed for the performance of certain transactions subject to the condition that those agents have not been the subject of certain criminal or disciplinary measures; third, make the grant of that licence subject to compliance with substantive provisions which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise, by agents established in other Member States, of their right of freedom to provide services in the territory of a Member State; or, fourth, govern the possibility for certain players’ agents to approach new players with a view to representing them, where those different categories of rules are neither justified by a legitimate objective in the public interest nor proportionate to such an objective.

Point (f) of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),

must be interpreted as precluding regulations adopted by an international sports federation governing the activity of sports agents, in so far as those regulations provide for the disclosure and publication, by that federation, first, of any sanctions imposed on agents and their clients and, second, of the details of all transactions involving those agents.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: German.